United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northeastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION [1]
STACI
G. CORNELIUS U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The
plaintiff, Teresa Lynne Smith, appeals from the decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the
“Commissioner”) denying her applications for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Smith
timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and
the Commissioner's decision is ripe for review pursuant
to 42 U.S.C §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the
reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's decision is
due to be affirmed.
I.
Procedural History
Smith
has a high school education and has previously been employed
as a laborer for a trucking company, a cook, a courier, and a
cleaner. (Tr. at 38, 40-43, 64-71). In her applications for
DIB and SSI, Smith alleged she became disabled on November
15, 2012, due to chronic pain in her knees and ankles,
anxiety, depression, muscle spasms, and high blood pressure.
(Id. at 105). After her claims were denied, Smith
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (Id. at 10). Following a
hearing, the ALJ denied Smith's claims. (Id. at
10-20). Smith was forty-six years old when the ALJ issued the
decision. (Id. at 10, 195). After the Appeals
Council denied review of the ALJ's decision (id.
at 1-3), that decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner, see Frye v. Massanari, 209 F.Supp.2d
1246, 1251 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel,
150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). Thereafter, Smith
commenced this action. (Doc. 1).
II.
Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To
establish eligibility for disability benefits, a claimant
must show “the inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1)(A), 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a),
416.905(a). Furthermore, a claimant must show she was
disabled between her alleged initial onset date and her date
last insured. Mason v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 430
Fed.Appx. 830, 831 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1209, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005);
Demandre v. Califano, 591 F.2d 1088, 1090 (5th Cir.
1979)). The Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) employs a five-step sequential analysis
to determine an individual's eligibility for disability
benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4).
First,
the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is
engaged in “substantial gainful activity.”
Id. at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i),
416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity, the Commissioner will find the claimant is
not disabled. Id. at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)
and (b), 416.920(a)(4)(i) and (b). At the first step, the ALJ
determined Smith met the SSA's insured status
requirements through December 31, 2017, and has not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since November 15, 2012. (Tr.
at 12).
If the
claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the
Commissioner must next determine whether the claimant suffers
from a severe physical or mental impairment or combination of
impairments that has lasted or is expected to last for a
continuous period of at least twelve months. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the
claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of
impairments, the Commissioner will find the claimant is not
disabled. Id. at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and
(c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii) and (c). At the second step, the ALJ
determined Smith has the following severe impairment:
reconstructive surgery of weight bearing joints.
(Id. at 12).
If the
claimant has a severe impairment or combination of
impairments, the Commissioner must then determine whether the
impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals one
of the “Listings” found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the
claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets
or equals one of the Listings, the Commissioner will find the
claimant is disabled. Id. at §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iii) and (d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii) and (d). At
the third step, the ALJ determined Smith does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the Listings. (Tr. at
14).
If the
claimant's impairment or combination of impairments does
not meet or equal one of the Listings, the Commissioner must
determine the claimant's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) before proceeding to the fourth step. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). At the fourth
step, the Commissioner will compare an assessment of the
claimant's RFC with the physical and mental demands of
the claimant's past relevant work. Id. at
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) and (e), 416.920(a)(4)(iv)
and (e). If the claimant is capable of performing her past
relevant work, the Commissioner will find the claimant is not
disabled. Id. at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is unable to perform her
past relevant work, the Commissioner must finally determine
whether the claimant is capable of performing other work that
exists in substantial numbers in the national economy in
light of the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work
experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) and
(g)(1), 416.920(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1). If the claimant is
capable of performing other work, the Commissioner will find
the claimant is not disabled. Id. at §§
404.1520(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1), 416.920(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1).
Before
proceeding to the fourth step, the ALJ determined Smith has
the RFC to perform a limited range of light work. (Tr. at
14).[2]
At the fourth step, the ALJ determined Smith is able to
perform her past relevant work as a courier. (Id. at
17). Nonetheless, the ALJ proceeded to the fifth step and
determined that considering Smith's age, education, work
experience, and RFC there are jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy that Smith can perform, such
as those of assembler, wire worker, and inspector checker.
(Id. at 18-19). The ALJ concluded Smith is not
disabled based on her determinations at the fourth and fifth
steps of the sequential evaluation.
III.
Standard of Review
Review
of the Commissioner's decision is limited to a
determination of whether that decision is supported by
substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied
correct legal standards. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). A district
court must review the Commissioner's findings of fact
with deference and may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate
the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner. Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007); Dyer
v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).
Rather, a district court must “scrutinize the record as
a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth
v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)
(internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less
than a preponderance.” Id. A district court
must uphold factual findings supported by substantial
evidence, even if the preponderance of the evidence is
against those findings. Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d
1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Martin v.
Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
A
district court reviews the Commissioner's legal
conclusions de novo. Davis v. Shalala, 985
F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). “The
[Commissioner's] failure to apply the correct law or to
provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for
determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted
...