United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northwestern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
R.
DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On
December 13, 2019, the Magistrate Judge entered a Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 17) recommending that the petition for
writ of habeas corpus be dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner
Timothy Wayne Weakley (“Weakley” or
“Petitioner”) has filed objections. (Doc. 18).
The court has considered the entire file in this action,
together with the report and recommendation
(“R&R”), and has reached an independent
conclusion that the report and recommendation is due to be
adopted and approved.
The
Magistrate Judge concluded that Weakley's petition, which
challenges a state sentence imposing an obligation on Weakley
to pay restitution through his then-pending Chapter 13
bankruptcy proceeding, did not present a cognizable claim
because it only alleged violations of state law.
(See Doc. 17). In addition to making enumerated
objections, Weakley focuses on the Magistrate Judge's
statement that Weakley “has potentially presented a
viable claim for habeas relief, ” arguing it
contradicts the Magistrate Judge's later conclusion that
Weakley “does not raise a claim for habeas relief at
all.” (Doc. 18 at 3-4). However, Weakley misreads the
Magistrate Judge's R&R.
Weakley
initially focuses on the Magistrate Judge's conclusion
that Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that a habeas
petitioner may not challenge the legality of the restitution
portion of his sentence. Contrary to his assertion, this
reference does not mean that Weakley's claim, which
includes a suspended prison sentence, was not cognizable in a
habeas petition due to a failure to meet the habeas “in
custody” requirement. (Doc. 17 at 5-6). Indeed, the
Magistrate Judge assumed that he could.[1] Further, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that, regardless of whether
Weakley had presented a cognizable claim based on the
relief he seeks, the underlying claim itself is not
cognizable because Weakley alleges only violations of state
law. (Id. at 6-8). Again, contrary to his
contentions, the Magistrate Judge's findings are not
inconsistent with the R&R's recommendations, as
Weakley claims.
Turning
next to Weakley's enumerated objections, he first argues
that the State of Alabama created a liberty interest subject
to due process analysis when it imposed a restitution
obligation, and that the Magistrate Judge should have
analyzed it as such rather than concluding Weakley alleged
only a violation of state law. (Doc. 18 at 6-7). “When
. . . a State creates a liberty
interest, the Due Process Clause requires fair procedures for
its vindication-and federal courts will review the
application of those constitutionally required
procedures.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216,
220 (2011). But “a State creates a protected liberty
interest by placing substantive limitations on official
discretion.” Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462 (1989) (quoting Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983)). Weakley did not
identify in his petition, and has not identified in his
objections, how any official discretion was limited by his
restitution obligation such that it would have created a
liberty interest under the Constitution. The Magistrate Judge
did not err in finding that Weakley's petition concerns
only a violation of state law, which cannot support habeas
relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67
(1991).
Weakley's
second objection concerns the Magistrate Judge's
quotation from a particular portion of Carrizales v.
Wainwright, 669 F.2d 1053 (11th Cir. 1983):
“federal habeas relief is available only if the
petitioner alleges and proves that his conviction contravenes
federal law.” (Doc. 18 at 9). Weakley contends this
reference shows the Magistrate Judge did not consider his
petition, as he is attacking only his sentence rather than
his conviction. (Id. at 9-10). But, the Magistrate
Judge's analysis tracks Weakley's claims and
specifically refers to his sentence. (See, e.g.,
Doc. 17 at 6 (“Weakley has potentially presented a
viable claim for habeas relief notwithstanding his challenge
nominally attacks the restitution portion of his
sentence”), 8 (“None of this points to illegality
in Weakley's plea agreement or sentence apart from an
arguable violation of state law.”)). Weakley's
second objection is meritless.
In his
third and fourth objections, Weakley argues that the
Magistrate Judge did not adequately address whether the
restitution order “chills, burdens or frustrates [his]
substantive constitutional right to voluntarily dismiss his
bankruptcy at any time” (Doc. 18 at 11-12), and that
the Magistrate Judge erred by concluding Weakley was not in
custody in violation of federal law because the restitution
order blocked that right (id. at 14-17). Weakley
does not point to any authority to support that a right to
dismiss a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition is constitutional in
nature. In fact, any right to dismiss a Chapter 13 petition
is statutory - it is wholly a creation of the bankruptcy code
itself. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) (“On
request of the debtor at any time, if the case has not been
converted under section 706, 1112, or 1208 of this title, the
court shall dismiss a case under this chapter. Any waiver of
the right to dismiss under this subsection is
unenforceable.”). That Weakley has a statutory right
under the bankruptcy code to dismiss his Chapter 13 petition
does not mean that exercising that right exempts him from the
consequences of doing so, nor does it make those consequences
a matter of constitutional import solely because they might
result in the imposition of a suspended sentence. Neither of
these objections hold water.
Weakley's
fifth and final objection is that the Magistrate Judge
mischaracterized Respondent's argument and found
Weakley's claim not cognizable for a reason Respondent
did not argue. (Doc. 18 at 17-19). But, this court (and the
Magistrate Judge) are not automatons. Judicial officers are
not bound to find a non-cognizable claim to be cognizable
simply because the parties did not make a correct argument.
Contrary to Weakley's assertion, it was unnecessary for
the Magistrate Judge to address Respondent's contention
that Weakley could seek relief from the bankruptcy court.
(Doc. 18 at 19). As the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded,
Weakley's claim was otherwise barred. And, even if it was
error for the Magistrate Judge to fail to address this
argument (and, to be clear, it was not), any such error was
harmless.
Following
his objections, Weakley includes a section suggesting that
there remain “unresolved issues.” (Doc. 18 at
19-20). The two issues Weakley points to are (1) the
inability of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals,
Respondent, or the Magistrate Judge to find a case in which a
court ordered restitution paid through a bankruptcy
proceeding and (2) the R&R's failure to address his
argument that his wife, a joint debtor in the bankruptcy
proceeding, was unfairly burdened with the restitution
obligation. The first of these arguments is immaterial, as it
is Weakley's burden to show a constitutional violation,
not the burden of either the court or Respondent to disprove
one. See Blankenship v. Hall, 542 F.3d 1253, 1270
(11th Cir. 2008) (noting that the petitioner bears the burden
to establish his right to habeas relief and prove all facts
necessary to show a constitutional violation). The second
argument is not one Weakley has standing to raise. And, it is
also moot, because whatever problem the second
“unresolved issue” might raise, Weakley's
bankruptcy petition was severed from his wife's and has
been dismissed. See In re: Timothy W. Weakley and Anita
L. Weakley, No. 16-82685-CRJ13 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.);
In re: Timothy W. Weakley, No. 17-83366-CRJ13
(Bankr. N.D. Ala.).[2]
For all
these reasons, the court hereby adopts and approves the
findings and recommendation of the magistrate judge as the
findings and conclusions of this court. The petition for writ
of habeas corpus is due to be DISMISSED. A
separate Order will be entered.
This
court may issue a certificate of appealability “only if
the applicant has a made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). To
make such a showing, a “petitioner must demonstrate
that reasonable jurists would find the district court's
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,
” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000),
or that “the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (internal quotations
omitted). This Court finds Petitioner's claims do not
satisfy either standard.
DONE
and ORDERED.
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