Jones v. Beasley

          RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

          WALLACE CAPEL, JR. CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         I. INTRODUCTION

         This civil action is pending before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 application for habeas corpus relief filed by Quincy B. Jones, a federal inmate currently incarcerated at the Allenwood United States Penitentiary in White Deer, Pennsylvania.^[1] In this habeas petition, Jones alleges that under recent Supreme Court case law his murder for hire conviction no longer qualifies as a crime of violence and this court miscalculated the applicable sentencing guidelines. Doc. 1 at 5-6; Doc. 1-1- at 2-5. Jones maintains that he may proceed on his claims in a 28 U.S.C § 2241 petition under the “saving clause” of 28 U.S.C § 2255(e). Doc. 1-1 at 4-6. Although Jones states that the Allenwood United States Penitentiary in White Deer, Pennsylvania is located in the jurisdiction of this court, Doc. 1-1 at 1, this facility is actually located within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 28 U.S.C. § 118.

         Upon review of the habeas petition, the court finds that this case should be transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).^[2]

         II. DISCUSSION

         In the present civil action, Jones presents challenges to his federal conviction and sentence in a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. Jones alleges he is permitted to seek relief under 28. U.S.C. § 2241 via the “saving clause” set forth in 28 U.S.C § 2255(e). However, to proceed in such a habeas action, Jones must satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. As a general rule, a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for habeas corpus relief “may be brought only in the district court for the district in which the inmate is incarcerated.” Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d, 1488, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991); Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-495 (1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.”). “Jurisdiction is determined at the time the action is filed[.]” United States v. Edwards, 27 F.3d 564 (4th Cir. 1994).

The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the proper respondent to a habeas petition is “the person who has custody over [the petitioner].” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; see also § 2243 (“The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained”). The consistent use of the definite article in reference to the custodian indicates that there is generally only one proper respondent to a given prisoner's habeas petition. This custodian, moreover, is “the person” with the ability to produce the prisoner's body before the habeas court. Ibid. We summed up the plain language of the habeas statute over 100 years ago in this way: “[T]hese provisions contemplate a proceeding against some person who has the immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the body of such party before the court or judge, that he may be liberated if no sufficient reason is shown to the contrary.” Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574, 5 S.Ct. 1050, 29 L.Ed. 277 (1885) (emphasis added); see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus” acts upon “the person who holds [the detainee] in what is alleged to be unlawful custody, ” citing Wales, supra, at 574, 5 S.Ct. 1050); Braden, supra, at 495, 93 S.Ct. 1123 (“‘[T]his writ . . . is directed to . . . [the] jailer, '” quoting In re Jackson, 15 Mich. 417, 439-40 (1867)).

In accord with the statutory language and Wales' immediate custodian rule, longstanding practice confirms that in habeas challenges [, if they may be raised via § 2255(e)'s “saving clause” in a § 2241 habeas petition, ] to present physical confinement - “core challenges” -the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held. . . .

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 (2004).^[3]

         Jones is presently incarcerated in the Allenwood United States Penitentiary in White Deer, Pennsylvania, a facility not located within the jurisdiction of this court. Instead, this federal penitentiary is located within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. “District courts are limited to granting habeas relief within their respective jurisdictions. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a). “[The Supreme Court has] interpreted this language to require nothing more than that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian[.]” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442. This court therefore lacks jurisdiction over the petitioner's current § 2241 habeas petition. However, the law provides that when a case is filed “laying venue in the wrong division or district” a district court may, “if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district . . . where it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district . . . where it might have been brought[.]”); 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (specifically granting federal courts the power to transfer a civil action to “cure a want of jurisdiction” where such transfer “is in the interest of justice[.]”). Under the circumstances of this case, the undersigned concludes that in the interest of justice this case should be transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania for review and disposition.^[4]

         III. CONCLUSION

         Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case be transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

         On or before December 2, 2019, the parties may file objections to this Recommendation. The parties must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in the Recommendation to which the objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the court.

         Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and legal conclusions set forth in the Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of these factual findings and legal conclusions and shall “waive the right to challenge on appeal the District Court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993)(“When the magistrate provides such notice and a party still fails to object to the findings of fact [and law] and those ...