EX PARTE Kristi KELLEY (In re: Arnold Curry, as administrator of the Estate of A.C., a deceased minor
v.
Kristi Kelley et al.). Ex parte Becky Van Gilder (In re: Arnold Curry, as administrator of the Estate of A.C., a deceased minor
v.
Kristi Kelley et al.)
Montgomery
Circuit Court, CV-15-900134.
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[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
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Steve
Marshall, atty. gen., and Sharon E. Ficquette, gen. counsel,
and Felicia M. Brooks, deputy atty. gen., Department of Human
Resources, for petitioner Kristi Kelley.
Terrie
Scott Morgan of Capell & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, for
petitioner Becky Van Gilder.
D.
Brett Turnbull and Andrew J. Moak, of Cory Watson, P.C.,
Birmingham, for respondent.
PER
CURIAM.
This
case addresses whether a foster-care provider and a
caseworker for the Department of Human Resources
("DHR") are immune from liability. Arnold Curry
filed this wrongful-death action against Becky Van Gilder, a
licensed foster-care provider, and Kristi
Kelley,[1] a caseworker with the Montgomery
County DHR office, seeking damages for the death of his
nine-year-old son A.C., who died of complications related to
sickle-cell anemia after DHR removed him from Curry's
home. Curry alleged that Van Gilder had acted negligently and
wantonly in caring for A.C. and that Kelley had acted
negligently and wantonly in managing A.C.'s case. Van
Gilder and Kelley separately asked the Montgomery Circuit
Court to enter summary judgments in their favor, denying
liability and arguing that they were protected by immunity
based on their respective roles as a foster parent and a DHR
caseworker. The trial court denied their motions. They have
separately petitioned this Court for writs of mandamus
directing the trial court to vacate its previous order
denying their summary-judgment motions and to enter a new
order granting those motions. We have consolidated the
petitions for the purpose of issuing one opinion. We grant
the petitions in part and deny them in part.
Facts
and Procedural History
On
February 25, 2013, DHR removed A.C. and his two siblings from
their home after receiving reports from officials at the
children's school and a neighbor of the family indicating
that Curry was physically abusing the children. DHR placed
the children with Van Gilder and, after conducting an
investigation and substantiating the allegations of abuse,
DHR obtained legal custody of the children. Kelley was
assigned to be the caseworker for the children and, in
accordance with DHR policy, drafted the initial
Individualized Service Plan ("ISP"), setting forth
DHR's plans and goals for the family.
Van
Gilder was told at placement that A.C. suffered from
sickle-cell anemia, and she subsequently took him to
appointments with his primary-care physician and received
instruction from the Sickle Cell Center associated with the
University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital. Van Gilder
states that she was told it was important for A.C. to stay
hydrated and to rest when he was tired but that he could
otherwise engage in any activities that interested him. She
also states that she was told to give him ibuprofen or
acetaminophen if he complained of pain but that, if that
medication did not alleviate his pain, if he complained of
chest pain, or if he had a body temperature of over 101
degrees, she should seek emergency medical treatment. Kelley
also attended at least some of A.C.'s medical
appointments and visited the children on at least a monthly
basis over the next several months.
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On May
18, 2013, Van Gilder's grandmother died, and she made
plans to attend the funeral, which was out of state. Van
Gilder arranged for Susan Moss, a friend and another licensed
foster parent, to care for A.C. and his siblings while she
was away.[2] Van Gilder states that she told Moss
about A.C.'s condition and care and that, when she left
the children with Moss on May 24, 2013, she also left pain
medication for A.C. in case it was needed. That evening, A.C.
told Moss that he had a stomachache; he subsequently felt
better and no medication was administered. On May 25, 2013,
A.C. again reported that he had a stomachache. Moss gave him
acetaminophen and, after taking a nap, A.C. said he felt
better. Van Gilder states that she communicated with Moss and
A.C. later that day and that they both told her he was
feeling better.
A.C.
did not complain of any discomfort over the next two days. On
May 28, 2013, he woke up with a sore throat and asked for a
Sprite soft drink. Shortly afterward, Van Gilder retrieved
him and his siblings from Moss's home; A.C. apparently
made no further complaints before going to bed that night.
After A.C. went to bed, one of his siblings alerted Van
Gilder that A.C. was in pain and was crying. Van Gilder
checked on him, and, when he complained of chest pain, she
took him to the emergency room. A.C. was admitted to the
hospital. Van Gilder notified Kelley of his hospitalization
the next morning, and Kelley went to the hospital and visited
him.
A.C.
initially appeared to be in stable condition, but on May 30,
2013, his condition deteriorated, and the decision was made
to transfer him to a hospital in Birmingham because he was
showing symptoms of acute chest syndrome and hypoxia, which
are complications of sickle-cell anemia. Van Gilder
accompanied A.C. in the ambulance to Birmingham, but before
A.C. could be given a needed blood transfusion, he suffered
respiratory failure and died.
On
January 26, 2015, Curry, initiated this wrongful-death action
against Van Gilder and Kelley, alleging that their negligence
and wantonness caused A.C.'s death.[3] The essence of
Curry's complaint was that Van Gilder and Kelley failed
to act in accordance with DHR policies and guidelines and
that their failure to do so proximately caused A.C.'s
death. Curry alleged that Van Gilder had been provided
guidelines for caring for a child with sickle-cell anemia and
that she violated those guidelines by not telling Moss to
take A.C. to the hospital after being apprised that he had
complained of stomach pain on consecutive days. Curry alleged
that Kelley failed to properly manage A.C.'s case by not
educating herself about A.C.'s condition and by failing
to ensure that necessary information regarding his care was
shared with all interested parties, including the different
divisions of DHR, Van Gilder, and Moss. Curry further alleged
that, if Kelley had acted properly, A.C. would have been
classified as "medically fragile" and, under DHR
policy, his caretakers
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would have been subject to additional training and oversight.
On
November 17, 2017, Van Gilder and Kelley filed separate
motions for a summary judgment. Van Gilder argued in her
motion that the doctrine of parental immunity barred any
claim against her based on negligence and that Curry had
identified no evidence indicating that she had acted wantonly
in caring for A.C. In her summary-judgment motion, Kelley
argued that she was entitled to parental immunity as well as
State-agent immunity. Kelley further argued that Curry had
identified no act or omission on her part that had
proximately caused A.C.'s death. On February 1, 2018, the
trial court conducted a hearing on the motions for summary
judgment. Several months later, the trial court denied both
motions without stating its rationale for doing so. Van
Gilder and Kelley subsequently filed separate petitions for
the writ of mandamus with this Court.
Standard
of Review
"A
writ of mandamus is a
"`drastic and extraordinary writ that will be issued
only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon
the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do
so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'
"Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628
So.2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993)."
Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002). This
Court generally will not entertain a mandamus challenge to a
trial court's denial of a summary-judgment motion, but we
make an exception to this rule when a trial court has denied
a summary-judgment motion that is "grounded on a claim
of immunity." Id. See also Ex parte Spurgeon,
82 So.3d 663, 665 (Ala. 2011) (considering a petition for a
writ of mandamus filed by foster parents arguing that they
were entitled to a summary judgment on the basis of the
doctrines of parental immunity, State immunity, and
State-agent immunity); Ex parte Sumerlin, 26 So.3d
1178, 1183 (Ala. 2009) (considering a petition for a writ of
mandamus filed by a DHR employee arguing that a summary
judgment should have been entered in her favor based on the
doctrine of State-agent immunity). Because one of the
purposes of immunity is to spare a defendant from the demands
associated with defending a drawn-out lawsuit, a defendant
wrongfully denied immunity protection has no adequate remedy
if the case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Ryan
v. Hayes, 831 So.2d 21, 31-32 (Ala. 2002).
We
emphasize, however, that this Court will consider such
petitions only to the extent they challenge the trial
court's determination of immunity issues. This
Court will not consider secondary arguments about the
appropriateness of summary judgment on other grounds or
review the trial court's conclusions on other issues
decided at the same time as the immunity issue. See
Spurgeon, 82 So.3d at 670 (stating that this Court would
not consider the trial court's rulings on matters not
"relevant to the resolution of the issues of the
applicability of parental, State, or State-agent
immunity" because those rulings were "beyond the
proper scope of mandamus review"); Ex parte
Hudson, 866 So.2d 1115, 1120 (Ala. 2003) (explaining
that on mandamus review of a denial of a summary-judgment
motion grounded on immunity "[w]e confine our
interlocutory review to matters germane to the issue of
immunity," and that "[m]atters relevant to the
merits of the underlying tort claim, such as issues of duty
or causation, are best left to the trial court").
As
further explained in Wood, the standard of review we
apply on a
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petition for a writ of mandamus to a trial court's denial
of a motion seeking a summary judgment on immunity grounds is
the same standard of review we would apply in any appeal
reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for a
summary judgment:
"If there is a genuine issue as to any material fact
on the question whether the movant is entitled to immunity,
then the moving party is not entitled to a summary
judgment. Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. In determining whether
there is [an issue of] material fact on the question
whether the movant is entitled to immunity, courts, both
trial and appellate, must view the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, accord the nonmoving
party all reasonable favorable inferences from the
evidence, and resolve all reasonable doubts against the
moving party, considering only the evidence before the
trial court at the time it denied the motion for a summary
judgment. Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911, 912 (Ala.
2000)."
852 So.2d at 708.
Van
Gilder's Petition (no. 1170995)
Van
Gilder argues first that the trial court erred by not
entering a summary judgment in her favor on Curry's
wrongful-death claim to the extent that claim is premised on
alleged negligence. She bases her argument on the doctrine of
parental immunity, which she says bars negligence-based
claims against a foster parent. In support of her argument,
Van Gilder cites multiple cases decided by this Court,
including Spurgeon, in which we stated the rule that
"in Alabama the parental-immunity doctrine extends to
foster parents with regard to simple negligence claims."
82 So.3d at 668. Curry concedes that Van Gilder's
argument is meritorious, and he does not oppose this
Court's granting her petition with regard to the
negligence allegations in his complaint.
Curry
argues, however, that to the extent his wrongful-death claim
is based on wantonness, it is not barred by the doctrine of
parental immunity. Van Gilder agrees. The parties' view
of the scope of parental immunity is in accord with the
applicable law, which we explained in Spurgeon:
"The [foster parents] do not argue that they are
entitled to parental immunity on the wantonness claims,
and, indeed, our decision in Mitchell [v. Davis,
598 So.2d 801 (Ala. 1992)], makes it clear that such claims
against foster parents are not barred by the
parental-immunity doctrine. Mitchell, 598 So.2d at
805-06 (`[T]he trial court must determine whether the acts
by the defendants alleged to give rise to liability would
amount only to simple negligence or would rise to the level
of wantonness. ... If the alleged acts amounted to
wantonness ..., then the wantonness claim by the foster
children would not be barred by the parental immunity
doctrine.')."
82 So.3d at 669. Thus, there is no question that the doctrine
of parental immunity bars Curry's wrongful-death claim
against Van Gilder to the extent that claim is based on
alleged negligence, but not ...