United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
R.
DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
matter is before the court on CHC Companies, LLC's
(“CHC”) and Correct Care Solutions, LLC's
(“CCS”) Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amended
Complaint. (Doc. # 74). The Motion has been fully briefed and
is under submission. (Docs. # 76, 80).
I.
Background
This
case is one of a series of several cases, primarily putative
class action suits, that have been brought against Judicial
Correction Services, Inc. (“JCS”), corporate
entities related to JCS, and municipalities that contracted
with JCS for probation supervision services. (Doc. #
72).[1]
In these cases, the court has ruled on numerous motions to
dismiss, several substantive dispositive motions following
discovery, and one motion for class certification.
Plaintiffs'
Fourth Amended Complaint in this case, like the complaints in
all of the other cases, focuses on probation services
provided by JCS to various municipalities in the state of
Alabama. (Doc. # 72). The vast majority of the well-pleaded
facts in the Fourth Amended Complaint relate to JCS.
(Id.). Based on a careful review of the Fourth
Amended Complaint, the only well-pleaded (i.e.,
non-conclusory) facts alleged regarding CHC and CCS are (1)
that “CHC merged with Defendant JCS on September 30,
2011”, and (2) that “CCS purchased Defendant CHC
in 2014.” (Doc. # 72 at ¶¶ 20-21). The
remaining allegations are wholly conclusory. For example,
Plaintiffs allege “CHC directed and controlled
Defendant JCS's operations . . . .” (Doc. # 72 at
¶ 20) and “CCS . . . directed and controlled
Defendant JCS's operations . . . .” (Doc. # 72 at
¶ 21). Plaintiffs further allege “[e]ach of the
plaintiffs [] was sentenced to probation, which Defendant
JCS, Defendant CHC, and/or Defendant CCS extended beyond two
(2) years.” (Doc. # 72 at ¶ 24)). To further
illustrate the conclusory nature of the allegations regarding
CHC and CCS, the court notes that Plaintiffs allege
“Plaintiff Antonio Calhoun was continuously kept on
probation by Defendants JCS, CHC and CCS for approximately
six (6) years, from February 12, 2009, through at least
February 5, 2015.” (Doc. # 72 at ¶ 29).
Interestingly, according to earlier allegations of the Fourth
Amended Complaint, CHC did not “merge” with JCS
until 2011, and CCS did not “purchase” JCS until
2014. (Doc. # 72 at ¶¶ 20-21). Therefore, it is not
plausibly alleged that either CHC or CCS kept Mr. Calhoun on
probation from 2009 through 2015. There are similar examples
of this type of conclusory factual allegations in the amended
pleading.
Plaintiffs
make no effort, in this fourth iteration of their
Complaint, to provide supporting factual detail to flesh out
these conclusory allegations regarding CHC and CCS.
II.
Standard of Review
The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). However, the
complaint must include enough facts “to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings
that contain nothing more than “a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action” do not meet Rule
8 standards, nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely
upon “labels and conclusions” or “naked
assertion[s]” without supporting factual allegations.
Id. at 555, 557. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, courts view the allegations in the complaint in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Watts
v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir.
2007).
To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement, '” the complaint
must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A
plausible claim for relief requires “enough fact[s] to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence” to support the claim. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556.
In
considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “1)
eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely
legal conclusions; and 2) where there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, ‘assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.'” Kivisto v. Miller, Canfield,
Paddock & Stone, PLC, 413 Fed.Appx. 136, 138 (11th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna
Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010)). That task
is context specific and, to survive the motion, the
allegations must permit the court based on its
“judicial experience and common sense . . . to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. If the court determines that
all of the well-pleaded facts, accepted as true, do not state
a claim that is plausible, the claims are due to be
dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
III.
Analysis
Count I
of the Fourth Amended Complaint asserts a Violation of Due
Process claim presumably against all Defendants. (Doc. # 72
at ¶¶ 22-43). Counts II, III, and IV contain Civil
Conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 involving
different municipal courts, again presumably against all
Defendants. (Doc. # 72 at ¶¶ 44-68). Count V
contains a Money Had and received claim, against presumably
against all Defendants.
A.
Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint Is An Impermissible
Shotgun Pleading
Each
count of the Fourth Amended Complaint adopts and incorporates
by reference all previous allegations. (Doc. # 72 at
¶¶ 22, 44, 58, 65, and 69). The Eleventh Circuit
has explained that “[t]he typical shotgun complaint
contains several counts, each one incorporating by reference
the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a situation
where most of the counts (i.e., all but the first)
contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal
conclusions.” Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v.
Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295
(11th Cir. 2002); see also Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm.
Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“Shotgun pleadings are those that incorporate every
antecedent allegation by reference into each subsequent claim
for relief or affirmative defense.”). Shotgun pleadings
violate rule 8(a)(2)'s direction that the pleading
provide a “short and plain statement” of a
plaintiff's claims and Rule 8(d)(1)'s direction that
each allegation “be simple, concise, and direct.”
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