Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Watson v. State

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

January 10, 2020

Alyssa Sue Watson
v.
State of Alabama Marcus King George
v.
State of Alabama

          Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court (CC-18-887), (CC-18-886)

          KELLUM, JUDGE.

         Alyssa Sue Watson and Marcus King George were each indicted for felony murder (murder committed during the course of a kidnapping in the first degree), see § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, and for kidnapping in the first degree, see § 13A-6-43(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975, in connection with the kidnapping and subsequent death of Samantha Payne. On motion of the State, the trial court consolidated the cases for trial. After being instructed on the applicable principles of law, a jury found Watson and George guilty of felony murder and first-degree kidnapping as charged in the indictments. The trial court sentenced both Watson and George to 30 years' imprisonment for each conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. Watson and George filed timely notices of appeal. Because Watson and George were tried together and raise the same or similar issues on appeal, we have consolidated the two appeals for purposes of issuing a single opinion.

         The evidence adduced at trial indicated the following. On October 30, 2015, Payne told her mother that she was going to a party with Watson, George, Chylli Bruce, and Mike Belcher. Payne, who lived with her parents, did not return home from the party. After not hearing from her daughter for a few days, Payne's mother, Suzanne, telephoned Belcher and asked if he had seen Payne. Belcher laughed and said he had not seen her. The afternoon of November 9, 2015, Suzanne notified law enforcement that Payne was missing. She provided a description of her daughter as well as identifying characteristics, including that Payne had a tattoo of a butterfly on her lower back. Within hours, law-enforcement officers arrived at Suzanne's home with a photograph of the butterfly tattoo, and informed her that her daughter's body had been found.

         A local hunter had found Payne's body in the Talladega National Forest in Tuscaloosa County the morning her mother reported her missing. When Payne was found, her body was largely decomposed and her skull was found approximately 14 feet from her body. Her arms and wrists were bound and had been tied to a tree with a belt, shoestring, and coaxial cable. She was nude, and pieces of what appeared to be women's clothing were found nearby, including a pair of jeans found next to a nearby road. Steven F. Dunton, a pathologist with the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences ("DFS"), performed an autopsy on Payne's remains. The majority of her internal organs were missing, and there was little to no tissue left on her legs, skull, and hands. There was evidence of hemorrhaging in the areas where her arms had been bound, thus suggesting that Payne was likely alive when she was tied up, and four of her ribs were fractured. Because of the advanced state of decomposition, Dr. Dunton was unable to determine the cause or manner of Payne's death but he indicated that the circumstances of her discovery were "strongly suggestive of foul play." (State's Exhibit 93.)

         Investigators with the Tuscaloosa Police Department and the Tuscaloosa Sheriff's Department quickly learned that, a week before Payne's body had been found, Bruce and Steven George ("Steven")[1] had been arrested in Hale County near the Talladega National Forest.[2] They both had blood on their clothes. A knife was found on the ground nearby, and Steven had two cellular telephones on his person, one of which Steven later said belonged to Belcher. After investigators spoke with Bruce and Steven, they were able to identify the remains found in the forest as Payne's, and Watson, George, and Belcher became suspects in her death.

         As part of plea agreements with the State, Steven and Bruce both testified against Watson and George about the events leading to Payne's death.[3] Steven testified that on November 1, 2015, he, Belcher, and Bruce were "working on bikes and getting high" at Wee Racing, a motorcycle-repair shop owned by Belcher's father. (R. 438.)[4] At some point that evening, Payne arrived at the shop. Watson and George arrived sometime later. When Payne went to the bathroom "to do her a shot of dope," Steven took the keys to her automobile and asked if George wanted to go for a ride. (R. 440.) As Steven and George drove around, Steven decided he wanted to steal the catalytic convertor and battery from Payne's vehicle. Steven drove George back to Wee Racing and George agreed to meet him at the Harrisburg bridge. Once at the bridge, Steven took the battery out of Payne's vehicle and waited for George to arrive. George arrived with Watson about 30 minutes later; he had brought with him the equipment needed to remove the catalytic convertor. Watson removed clothing from the passenger compartment of Payne's vehicle and Steven removed the catalytic convertor. Steven then punctured the gas tank and set the vehicle on fire.

         Steven, Watson, and George drove to Belcher's residence, where Steven changed clothes and put the catalytic convertor and battery inside the house. The three then drove back to Wee Racing. As they pulled up to the shop, Belcher and Bruce were leaving in Belcher's automobile. Steven said that he could see that Bruce was driving and that Belcher was in the backseat but could not see anything else in the vehicle. After a short discussion, Steven, Watson, and George followed Belcher and Bruce to Belcher's residence. Once at the residence, Belcher dragged Payne out of the backseat of the vehicle and began beating her, "slamming" her on the ground, and kicking her. (R. 457.) As Belcher was beating Payne, "[a] bunch of police went by" and Steven heard someone say they needed to go somewhere else. (R. 459.) Steven did not know who made the statement but he said that it was a male voice. According to Steven, Payne fought Belcher when he tried to force Payne back into his vehicle, and Watson hit Payne on the head with a pistol. Payne went limp, and Belcher was able to get Payne into the vehicle.

         Steven testified that he, George, and Watson followed the vehicle carrying Belcher, Bruce, and Payne to property he believed belonged to Watson's family, on which there was a house and a mobile home. Belcher pulled Payne out of his vehicle and again began "kicking her and stomping her." (R. 467.) Belcher then told Steven to get something to restrain Payne. Steven used his knife to cut "cable wire" (R. 468) from the outside of the mobile home and he and George "found some old shoestrings" inside the mobile home. (R. 470.) When he and George returned to the others, Steven said, a fire was burning in a barrel and Watson was putting in the fire the clothes she had taken from Payne's vehicle. Watson and Bruce also tried to remove Payne's press-on fingernails because, Steven said, they were worried DNA might be under the fingernails. According to Steven, he helped Belcher tie Payne's hands and feet, and, when daylight approached, he and Belcher put Payne in the trunk of Belcher's vehicle. Steven testified that he asked Belcher why he was doing what he was to Payne, and Belcher said it was because Payne had been talking to law enforcement about his selling methamphetamine and "was trying to set him up." (R. 474.)

         Steven, George, and Watson again followed the vehicle carrying Belcher, Bruce, and Payne as they left Belcher's residence. During the drive, Payne tried to escape from the trunk of Belcher's vehicle. Belcher stopped and had Steven get in the backseat and hold the backseat so Payne could not get from the trunk into the passenger compartment of the vehicle. After driving further, Belcher stopped a second time near the forest, and George said he knew a place to take Payne. The vehicle carrying Belcher, Bruce, Steven, and Payne then followed George and Watson until Belcher's vehicle ran out of gas. Bruce, using Belcher's cellular telephone, attempted to telephone George and Watson to let them know Belcher's vehicle had run out of gas and that they were no longer following George and Watson. Steven assisted Belcher in getting Payne out of the trunk and dragging her into the forest. When Payne started "getting loud," Belcher began "stomping her in the face, telling her to shut up" and threatening to kill her. (R. 483.) Belcher told Steven to go back to the vehicle and get something to further restrain Payne and he asked Steven for Steven's knife. Steven gave Belcher his knife and returned to the vehicle. When he left, Steven said, Payne was alive, was bound, and was fully clothed.

         When Steven got back to the vehicle, he and Bruce attempted to leave, but made it only about 100 yards before the vehicle died again. Steven and Bruce then began walking to find gasoline. All the doors on the vehicle were closed when they left. Using Belcher's cell phone, Steven eventually telephoned his brother and asked him to bring gasoline. His brother did so. When Steven and Bruce got back to Belcher's vehicle, the back door on the driver's side was open and Steven's knife was on the ground near the tire. As he and Bruce waited by the vehicle, a deputy with the Hale County Sheriff's Department saw them and approached. Steven testified that he had narcotics on his person and he and Bruce were arrested.

         Bruce testified that the night of November 1, 2015, she was at Wee Racing using drugs with Payne, Belcher, Steven, Watson, and George. Eventually, everyone left except her, Belcher, and Payne. Payne noticed that her vehicle was missing and she accused Belcher of stealing it. Belcher and Payne argued and, when Payne tried to walk away, Belcher "slam[med] her against a wall." (R. 677.) Belcher told Bruce to get the keys to his vehicle to drive them to his residence. According to Bruce, Belcher forced Payne into the vehicle and, as they were leaving, Steven, George, and Watson were pulling into the parking lot of Wee Racing. Belcher told them to go to his house. Once at Belcher's residence, Belcher pulled Payne out of the vehicle and began punching her. When they saw people begin to arrive at a nearby business, Bruce said, George suggested going to another location. Belcher then forced Payne back into his vehicle and the group drove to what Bruce described as an "abandoned trailer." (R. 683.) Again, Belcher pulled Payne out of the vehicle and began beating her. Belcher then told Bruce to find something to tie up Payne and to burn Payne's belongings. Bruce said that she and Watson removed Payne's jewelry and attempted to remove her press-on fingernails and then burned them in a fire on the property. She denied burning any clothing. Belcher then forced Payne into the trunk of his vehicle and he, Bruce, and Steven followed Watson and George to the Talladega National Forest. Bruce said that she did not see Watson hit Payne with a gun.

         At one point, Bruce said, Payne escaped from the trunk and they stopped to force her back inside. As they were following Watson and George, Belcher's vehicle ran out of gasoline; Watson and George continued driving and did not stop. Bruce said she walked away from the vehicle in an attempt to find cellular service so she could telephone Watson using Belcher's cell phone; Watson did not answer. When Bruce returned to the vehicle, Belcher and Payne were gone. She and Steven then began walking to find gasoline. Once they were in an area with cellular service, Steven telephoned his brother and asked him to bring them some gasoline, which he did. According to Bruce, when they returned to Belcher's vehicle with the gasoline, they were stopped by law enforcement and, after finding drugs and drug paraphernalia in Belcher's vehicle and on Steven's person, law enforcement arrested them. Bruce testified that Belcher subsequently told her that he had killed Payne by stabbing her multiple times. Bruce identified at trial the pair of jeans found on the side of the road near where Payne's body was found as the jeans Payne was wearing the night she was killed.

         During the execution of various search warrants over the course of several days after Payne's body was found, investigators found bloodstains and hair in both the passenger compartment and the trunk of Belcher's Nissan Altima automobile; a pink belt -- which Bruce identified at trial as having been worn by Payne the night she was killed -- in a duffel bag in a pickup truck that was parked at Belcher's residence; cables and wires in a bag in Belcher's house; and an automobile battery in the clothes dryer in Belcher's house. At the property identified as belonging to Watson's family, investigators found in the crawl space under the house coaxial cable that appeared to have been cut and an area in the yard that had been burned. Payne's automobile was also found under the Harrisburg Bridge in Bibb County. It had been burned, and the catalytic convertor and battery were missing.

         Pursuant to court orders, investigators obtained records from Verizon Wireless for cell phones belonging to Watson, George, and Belcher. The records include call details for each call that was made or received on November 2, 2015, between 1:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on each cell phone. The records indicated that, during those hours, numerous calls were made between Watson, George, and Belcher, including over two dozen calls from Belcher's cell phone to Watson's cell phone between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., which went to Watson's voicemail. Allison Duncan, an intelligence analyst with the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency ("ALEA"), analyzed the call details, which included cell-site-location information. Her testimony indicated that many of calls to and from Watson's, George's, and Belcher's cell phones were routed through cellular towers located near Wee Racing, Belcher's residence, the property identified as belonging to Watson's family, and the area where Payne's body was found. Of particular import, many of the calls to and from Watson's, George's, and/or Belcher's cell phones before approximately 5:00 a.m. were routed through a tower located near Wee Racing and Belcher's residence; many of the calls to and from Watson's and Belcher's cell phones between approximately 5:00 a.m. and 7:30 a.m. were routed through towers located near the property identified as belonging to Watson's family; and the calls made to and from Belcher's cell phone after 7:30 a.m. were routed through towers near and around where Payne's body was found.

         I.

         Watson and George contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress their cell phone records on two grounds, each of which we address each in turn, bearing in mind the following.

         In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply the ore tenus standard of review to the court's findings of fact based on disputed evidence. "When evidence is presented ore tenus to the trial court, the court's findings of fact based on that evidence are presumed to be correct," Ex parte Perkins, 646 So.2d 46, 47 (Ala. 1994); "[w]e indulge a presumption that the trial court properly ruled on the weight and probative force of the evidence," Bradley v. State, 494 So.2d 750, 761 (Ala.Crim.App.1985), aff'd, 494 So.2d 772 (Ala. 1986); and we make "'all the reasonable inferences and credibility choices supportive of the decision of the trial court.'" Kennedy v. State, 640 So.2d 22, 26 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (quoting Bradley, 494 So.2d at 761). However, "the ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak a trial judge's conclusions of law, or incorrect application of law to the facts, with a presumption of correctness." Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So.2d 1113, 1144-45 (Ala. 1999). "Questions of law are reviewed de novo." Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So.2d 337, 342 (Ala. 2004). Likewise, a trial court's application of law to the facts is reviewed de novo, and "when the trial court improperly applies the law to the facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court's judgment." Ex parte Agee, 669 So.2d 102, 104 (Ala. 1995).

         A.

         Watson and George contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress on the ground that investigators obtained their cell-phone numbers without first advising them of their rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

         The record indicates that Watson and George were brought to the police station for questioning on November 12, 2015. Rob Davis, a sergeant with the Tuscaloosa Police Department, spoke with Watson, and J.C. Bryant, an investigator with the Tuscaloosa Police Department, spoke with George. Before advising Watson and George of their Miranda rights, Sgt. Davis and Inv. Bryant requested biographical and contact information from them, specifically, their names, dates of birth, race, gender, addresses, and phone numbers. Watson and George provided their cell-phone numbers. Sgt. Davis and Inv. Bryant both testified at the suppression hearing that they routinely ask for biographical and contact information from every witness and suspect they interview before advising the person of his or her Miranda rights so they can contact that person in the future if necessary and so they can fill out the Miranda form used by the Tuscaloosa Police Department, which contains space at the top for the interviewer to fill in the biographical and contact information of the person being interviewed. Both Sgt. Davis and Inv. Bryant also testified that they did not know, at the time they spoke with Watson and George, that Watson's and George's cell-phone numbers would be important to the investigation.

"The Fifth Amendment provides that 'no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona established procedures to safeguard a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against the inherently coercive effects of custodial interrogation. Miranda requires that before questioning a suspect in custody, law enforcement officials must inform the suspect of certain rights, including [the right to remain silent, ] the right to have an attorney present during questioning, and that if the suspect cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him. Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Failure to inform a suspect of his Fifth Amendment rights before questioning renders any pretrial statements elicited from the suspect during custodial interrogation inadmissible at trial. Id. at 492, 86 S.Ct. 1602."

Whitt v. State, 733 So.2d 463, 476 (Ala.Crim.App.1998). "[C]ustodial interrogation ... mean[s] questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. "[T]he term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (footnotes omitted).

         In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990), the United States Supreme Court recognized "a 'routine booking question' exception which exempts from Miranda's coverage questions to secure '"biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services"'" and questions "'for record-keeping purposes only' ... [that] appear reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns," so long as the questions are not "'designed to elicit incriminating admissions.'" 496 U.S. at 601-02 & n.14 (internal citations omitted). Even before Muniz, this Court recognized a similar exception. In Varner v. State, 418 So.2d 961 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), this Court recognized that questioning the defendant about his "name, address, age, race, date of birth, social security number, height, weight, mother's and father's name[s], ... and telephone number ... [were] questions seeking biographical information [that] 'did not relate, even tangentially, to criminal activity.'" 418 So.2d 962 (quoting United States v. Menichino, 497 F.2d 935, 941 (5th Cir. 1974)). "They were 'non-investigative' questions not designed to investigate crimes or the involvement of the arrested person or others in crimes" and, thus, were not subject to the requirements of Miranda because "'Miranda was only "concerned with protecting the suspect against interrogation of an investigative nature rather than the obtaining of basic identifying data required for booking and arraignment."'" Varner, 418 So.2d at 962 (quoting United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942, 946 (4th Cir. 1977), quoting in turn, United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1113 (2d Cir. 1975)).

         "Examples of questions to which the routine booking question exception will ordinarily extend include the suspect's name, address, telephone number, age, date of birth, and similar such pedigree information." Hughes v. State, 346 Md. 80, 95, 695 A.2d 132, 139 (1997). See also Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Minn. 2012) ("[A] Miranda warning is not required before police ask routine identification and biographical questions, like name, address, or telephone number."); State v. Crooks, 378 N.W.2d 722, 725 (Iowa 1985) ("Obtaining 'incidental identifying information' such as name, address, and telephone number from a person in custody is not the type of interrogation which Miranda seeks to avoid."); Bucknor v. State, 965 So.2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding "that the routine request for a contact number ... falls within the 'booking exception'" to Miranda); and United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 379 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding "that a government agent's eliciting biographical information, such as an address and telephone number, for the non-interrogative purpose of identification" is not subject to Miranda). "Whether the information gathered turns out to be incriminating in some respect does not, by itself, alter the general rule that pedigree questioning does not fall under the strictures of Miranda." Rosa v. McCray, 396 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 2005). "Only if the government agent should reasonably be aware that the information sought, while merely for basic identification purposes in the usual case, is directly relevant to the substantive offense charged, will the questioning be subject to scrutiny." United States v. Laughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391-92 (8th Cir. 1985). "Absent evidence that 'the police used the booking questions to elicit incriminating statements from the defendant, routine biographical questions are not ordinarily considered interrogation.'" United States v. Broadus, 7 F.3d 460, 464 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Clark, 982 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1993)).

         Sgt. Davis and Inv. Bryant both testified that they routinely ask for contact information, including a telephone number, from every witness or suspect they interview so they can contact the person at a later date if necessary and so they can include that information on the Miranda form. Both Sgt. Davis and Inv. Bryant denied that they had any knowledge, at the time they spoke with Watson and George, that Watson's and George's cell-phone numbers would be important to the investigation, and their testimony indicates that their involvement in the investigation was limited largely to interviews and to assisting with the execution of one or more search warrants. Under the circumstances in this case, we conclude that asking Watson and George for their telephone numbers before they were read their Miranda rights fell within the "booking exception" to Miranda. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Watson's and George's motions to suppress on this ground.

          B.

         Watson and George also contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress on the ground that investigators obtained their cell-phone records without a search warrant. Watson and George both concede that investigators obtained court orders for the records in accordance with §§ 13A-8-115 and 15-5-40, Ala. Code 1975, but, relying on Carpenter v. United States, U.S., 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018), they argue that the court orders were not sufficient and that search warrants were required.

         Section 13A-8-115(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[a] law enforcement officer, a prosecuting attorney, or the Attorney General may require the disclosure of stored wire or electronic communications, as well as transactional records and subscriber information pertaining thereto, to the extent and under the procedures and conditions provided for by the laws of the United States." Section 15-5-40(c), Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"An emergency declared or order issued under the combined authority of the provisions of federal law defined at Chapters 121 and 206 of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2701-2712 and 3121-3127, may authorize disclosure of call-identifying addressing, routing, or signaling information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber, customer, or user of a wire or electronic communications service."

         Both § 13A-8-115 and § 15-5-40 incorporate by reference, directly or indirectly, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. ("the SCA"). The SCA permits the government to compel disclosure of certain telecommunications records, including cell-phone records, by warrant or by court order. With respect to court orders, § 2703(d) provides, in relevant part:

"A court order for disclosure ... may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."

In Carpenter, investigators obtained court orders pursuant to the SCA for the defendant's cell-phone records for a period spanning four months, during which time a series of robberies had been committed. Information from the records indicated that the defendant's cell phone was near the locations of four of the robberies at the time of those robberies. The defendant moved to suppress the records, and the trial court denied the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment. However, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit, holding that "an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through" cell-site location information and that, therefore, "the Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such records." U.S. at,, 138 S.Ct. at 2217, 2221. The Court explained:

"The Government acquired the cell-site records pursuant to a court order issued under the Stored Communications Act, which required the Government to show 'reasonable grounds' for believing that the records were 'relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.' 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). That showing falls well short of the probable cause required for a warrant. The Court usually requires 'some quantum of individualized suspicion' before a search or seizure may take place. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-561, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). Under the standard in the Stored Communications Act, however, law enforcement need only show that the cell-site evidence might be pertinent to an ongoing investigation -- a 'gigantic' departure from the probable cause rule, as the Government explained below. App. 34. Consequently, an order issued under Section 2703(d) of the Act is not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical cell-site records. Before compelling a wireless carrier to turn over a subscriber's [cell-site- location information], the Government's obligation is a familiar one -- get a warrant."

U.S. at, 138 S.Ct. at 2221.

         After remand, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals again affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Court explained:

"Although the Government should have obtained a warrant in this case, we may nevertheless affirm the district court's decision if the Government acquired Carpenter's [cell-site-location information] in good faith reliance on the SCA. 'Though evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is generally excluded, the Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule "should be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective."' United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 533 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)). In Illinois v. Krull, the Court extended Leon's good faith exception to evidence obtained in reasonable reliance on a statute that is later declared unconstitutional, reasoning 'that the greatest deterrent to the enactment of unconstitutional statutes by a legislature is the power of the courts to invalidate such statutes.' 480 U.S. 340, 352, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); see also id. at 349, 107 S.Ct. 1160 ('The application of the exclusionary ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.