United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Western Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
L.
Scott Coogler United States District Judge
The
magistrate judge filed a report on December 6, 2019,
recommending the plaintiff's claims against the City of
Decatur Police Department and the City of Decatur based on
municipal liability be dismissed without prejudice pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) for failing
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 10).
The magistrate judge further recommended that the
plaintiff's claims against Derrick Anderson for malicious
prosecution related to the October 18, 2016 DUI charge and
the plaintiff's claims against Michael Kent for wrongful
arrest concerning his February 17, 2017 arrest be referred to
the magistrate judge for further proceedings. (Id.).
The
plaintiff filed timely objections to the report and
recommendation. (Doc. 11). The plaintiff first objects to the
finding that a motion to revoke his bond was filed in state
court on February 10, 2017. (Id. at 1). However,
this court may take judicial notice of state court pleadings,
Keith v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034, 1041
n.18 (11th Cir. 2014), and that motion appears in state court
records. See State v. Robert Evans Lewis,
III, DC-2016-0001478.00 (state court doc. 11).
Therein, an Assistant District Attorney alleged “[o]n
or about August 30, 2016, the defendant reportedly went to
wife's house, damaged property, physically assaulted her
and attempted to run over her with his car.”
(Id.). Whether or not those allegations are true has
no relevance to the claims before this court. The magistrate
judge noted the existence of the February 10, 2017 motion to
revoke bond because here, the plaintiff challenges his
February 17, 2017 arrest. (See doc. 10 at 9).
Similarly,
while the plaintiff “objects to the Court's finding
that on October 24, 2016, he failed to appear in Decatur
Municipal Court …” (doc. 11 at 1), again that
statement is drawn from the state court motion to revoke
bond. Whether or not the plaintiff actually failed to appear
in Decatur Municipal Court on October 24, 2016, has no
bearing on the merits of his claims here. Rather, in this
action, the plaintiff alleges wrongful arrest. The fact of
the motion to revoke bond is relevant to the legitimacy of
the plaintiff's arrest. The reasons underlying the motion
to revoke bond, and whether or not those reasons have merit,
are issues for the state court. The plaintiff's
objections to this court acknowledging the existence of the
state court motion to revoke bond are overruled.
The
plaintiff next objects to the finding that his current
detention appears to be based upon the bond revocation,
because the bodycam footage of his arrest shows defendant
Michael Kent first telling the plaintiff he is under arrest
for a felony warrant, then admitting no felony warrant
exists, then arresting the plaintiff for misdemeanor public
intoxication. (Doc. 11 at 2). However, the court actually
found “nothing in the record currently before the Court
rules out the possibility the plaintiff was wrongfully
arrested and detained on a false public intoxication charge
on February 17, 2017. (Doc. 10 at 10). In other words, the
finding the plaintiff objects to is the very finding he
asserts the court should have made. This objection is
overruled.
Finally,
the plaintiff objects to the finding that his failure to
supervise claim against the City of Decatur fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 11 at 2). In
his amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged only that
“City of Decatur, AL has custom of arresting me without
field sobriety test and charging me with DUI or PI even after
0.0% BAC is established which constitutes deliberate
indifference.” (Doc. 9 at 4). The plaintiff now claims
the purchase of bodycams was “specifically for the
purpose of supervising the officers wearing the cameras.
Obviously the municipality knew of the need when it purchased
the cameras … and ignoring what they capture
constitutes deliberate indifference.” (Doc. 11 at 2).
To
establish a claim against a city for failing to supervise, a
plaintiff must allege “a direct causal link between a
municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). As explained by the Eleventh
Circuit
To allege a custom or policy giving rise to a
substantive-due-process violation, a plaintiff must point to
either an officially promulgated policy or an unofficial
custom or practice of the government entity shown through the
repeated acts of a final policymaker for that entity.
Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329-30 (11th
Cir. 2003). Either way, though, a plaintiff “(1) must
show that the local governmental entity ... has authority and
responsibility over the governmental function in issue and
(2) must identify those officials who speak with final
policymaking authority for that local governmental entity
concerning the act alleged to have caused the particular
constitutional violation in issue.” Id., at
1330. We have noted that a government entity almost never
will have a formal policy allowing a particular
constitutional violation. Id. So, usually, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the government entity has a
custom or practice of allowing the particular constitutional
violation. Id. To do this, a plaintiff generally
must show “‘a persistent and widespread
practice.'” Church v. City of Huntsville,
30 F.3d 1332, 1345 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Depew v.
City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir.
1986)). Indeed, the practice must be extensive enough to
allow actual or constructive knowledge of such customs or
policies to be attributed to the governing body of the
municipality. Id. “Normally random acts or
isolated incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or
policy.” Church, 30 F.3d at 1345 (quoting
Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d at 1499).
Daniel v. Hancock County School Dist., 626 Fed.Appx.
825, 832 (11th Cir. 2015).
Nothing
in the plaintiff's allegations identifies a municipal
policy or custom. Rather, the plaintiff claims only that, on
two occasions, he was wrongfully arrested for DUI when he was
not intoxicated. The plaintiff asserts the city purchased the
bodycams to supervise its officers and therefore the failure
to review the bodycam footage amounts to a failure to
supervise the officers. The problem with this argument is
that the city's failure to review the bodycam footage did
not cause a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional
rights. Nothing in the plaintiff's wholly conclusory,
unsupported statements concerning the purchase of bodycams
supports a finding that a city decisionmaker knew that City
of Decatur police officers needed further supervision in
arresting suspects, and with that knowledge, failed to
undertake any training. Rather, the plaintiff's objection
makes clear he seeks to hold the city liable “for the
wrongful actions of its police officers in making a false
arrest.” See Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d
1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). Section 1983 does not permit
such respondeat superior liability. Id.
Based
on the foregoing, the plaintiff's objection to the
conclusion that he failed to state a viable claim for
municipal liability for failure to supervise is overruled.
Having
carefully reviewed and considered de novo all the
materials in the court file, including the report and
recommendation, the plaintiff's objections are
OVERRULED. The magistrate judge's report
is hereby ADOPTED and the recommendation is
ACCEPTED. The court ORDERS
that the plaintiff's claims against the City of Decatur
Police Department, the City of Decatur, and claims based on
excessive bail are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The
court further ORDERS that the plaintiffs
claims against defendant Derrick Anderson for wrongful arrest
and false imprisonment are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE as barred by the statute of limitations.
The
court further ORDERS that the plaintiffs
remaining claims, specifically his malicious prosecution
claim against Derrick Anderson based on the October 18, 2016
arrest and later dismissal of that charge, and his wrongful
arrest and false imprisonment claim against Michael Kent
concerning his February 17, 2017 arrest, are
REFERRED to the magistrate judge for further
proceedings.
DONE
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