Appeal
from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court (CC-18-887), (CC-18-886)
KELLUM, JUDGE.
Alyssa
Sue Watson and Marcus King George were each indicted for
felony murder (murder committed during the course of a
kidnapping in the first degree), see § 13A-6-2(a)(3),
Ala. Code 1975, and for kidnapping in the first degree, see
§ 13A-6-43(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975, in connection with the
kidnapping and subsequent death of Samantha Payne. On motion
of the State, the trial court consolidated the cases for
trial. After being instructed on the applicable principles of
law, a jury found Watson and George guilty of felony murder
and first-degree kidnapping as charged in the indictments.
The trial court sentenced both Watson and George to 30
years' imprisonment for each conviction, the sentences to
run concurrently. Watson and George filed timely notices of
appeal. Because Watson and George were tried together and
raise the same or similar issues on appeal, we have
consolidated the two appeals for purposes of issuing a single
opinion.
The
evidence adduced at trial indicated the following. On October
30, 2015, Payne told her mother that she was going to a party
with Watson, George, Chylli Bruce, and Mike Belcher. Payne,
who lived with her parents, did not return home from the
party. After not hearing from her daughter for a few days,
Payne's mother, Suzanne, telephoned Belcher and asked if
he had seen Payne. Belcher laughed and said he had not seen
her. The afternoon of November 9, 2015, Suzanne notified law
enforcement that Payne was missing. She provided a
description of her daughter as well as identifying
characteristics, including that Payne had a tattoo of a
butterfly on her lower back. Within hours, law-enforcement
officers arrived at Suzanne's home with a photograph of
the butterfly tattoo, and informed her that her
daughter's body had been found.
A local
hunter had found Payne's body in the Talladega National
Forest in Tuscaloosa County the morning her mother reported
her missing. When Payne was found, her body was largely
decomposed and her skull was found approximately 14 feet from
her body. Her arms and wrists were bound and had been tied to
a tree with a belt, shoestring, and coaxial cable. She was
nude, and pieces of what appeared to be women's clothing
were found nearby, including a pair of jeans found next to a
nearby road. Steven F. Dunton, a pathologist with the Alabama
Department of Forensic Sciences ("DFS"), performed
an autopsy on Payne's remains. The majority of her
internal organs were missing, and there was little to no
tissue left on her legs, skull, and hands. There was evidence
of hemorrhaging in the areas where her arms had been bound,
thus suggesting that Payne was likely alive when she was tied
up, and four of her ribs were fractured. Because of the
advanced state of decomposition, Dr. Dunton was unable to
determine the cause or manner of Payne's death but he
indicated that the circumstances of her discovery were
"strongly suggestive of foul play." (State's
Exhibit 93.)
Investigators
with the Tuscaloosa Police Department and the Tuscaloosa
Sheriff's Department quickly learned that, a week before
Payne's body had been found, Bruce and Steven George
("Steven")[1] had been arrested in Hale County near the
Talladega National Forest.[2] They both had blood on their clothes. A
knife was found on the ground nearby, and Steven had two
cellular telephones on his person, one of which Steven later
said belonged to Belcher. After investigators spoke with
Bruce and Steven, they were able to identify the remains
found in the forest as Payne's, and Watson, George, and
Belcher became suspects in her death.
As part
of plea agreements with the State, Steven and Bruce both
testified against Watson and George about the events leading
to Payne's death.[3] Steven testified that on November 1, 2015,
he, Belcher, and Bruce were "working on bikes and
getting high" at Wee Racing, a motorcycle-repair shop
owned by Belcher's father. (R. 438.)[4] At some point
that evening, Payne arrived at the shop. Watson and George
arrived sometime later. When Payne went to the bathroom
"to do her a shot of dope," Steven took the keys to
her automobile and asked if George wanted to go for a ride.
(R. 440.) As Steven and George drove around, Steven decided
he wanted to steal the catalytic convertor and battery from
Payne's vehicle. Steven drove George back to Wee Racing
and George agreed to meet him at the Harrisburg bridge. Once
at the bridge, Steven took the battery out of Payne's
vehicle and waited for George to arrive. George arrived with
Watson about 30 minutes later; he had brought with him the
equipment needed to remove the catalytic convertor. Watson
removed clothing from the passenger compartment of
Payne's vehicle and Steven removed the catalytic
convertor. Steven then punctured the gas tank and set the
vehicle on fire.
Steven,
Watson, and George drove to Belcher's residence, where
Steven changed clothes and put the catalytic convertor and
battery inside the house. The three then drove back to Wee
Racing. As they pulled up to the shop, Belcher and Bruce were
leaving in Belcher's automobile. Steven said that he
could see that Bruce was driving and that Belcher was in the
backseat but could not see anything else in the vehicle.
After a short discussion, Steven, Watson, and George followed
Belcher and Bruce to Belcher's residence. Once at the
residence, Belcher dragged Payne out of the backseat of the
vehicle and began beating her, "slamming" her on
the ground, and kicking her. (R. 457.) As Belcher was beating
Payne, "[a] bunch of police went by" and Steven
heard someone say they needed to go somewhere else. (R. 459.)
Steven did not know who made the statement but he said that
it was a male voice. According to Steven, Payne fought
Belcher when he tried to force Payne back into his vehicle,
and Watson hit Payne on the head with a pistol. Payne went
limp, and Belcher was able to get Payne into the vehicle.
Steven
testified that he, George, and Watson followed the vehicle
carrying Belcher, Bruce, and Payne to property he believed
belonged to Watson's family, on which there was a house
and a mobile home. Belcher pulled Payne out of his vehicle
and again began "kicking her and stomping her." (R.
467.) Belcher then told Steven to get something to restrain
Payne. Steven used his knife to cut "cable wire"
(R. 468) from the outside of the mobile home and he and
George "found some old shoestrings" inside the
mobile home. (R. 470.) When he and George returned to the
others, Steven said, a fire was burning in a barrel and
Watson was putting in the fire the clothes she had taken from
Payne's vehicle. Watson and Bruce also tried to remove
Payne's press-on fingernails because, Steven said, they
were worried DNA might be under the fingernails. According to
Steven, he helped Belcher tie Payne's hands and feet,
and, when daylight approached, he and Belcher put Payne in
the trunk of Belcher's vehicle. Steven testified that he
asked Belcher why he was doing what he was to Payne, and
Belcher said it was because Payne had been talking to law
enforcement about his selling methamphetamine and "was
trying to set him up." (R. 474.)
Steven,
George, and Watson again followed the vehicle carrying
Belcher, Bruce, and Payne as they left Belcher's
residence. During the drive, Payne tried to escape from the
trunk of Belcher's vehicle. Belcher stopped and had
Steven get in the backseat and hold the backseat so Payne
could not get from the trunk into the passenger compartment
of the vehicle. After driving further, Belcher stopped a
second time near the forest, and George said he knew a place
to take Payne. The vehicle carrying Belcher, Bruce, Steven,
and Payne then followed George and Watson until Belcher's
vehicle ran out of gas. Bruce, using Belcher's cellular
telephone, attempted to telephone George and Watson to let
them know Belcher's vehicle had run out of gas and that
they were no longer following George and Watson. Steven
assisted Belcher in getting Payne out of the trunk and
dragging her into the forest. When Payne started
"getting loud," Belcher began "stomping her in
the face, telling her to shut up" and threatening to
kill her. (R. 483.) Belcher told Steven to go back to the
vehicle and get something to further restrain Payne and he
asked Steven for Steven's knife. Steven gave Belcher his
knife and returned to the vehicle. When he left, Steven said,
Payne was alive, was bound, and was fully clothed.
When
Steven got back to the vehicle, he and Bruce attempted to
leave, but made it only about 100 yards before the vehicle
died again. Steven and Bruce then began walking to find
gasoline. All the doors on the vehicle were closed when they
left. Using Belcher's cell phone, Steven eventually
telephoned his brother and asked him to bring gasoline. His
brother did so. When Steven and Bruce got back to
Belcher's vehicle, the back door on the driver's side
was open and Steven's knife was on the ground near the
tire. As he and Bruce waited by the vehicle, a deputy with
the Hale County Sheriff's Department saw them and
approached. Steven testified that he had narcotics on his
person and he and Bruce were arrested.
Bruce
testified that the night of November 1, 2015, she was at Wee
Racing using drugs with Payne, Belcher, Steven, Watson, and
George. Eventually, everyone left except her, Belcher, and
Payne. Payne noticed that her vehicle was missing and she
accused Belcher of stealing it. Belcher and Payne argued and,
when Payne tried to walk away, Belcher "slam[med] her
against a wall." (R. 677.) Belcher told Bruce to get the
keys to his vehicle to drive them to his residence. According
to Bruce, Belcher forced Payne into the vehicle and, as they
were leaving, Steven, George, and Watson were pulling into
the parking lot of Wee Racing. Belcher told them to go to his
house. Once at Belcher's residence, Belcher pulled Payne
out of the vehicle and began punching her. When they saw
people begin to arrive at a nearby business, Bruce said,
George suggested going to another location. Belcher then
forced Payne back into his vehicle and the group drove to
what Bruce described as an "abandoned trailer." (R.
683.) Again, Belcher pulled Payne out of the vehicle and
began beating her. Belcher then told Bruce to find something
to tie up Payne and to burn Payne's belongings. Bruce
said that she and Watson removed Payne's jewelry and
attempted to remove her press-on fingernails and then burned
them in a fire on the property. She denied burning any
clothing. Belcher then forced Payne into the trunk of his
vehicle and he, Bruce, and Steven followed Watson and George
to the Talladega National Forest. Bruce said that she did not
see Watson hit Payne with a gun.
At one
point, Bruce said, Payne escaped from the trunk and they
stopped to force her back inside. As they were following
Watson and George, Belcher's vehicle ran out of gasoline;
Watson and George continued driving and did not stop. Bruce
said she walked away from the vehicle in an attempt to find
cellular service so she could telephone Watson using
Belcher's cell phone; Watson did not answer. When Bruce
returned to the vehicle, Belcher and Payne were gone. She and
Steven then began walking to find gasoline. Once they were in
an area with cellular service, Steven telephoned his brother
and asked him to bring them some gasoline, which he did.
According to Bruce, when they returned to Belcher's
vehicle with the gasoline, they were stopped by law
enforcement and, after finding drugs and drug paraphernalia
in Belcher's vehicle and on Steven's person, law
enforcement arrested them. Bruce testified that Belcher
subsequently told her that he had killed Payne by stabbing
her multiple times. Bruce identified at trial the pair of
jeans found on the side of the road near where Payne's
body was found as the jeans Payne was wearing the night she
was killed.
During
the execution of various search warrants over the course of
several days after Payne's body was found, investigators
found bloodstains and hair in both the passenger compartment
and the trunk of Belcher's Nissan Altima automobile; a
pink belt -- which Bruce identified at trial as having been
worn by Payne the night she was killed -- in a duffel bag in
a pickup truck that was parked at Belcher's residence;
cables and wires in a bag in Belcher's house; and an
automobile battery in the clothes dryer in Belcher's
house. At the property identified as belonging to
Watson's family, investigators found in the crawl space
under the house coaxial cable that appeared to have been cut
and an area in the yard that had been burned. Payne's
automobile was also found under the Harrisburg Bridge in Bibb
County. It had been burned, and the catalytic convertor and
battery were missing.
Pursuant
to court orders, investigators obtained records from Verizon
Wireless for cell phones belonging to Watson, George, and
Belcher. The records include call details for each call that
was made or received on November 2, 2015, between 1:00 a.m.
and 10:00 a.m. on each cell phone. The records indicated
that, during those hours, numerous calls were made between
Watson, George, and Belcher, including over two dozen calls
from Belcher's cell phone to Watson's cell phone
between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., which went to Watson's
voicemail. Allison Duncan, an intelligence analyst with the
Alabama Law Enforcement Agency ("ALEA"), analyzed
the call details, which included cell-site-location
information. Her testimony indicated that many of calls to
and from Watson's, George's, and Belcher's cell
phones were routed through cellular towers located near Wee
Racing, Belcher's residence, the property identified as
belonging to Watson's family, and the area where
Payne's body was found. Of particular import, many of the
calls to and from Watson's, George's, and/or
Belcher's cell phones before approximately 5:00 a.m. were
routed through a tower located near Wee Racing and
Belcher's residence; many of the calls to and from
Watson's and Belcher's cell phones between
approximately 5:00 a.m. and 7:30 a.m. were routed through
towers located near the property identified as belonging to
Watson's family; and the calls made to and from
Belcher's cell phone after 7:30 a.m. were routed through
towers near and around where Payne's body was found.
I.
Watson
and George contend that the trial court erred in denying
their motions to suppress their cell phone records on two
grounds, each of which we address each in turn, bearing in
mind the following.
In
reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress,
we apply the ore tenus standard of review to the
court's findings of fact based on disputed evidence.
"When evidence is presented ore tenus to the
trial court, the court's findings of fact based on that
evidence are presumed to be correct," Ex parte
Perkins, 646 So.2d 46, 47 (Ala. 1994); "[w]e
indulge a presumption that the trial court properly ruled on
the weight and probative force of the evidence,"
Bradley v. State, 494 So.2d 750, 761
(Ala.Crim.App.1985), aff'd, 494 So.2d 772 (Ala. 1986);
and we make "'all the reasonable inferences and
credibility choices supportive of the decision of the trial
court.'" Kennedy v. State, 640 So.2d 22, 26
(Ala.Crim.App.1993) (quoting Bradley, 494 So.2d at
761). However, "the ore tenus rule does not extend to
cloak a trial judge's conclusions of law, or incorrect
application of law to the facts, with a presumption of
correctness." Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So.2d 1113,
1144-45 (Ala. 1999). "Questions of law are reviewed de
novo." Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley,
893 So.2d 337, 342 (Ala. 2004). Likewise, a trial court's
application of law to the facts is reviewed de novo, and
"when the trial court improperly applies the law to the
facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the
court's judgment." Ex parte Agee, 669 So.2d
102, 104 (Ala. 1995).
A.
Watson
and George contend that the trial court erred in denying
their motions to suppress on the ground that investigators
obtained their cell-phone numbers without first advising them
of their rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
The
record indicates that Watson and George were brought to the
police station for questioning on November 12, 2015. Rob
Davis, a sergeant with the Tuscaloosa Police Department,
spoke with Watson, and J.C. Bryant, an investigator with the
Tuscaloosa Police Department, spoke with George. Before
advising Watson and George of their Miranda rights,
Sgt. Davis and Inv. Bryant requested biographical and contact
information from them, specifically, their names, dates of
birth, race, gender, addresses, and phone numbers. Watson and
George provided their cell-phone numbers. Sgt. Davis and Inv.
Bryant both testified at the suppression hearing that they
routinely ask for biographical and contact information from
every witness and suspect they interview before advising the
person of his or her Miranda rights so they can
contact that person in the future if necessary and so they
can fill out the Miranda form used by the Tuscaloosa
Police Department, which contains space at the top for the
interviewer to fill in the biographical and contact
information of the person being interviewed. Both Sgt. Davis
and Inv. Bryant also testified that they did not know, at the
time they spoke with Watson and George, that Watson's and
George's cell-phone numbers would be important to the
investigation.
"The Fifth Amendment provides that 'no person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.' The United States Supreme Court in
Miranda v. Arizona established procedures to
safeguard a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against
the inherently coercive effects of custodial interrogation.
Miranda requires that before questioning a suspect
in custody, law enforcement officials must inform the suspect
of certain rights, including [the right to remain silent, ]
the right to have an attorney present during questioning, and
that if the suspect cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for him. Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
Failure to inform a suspect of his Fifth Amendment rights
before questioning renders any pretrial statements elicited
from the suspect during custodial interrogation inadmissible
at trial. Id. at 492, 86 S.Ct. 1602."
Whitt v. State, 733 So.2d 463, 476
(Ala.Crim.App.1998). "[C]ustodial interrogation ...
mean[s] questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. "[T]he
term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
In
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990), the
United States Supreme Court recognized "a 'routine
booking question' exception which exempts from
Miranda's coverage questions to secure
'"biographical data necessary to complete booking or
pretrial services"'" and questions
"'for record-keeping purposes only' ... [that]
appear reasonably related to the police's administrative
concerns," so long as the questions are not
"'designed to elicit incriminating
admissions.'" 496 U.S. at 601-02 & n.14
(internal citations omitted). Even before Muniz,
this Court recognized a similar exception. In Varner v.
State, 418 So.2d 961 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), this Court
recognized that questioning the defendant about his
"name, address, age, race, date of birth, social
security number, height, weight, mother's and
father's name[s], ... and telephone number ... [were]
questions seeking biographical information [that] 'did
not relate, even tangentially, to criminal
activity.'" 418 So.2d 962 (quoting United States
v. Menichino, 497 F.2d 935, 941 (5th Cir. 1974)).
"They were 'non-investigative' questions not
designed to investigate crimes or the involvement of the
arrested person or others in crimes" and, thus, were not
subject to the requirements of Miranda because
"'Miranda was only "concerned with
protecting the suspect against interrogation of an
investigative nature rather than the obtaining of basic
identifying data required for booking and
arraignment."'" Varner, 418 So.2d at
962 (quoting United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942,
946 (4th Cir. 1977), quoting in turn, United States ex
rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1113 (2d Cir.
1975)).
"Examples
of questions to which the routine booking question exception
will ordinarily extend include the suspect's name,
address, telephone number, age, date of birth, and similar
such pedigree information." Hughes v. State,
346 Md. 80, 95, 695 A.2d 132, 139 (1997). See also Bobo
v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Minn. 2012) ("[A]
Miranda warning is not required before police ask
routine identification and biographical questions, like name,
address, or telephone number."); State v.
Crooks, 378 N.W.2d 722, 725 (Iowa 1985) ("Obtaining
'incidental identifying information' such as name,
address, and telephone number from a person in custody is not
the type of interrogation which Miranda seeks to
avoid."); Bucknor v. State, 965 So.2d 1200,
1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding "that the
routine request for a contact number ... falls within the
'booking exception'" to Miranda); and
United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 379 (11th Cir.
1983) (holding "that a government agent's eliciting
biographical information, such as an address and telephone
number, for the non-interrogative purpose of
identification" is not subject to Miranda).
"Whether the information gathered turns out to be
incriminating in some respect does not, by itself, alter the
general rule that pedigree questioning does not fall under
the strictures of Miranda." Rosa v.
McCray, 396 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 2005). "Only if
the government agent should reasonably be aware that the
information sought, while merely for basic identification
purposes in the usual case, is directly relevant to the
substantive offense charged, will the questioning be subject
to scrutiny." United States v. Laughlin, 777
F.2d 388, 391-92 (8th Cir. 1985). "Absent evidence that
'the police used the booking questions to elicit
incriminating statements from the defendant, routine
biographical questions are not ordinarily considered
interrogation.'" United States v. Broadus,
7 F.3d 460, 464 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v.
Clark, 982 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Sgt.
Davis and Inv. Bryant both testified that they routinely ask
for contact information, including a telephone number, from
every witness or suspect they interview so they can contact
the person at a later date if necessary and so they can
include that information on the Miranda form. Both
Sgt. Davis and Inv. Bryant denied that they had any
knowledge, at the time they spoke with Watson and George,
that Watson's and George's cell-phone numbers would
be important to the investigation, and their testimony
indicates that their involvement in the investigation was
limited largely to interviews and to assisting with the
execution of one or more search warrants. Under the
circumstances in this case, we conclude that asking Watson
and George for their telephone numbers before they were read
their Miranda rights fell within the "booking
exception" to Miranda. Therefore, the trial
court properly denied Watson's and George's motions
to suppress on this ground.
B.
Watson
and George also contend that the trial court erred in denying
their motions to suppress on the ground that investigators
obtained their cell-phone records without a search warrant.
Watson and George both concede that investigators obtained
court orders for the records in accordance with §§
13A-8-115 and 15-5-40, Ala. Code 1975, but, relying on
Carpenter v. United States, U.S., 138 S.Ct. 2206
(2018), they argue that the court orders were not sufficient
and that search warrants were required.
Section
13A-8-115(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[a] law
enforcement officer, a prosecuting attorney, or the Attorney
General may require the disclosure of stored wire or
electronic communications, as well as transactional records
and subscriber information pertaining thereto, to the extent
and under the procedures and conditions provided for by the
laws of the United States." Section 15-5-40(c), Ala.
Code 1975, provides:
"An emergency declared or order issued under the
combined authority of the provisions of federal law defined
at Chapters 121 and 206 of Title 18, United States Code,
Sections 2701-2712 and 3121-3127, may authorize disclosure of
call-identifying addressing, routing, or signaling
information that may disclose the physical location of the
subscriber, customer, or user of a wire or electronic
communications service."
Both
§ 13A-8-115 and § 15-5-40 incorporate by reference,
directly or indirectly, the Stored Communications Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. ("the SCA"). The SCA
permits the government to compel disclosure of certain
telecommunications records, including cell-phone records, by
warrant or by court order. With respect to court orders,
§ 2703(d) provides, in relevant part:
"A court order for disclosure ... may be issued by any
court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall
issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information sought,
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation."
In Carpenter, investigators obtained court orders
pursuant to the SCA for the defendant's cell-phone
records for a period spanning four months, during which time
a series of robberies had been committed. Information from
the records indicated that the defendant's cell phone was
near the locations of four of the robberies at the time of
those robberies. The defendant moved to suppress the records,
and the trial court denied the motion. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's judgment. However, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit, holding
that "an individual maintains a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the record of his physical movements as
captured through" cell-site location information and
that, therefore, "the Government must generally obtain a
warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such
records." U.S. at,, 138 S.Ct. at 2217, 2221. The Court
explained:
"The Government acquired the cell-site records pursuant
to a court order issued under the Stored Communications Act,
which required the Government to show 'reasonable
grounds' for believing that the records were
'relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.'
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). That showing falls well short of
the probable cause required for a warrant. The Court usually
requires 'some quantum of individualized suspicion'
before a search or seizure may take place. United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-561, 96 S.Ct.
3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). Under the standard in the
Stored Communications Act, however, law enforcement need only
show that the cell-site evidence might be pertinent to an
ongoing investigation -- a 'gigantic' departure from
the probable cause rule, as the Government explained below.
App. 34. Consequently, an order issued under Section 2703(d)
of the Act is not a permissible mechanism for accessing
historical cell-site records. Before compelling a wireless
carrier to turn over a subscriber's [cell-site- location
information], the Government's obligation is a familiar
one -- get a warrant."
U.S. at, 138 S.Ct. at 2221.
After
remand, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals again affirmed the
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
suppress under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule. The Court explained:
"Although the Government should have obtained a warrant
in this case, we may nevertheless affirm the district
court's decision if the Government acquired
Carpenter's [cell-site-location information] in good
faith reliance on the SCA. 'Though evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is generally excluded, the
Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule
"should be modified so as not to bar the admission of
evidence seized in reasonable, good faith reliance on a
search warrant that is subsequently held to be
defective."' United States v. Frazier, 423
F.3d 526, 533 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677
(1984)). In Illinois v. Krull, the Court extended
Leon's good faith exception to evidence obtained
in reasonable reliance on a statute that is later declared
unconstitutional, reasoning 'that the greatest deterrent
to the enactment of unconstitutional statutes by a
legislature is the power of the courts to invalidate such
statutes.' 480 U.S. 340, 352, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d
364 (1987); see also id. at 349, 107 S.Ct. 1160
('The application of the exclusionary ...