United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Middle Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Claimant,
Robin Dodson Smith, commenced this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) on January 18, 2019, seeking judicial
review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration, affirming the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and thereby
denying her claim for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits. Upon review of the record and briefs, and
for the reasons stated herein, the court remands this case to
the Commissioner.
The
court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social
Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of review is limited
to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the
record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and whether correct legal standards were
applied. See, e.g., Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701
(11th Cir. 1988); Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d
1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983).
Claimant's
alleged disability began on February 1, 2009, and she last
met the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act on December 31, 2011.[1] The ALJ found that claimant suffered
from severe impairments of degenerative disc disease,
osteoarthritis, and chronic obstructive pulmonary
insufficiency (CPI), but concluded that she, nevertheless,
was capable of performing light work, with limitations
including occasionally climbing ramps and stairs, along with
the need to avoid hazards or odors, dusts, fumes, chemicals,
and other pulmonary irritants.[2]
Claimant
contends that the Commissioner's decision is neither
supported by substantial evidence nor in accordance with
applicable legal standards. Specifically, claimant asserts
the following arguments:
1. The ALJ failed to find claimant disabled pursuant to Grid
202.04 based on her advanced age of 55 and limitation to
light work.
2. The ALJ failed to consider that plaintiff's condition
of idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis is on the Compassionate
Allowance List, and entitled to special consideration.
3. ALJ failed to properly determine the date of disability
pursuant to Social Security Ruling 83-20, finding only that
she was not disabled prior to December 31, 2011, the date
last insured.
4. The ALJ improperly drew adverse inferences from lack of
medical treatment.
5. The ALJ failed to give consideration to Claimant's
excellent work history in assessing the testimony of
Claimant.
6. The finding that Claimant can perform her past work, as of
the date last insured, is not supported by substantial
evidence, and is not in accordance with proper legal
standards.
7. The ALJ denial was not based on substantial evidence.
Doc. no. 7, at 2.
The
court notes at the outset of discussion that this is an
insured benefit case under Title II, [3] and that the claimant's
claim for disability is limited to the insured benefit period
of February 1, 2009 (the date of alleged onset) to December
31, 2011 (the date on which claimant was last insured). The
claimant, now 61 years of age, was 55 years old upon the date
she was last insured. Her past relevant work is as a
preschool teacher/helper, robotic welder, and kindergarten
teacher/aid.[4] In addition, her social security earnings
are consistent without any significant non-earning periods
back to the year 1991 through her date of last insured of
December 31, 2011. There are no medical opinions regarding
the claimant's functional capacity and limitations during
the insured period.[5] Claimant's medical records during the
insured period are sparse, but they frame a picture of an
individual suffering from severe abdominal and back pain. Her
abdominal and lower-back pains stem from acute urinary tract
infections and bladder issues.[6] Her other back pain is associated
with osteoporosis and a compression fracture of the thoracic
vertebrae at T-7.[7] Claimant filed her initial application for
disability benefits on September 23, 2015, but the case was
not heard by the ALJ until June 19, 2017.
Claimant's
first assertion is that the ALJ failed to use the Medical
Vocational Guidelines, otherwise known as the “grids,
”[8] to determine that claimant was disabled.
The problem with this argument, as correctly argued by the
Commissioner, is that the grids are not used until step five
of the sequential process, and only then upon a finding that
a claimant cannot perform her past relevant work. Since the
ALJ found that the claimant could perform her past relevant
work, this argument is without merit in this case.
See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 ยง
200.00(a) (which provides that the grid rules apply ...