United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES S. COODY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
On
October 22, 2019, Lamont Drayton (“Drayton”), a
federal inmate at the Maxwell Federal Prison Camp, filed this
pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. # 1. Drayton challenges the validity
of a judgment regarding convictions imposed upon him in 2011
by the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas for various controlled substance offenses, possession
of firearm in the furtherance of a drug trafficking crime,
and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Doc. # 1 at 2.
Specifically, Drayton argues that “his appointed
counsel and the United States Government ill-advised
petitioner as to applicable penalties, by convincing
petitioner he was subject to mandatory 25 years if
convicted” on certain counts, which Drayton says was
erroneous advice that caused him to plead guilty.
Id. He further argues that the First Step Act
enacted in December of 2018 is retroactive to his case and
“chang[ed] the structure of [18 U.S.C.] § 924(c),
making it no longer applicable for multiple gun charges with
drugs . . . [which] emancipates Petitioner from any
retributive punishment [for his gun offense].”
Id. at 3.
Next,
Drayton invokes the Supreme Court's recent holding in
United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), and
argues that it “invalidated a section of 924(c) and its
constitutionality [such] that he should not have received
penalties of enhanced 924(c)[, ]” and he therefore
seeks “correction of [his] sentence.”
Id. at 4-5. Drayton asks this court to
“correct the sentence removing the 924(c) enhancement,
perform recalculations, reassess petitioner[']s base
offense level and criminal history category, while deleting
the 924(c) enhancement, as required and argued. . ., [and]
request[s] . . . a judgment of resentencing petitioner to
time served or a sentence appropriate to the release of
petitioner within the near future[.]” Id. at
5.
For the
reasons that follow, the undersigned finds this action should
be transferred to the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas, Drayton's court of conviction.
II.
DISCUSSION
Federal
courts have “an obligation to look behind the label of
a motion filed by a pro se inmate and determine
whether the motion is, in effect, cognizable under a
different remedial statutory framework.” United
States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 624-25 (11th Cir. 1990).
Although this action was brought as a petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, this court must consider whether the
action is properly styled as such, or if it is more
appropriately considered as a motion to vacate under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.
Section
2241 provides an avenue for challenges to matters such as the
administration of parole, prison disciplinary actions, prison
transfers, and certain types of detention. See, e.g.,
Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348,
1351-52 (11th Cir. 2008) (petition challenging decision of
federal Parole Commission is properly brought under §
2241); Bishop v. Reno, 210 F.3d 1295, 1304 n.14
(11th Cir. 2000) (petition challenging Bureau of Prisons'
administration of service credits, including calculation,
awarding, and withholding, involves execution rather than
imposition of sentence, and thus is a matter for habeas
corpus). For purposes of venue, petitions filed under §
2241 must be brought in the district in which the petitioner
is incarcerated. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,
442-43 (2004).
In
contrast, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) states:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established
by an Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon
the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added). For actions
properly considered under § 2255, venue and jurisdiction
lie only in the district of conviction. 28 U.S.C. §
2255(a).
Drayton's
self-described § 2241 petition challenges the validity
of his convictions and sentence by questioning the validity
of his guilty plea entered before the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas and the constitutionality of
the sentence imposed by that court. Generally, a federal
prisoner must bring any collateral attack on the legality of
his conviction or sentence through a motion to vacate under
§ 2255 rather than a petition for writ of habeas corpus
under § 2241. See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill
Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir.
2017); Venta v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Low, 2017 WL
4280936, at *1 (11th Cir. 2017). A petitioner challenging the
legality of his federal detention may do so under § 2241
only if he shows that § 2255 would be an
“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (the
so called “saving clause”); see also Johnson
v. Warden, 737 Fed.Appx. 989, 990-91 (11th Cir. 2018).
Drayton does not attempt to show that § 2255 would be an
inadequate vehicle to present his claims. Indeed, he cannot,
because his claims challenging the validity of his
convictions and sentence fall squarely within the realm of
injuries that § 2255 typically addresses.
When a
federal prisoner brings “a traditional claim attacking
his [conviction or] sentence that he could have brought in a
[§ 2255] motion to vacate, the remedy by [such] motion
is adequate and effective to test the legality of his
detention. . . . Allowing a prisoner with a claim that is
cognizable in a [§ 2255] motion to vacate to access
[§ 2241] nullifies the procedural hurdles of section
2255 and undermines the venue provisions.”
McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1090. Here, regardless of the
label Drayton places on his pleadings, his petition
challenging his convictions and sentence must be considered
as a motion under § 2255, not a § 2241 petition.
Section 2255 remains Drayton's exclusive remedy to bring
his challenge to his convictions and sentence.[1] Because he
challenges a judgment entered by the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas, jurisdiction to consider
the § 2255 motion lies only in the District of Kansas as
the district of conviction. See 28 U.S.C. §
2255(a).
Under
28 U.S.C. § 1631, a court that finds it lacks
jurisdiction to entertain a civil action may, if it is in the
interest of justice, transfer such action to any other court
in which the action could have been brought when it was
filed. Because Drayton is proceeding pro se, in the
interest of justice this ...