Appeal
from the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 3:11-cr-00074-ECM-SRW-1
Before
WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER
CURIAM.
Jeffery
Hill, a federal prisoner, appeals the revocation of his
supervised release after Hill was arrested while on
supervised release for unlawful possession of marijuana in
the first degree, in violation of Ala. Code §
13A-12-213; certain persons forbidden to possess a firearm,
in violation of § 13A-11-72; and possession of drug
paraphernalia, in violation of § 13A-12-260. During his
revocation proceedings, Hill filed a motion to suppress
evidence seized during the routine traffic stop that resulted
in his arrest, arguing that because the detention, search,
and seizure were illegal, the evidence the police seized
should have been excluded from the revocation proceedings.
However, the district court found that the exclusionary rule
did not apply to those proceedings and, therefore, denied his
motion to suppress. On appeal, Hill argues that the evidence
should have been suppressed, but he does not address whether
the exclusionary rule applies to revocation of supervised
release proceedings. After careful review, we affirm.
We
review the denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed
standard, reviewing the district court's findings of fact
for clear error and its application of the law to those facts
de novo. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d
1298, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2012).
The
Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const.
amend. IV. "[T]he Fourth Amendment contains no provision
expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in
violation of its commands." Arizona v. Evans,
514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995). Nonetheless, the exclusionary rule,
when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained
evidence during a criminal trial. Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009).
The
Supreme Court has not extended the exclusionary rule to
proceedings outside the criminal trial context. See,
e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998) (refusing to extend the rule to
state parole revocation proceedings); I.N.S. v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (holding that
the rule does not apply to deportation proceedings);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454, 459-60
(1976) (refusing to extend the rule to civil proceedings);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55
(1974) (holding that the rule does not apply to grand jury
proceedings). We've not addressed in a published decision
whether the exclusionary rule applies to revocation of
supervised release proceedings. However, every circuit that
has faced the issue has found that the exclusionary rule does
not apply in supervised release proceedings. See United
States v. Phillips, 914 F.3d 557, 558 (7th Cir. 2019)
("Scott left no room for the application of the
exclusionary rule to supervised-release-revocation
hearings."); United States v. Charles, 531 F.3d
637, 640 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he exclusionary rule
generally does not apply in revocation of supervised release
proceedings."); United States v. Hebert, 201
F.3d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) ("[W]e
conclude that the exclusionary rule does not apply to
supervised release revocation hearings."); United
States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 394 (4th Cir. 1999)
("Scott requires that the exclusionary rule not
be extended to federal supervised release revocation
proceedings."); United States v. Alexander, 124
F.3d 200, *1 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished
decision) ("[T]he exclusionary rule does not apply in
supervised release revocation proceedings."); United
States v. Montez, 952 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1992)
("[W]e hold that the exclusionary rule, absent a showing
of harassment, does not apply to revocation of supervised
release hearings.").
On
appeal, Hill generally argues that the evidence seized during
his arrest should have been suppressed during his revocation
of supervised release proceedings. He does not, however,
directly argue that the exclusionary rule should apply to
supervised release revocation proceedings. Indeed, neither
this Court nor the Supreme Court has held that the
exclusionary rule applies in that context. To the contrary,
the Supreme Court has held in similar situations --
including, most notably, state parole revocation proceedings
-- that the exclusionary rule does not apply. See,
e.g., Scott, 524 U.S. at 369. As the Supreme
Court explained, because of the "substantial social
costs" of the exclusionary rule, it has "repeatedly
declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other
than criminal trials." Id. at 363. These costs
include: its toll on "the truthfinding process,"
its incompatibility with the "traditionally flexible,
administrative procedures of parole revocation," and its
frequent necessity for "extensive litigation to
determine whether particular evidence must be excluded."
Id. at 364-66. The Supreme Court also observed that
"[t]he likelihood that illegally obtained evidence will
be excluded from trial provides deterrence against Fourth
Amendment violations, and the remote possibility that the
subject is a parolee and that the evidence may be admitted at
a parole revocation proceeding surely has little, if any,
effect on the officer's incentives." Id. at
367.
Hill
has not offered anything to indicate why, in light of the
Supreme Court's holding in the state parole revocation
context, the exclusionary rule should apply to the supervised
release revocation proceedings at issue here. Accordingly, we
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