United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Jasper Division
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
L.
SCOTT COOGLER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Stacey White Fuqua (“Fuqua”) originally filed
this action in Alabama state court, seeking compensatory and
exemplary damages for injuries resulting from a highway
collision with a tractor trailer operated by Defendant Marlin
Goodpasture, an employee of Defendant D&M Carriers, LLC
(“D&M”) (collectively,
“Defendants”). Fuqua brings claims of common law
negligence and wantonness against both Defendants and several
fictitious defendants, as well as negligent entrustment and
negligent/wanton hiring, training, and supervision claims
against D&M and fictitious defendants.
On
October 3, 2019, Defendants removed the case to this Court,
asserting diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332. (Doc. 1.) In the notice of removal, Defendants asserted
that removal was timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3)
because they only “first . . . ascertained” that
the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000 upon receipt of
Fuqua's settlement demand letter on September 16, 2019,
in which she demanded more than $2 million. Fuqua
subsequently filed a motion to remand (doc. 3), alleging that
removal was not timely because it was facially apparent from
her complaint that the amount in controversy requirement was
met; therefore, under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), the
deadline to remove expired 30 days after Defendants were
served, well before the notice of removal was filed. This
Court set a briefing scheduling, and Defendants timely filed
a response. (Doc. 6.) Fuqua did not file a reply.
For the
reasons stated below, Defendants' removal of this action
was not timely. Therefore, Fuqua's motion to remand is
due to be GRANTED, and this matter is due to be REMANDED to
the Circuit Court of Marion County, Alabama.
I.
BACKGROUND[1]
On
April 17, 2017, Fuqua, an Alabama State Trooper, was a
passenger in a vehicle driven by William Hall, for whom she
was administering a driving test. Fuqua and Hall were
traveling eastbound on I-22 in the right lane when Hall
slowed to exit the Interstate onto US-43. Goodpasture, while
acting as an employee of D&M and while in the line and
scope of his duties, was traveling in his commercial
18-wheeler behind Fuqua and Hall's vehicle. Goodpasture
failed to notice Hall's decrease in speed and rear-ended
the vehicle. The State Trooper who investigated the accident
determined that just moments before the collision,
Goodpasture took his eyes off the roadway, while traveling at
75 MPH, to attend to his two dogs in the cab of the truck.
The Trooper concluded that Goodpasture's distracted
driving caused the accident.
On
February 19, 2019, Fuqua sued Goodpasture, D&M, and
several fictitious defendants in state court for the injuries
she sustained in the accident. Goodpasture and D&M were
each served with the complaint on March 1, 2019.
(See doc. 1 at 2.) In her complaint, Fuqua alleges
that Goodpasture was driving his 18-wheeler at a high rate of
speed when he rear-ended Fuqua's vehicle. Her complaint
also alleges that Goodpasture was reckless or wanton leading
up to the collision because Goodpasture was tending to his
two dogs in the cabin of the trailer. Further, Fuqua alleged
that because of the accident she has undergone five
surgeries; suffered pain and mental anguish; suffered
permanent physical and vocational impairment; incurred nearly
two years of lost wages from her job as a State Trooper; and
lost time towards her pension and retirement. She sought
compensatory damages, as well as exemplary damages for
Defendants' wanton conduct, in an amount to be assessed
by a jury.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A
defendant may remove an action initially filed in state court
to federal court if the action is one over which the federal
court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a);
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987). As relevant here, jurisdiction exists if there is
complete diversity between the parties[2] and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75, 000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1);
Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d
1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005). Where, as here, the
plaintiff's complaint does not specify the amount of
damages requested, “the removing defendant must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement.”
Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th
Cir. 2001). To determine whether this burden has been met,
this Court should first look to the complaint to see if it is
“facially apparent” that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75, 000. See Id. If “the
jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent from the
complaint, ” this Court then “look[s] to the
notice of removal and may require evidence relevant to the
amount in controversy at the time the case was
removed.” Id.
The
removal statute contemplates two ways that defendants may
remove a case based on diversity jurisdiction. First, in
cases where the grounds for removal are apparent on the face
of the initial pleading, the defendant may remove by filing a
notice of removal with the district court within 30 days of
receiving a copy of the initial pleading. See 28
U.S.C. § 1446(a)-(b). Second, when the jurisdictional
grounds become apparent through the defendant's receipt
of “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper
from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one
which is or has become removable, ” the defendant may
remove by filing a notice of removal within 30 days of
receipt of the amended pleading, motion, order or other
paper. Id. § 1446(b)(3). The “statutory
procedures for removal are to be strictly construed.”
Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S.
28, 33 (2002).
III.
DISCUSSION
At
issue is whether the Defendants removed this case within the
time prescribed by the removal statute. Defendants argue that
their removal was timely because the amount in controversy
was not apparent from Fuqua's complaint, and they first
ascertained that the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000
on September 16, 2019, upon receipt of Fuqua's settlement
demand letter requesting more than $2 million. For the
reasons explained below, the Court concludes that it was
facially apparent from Fuqua's complaint that the amount
in controversy exceeds $75, 000. As a result, the Court also
concludes that the removal was not timely because Defendants
filed the notice of removal more than 30 days after they
received the complaint in contravention of 28 U.S.C. §
1446(b)(1).
Fuqua's
complaint, on its face, demonstrates that the amount in
controversy more likely than not exceeds $75, 000. Fuqua
alleges that her passenger vehicle was struck from behind by
an 18-wheeler traveling at a high rate of speed-as fast as 75
MPH. Further, as a result of the accident, Fuqua has
undergone five surgeries; suffered pain and mental anguish;
suffered permanent physical and vocational impairment;
incurred nearly two years of lost wages from her job as a
State Trooper; and lost time towards her pension and
retirement. She also seeks exemplary damages for
Defendants' alleged wanton conduct. To determine whether
the face of the complaint establishes the jurisdictional
amount, district courts may make “reasonable
deductions, reasonable inferences, or other reasonable
extrapolations.” Roe v. Michelin N. America,
Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010). Courts need
not “suspend reality” and instead may use their
“judicial experience and common sense” to decide
whether it is facially apparent that the amount in
controversy is met. Id. It “defies common
sense” that Fuqua would be seeking $75, 000 or less
given her allegations of five surgeries, pain and mental
anguish, permanent physical and vocational impairment, two
years of lost wages from her job as a State Trooper, lost
time towards pension and retirement, and her request for
exemplary damages. See Jones v. Novartis Pharm. Co.,
952 F.Supp.2d 1277, 1284 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (reaching the same
conclusion based on plaintiff's allegations of three
major surgeries, ongoing physical therapy, continuing pain
and suffering, permanent injuries, and a request for punitive
damages).[3] Based on its “judicial experience
and common sense, ” this Court concludes that
Fuqua's allegations “facially establish the
jurisdictionally required amount in controversy.”
Roe, 613 F.3d at 1063.
Defendants
assert in their notice of removal that prior to this case
being filed, they received medical documents and retail
billing information regarding Fuqua's post-accident
treatment, and that the expenses “remained well below
the amount in controversy threshold.” (Doc. 1 ¶
22.) However, Defendants did not specify the amount of the
expenses, leaving the Court unable to determine just how far
below the $75, 000 threshold they were. Defendants'
omission is significant because Fuqua allegedly has suffered
pain and mental anguish and is seeking exemplary damages,
meaning she seeks a greater recovery than mere compensation
for her injuries. Further, Defendants' argument regarding
medical expenses does not account for Fuqua's other
alleged damages, including almost two years of lost wages
from her job as a State Trooper and lost time towards her
retirement and pension. In ...