United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ORDER
WILLIAM H. STEELE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (doc.
45) filed by defendant, Marino Caido-Cardenas. The Motion has
been briefed and is now ripe.
Cardenas
and two co-defendants were indicted in the Southern District
of Alabama for the offenses of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine on board a vessel, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §
70506(b), and possession with the intent to distribute
cocaine on board a vessel, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §
70503(a)(1). The Government alleges the following pertinent
facts in support of these charges: On July 18, 2019, the U.S.
Coast Guard Cutter Seneca was on patrol in the eastern
Pacific Ocean when its helicopter detected a go-fast vessel
(the “Vessel”) approximately 50 nautical miles
south of the Azuero Peninsula in Panama. The Coast Guard
intercepted the Vessel, which flew no flag, had no vessel
registration documents, and lacked any other indicia of
nationality. Upon boarding the Vessel, Coast Guard agents
located approximately 800 kilograms of contraband that tested
positive for cocaine. The Vessel's three-man crew, one of
whom was Cardenas, identified themselves as Colombian
nationals and were thereafter detained by the Coast Guard and
were transported to this District to face criminal charges
under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
(“MDLEA”).
In his
Motion to Dismiss, Cardenas challenges the constitutionality
of the MDLEA as applied to him because “[t]here is no
indication in the indictment or the record before the Court
that Mr. Cardenas's conduct had any connection to, or
actual or potential effect in, the United States.”
(PageID.87.) As Cardenas correctly recognizes, binding
precedent forecloses this line of argument. Indeed, the
Eleventh Circuit has “held that the MDLEA is a valid
exercise of Congress's power under the Felonies Clause as
applied to offenses without a nexus to the United States,
” and has “upheld extraterritorial convictions
under our drug trafficking laws as an exercise of power under
the Felonies Clause.” United States v. Valois,
915 F.3d 717, 722 (11thCir. 2019) (citations
omitted); see also United States v. Campbell, 743
F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2014) (“we have
long upheld the authority of Congress to extend the criminal
jurisdiction of this country to any stateless vessel in
international waters engaged in the distribution of
controlled substances”) (citation and internal marks
omitted).[1] Simply put, Eleventh Circuit
“precedent holds that the MDLEA as applied to drug
trafficking on stateless vessels in international waters
… is a valid exercise of Congress's Felonies
Clause power, even without a U.S. nexus.” United
States v. Vargas, __ Fed.Appx. __, 2019 WL 2577420, *3
(11th Cir. June 24, 2019).
Insofar
as Cardenas endeavors to assert a due process claim based on
his lack of notice that he could be violating the laws of the
United States, the same binding authorities negate such a
contention. See Valois, 915 F.3d at 722 (rejecting
due process argument by foreign nationals arguing that their
drug trafficking offense lacked a nexus to the United States,
and explaining that “the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the trial and conviction of
aliens captured on the high seas while drug trafficking
because the MDLEA provides clear notice that all nations
prohibit and condemn drug trafficking aboard stateless
vessels on the high seas”); Campbell, 743 F.3d
at 812 (similar).
Cardenas
also argues that dismissal of the Indictment is required
because the Eleventh Circuit “has consistently
recognized that extraterritorial application of United States
law must be supported by a principle of extraterritorial
jurisdiction recognized by customary international
law.” (PageID.87.) But binding precedent also undercuts
this argument by finding the requisite principles of
extraterritorial jurisdiction to exist in the MDLEA context.
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has “recognized that the
conduct proscribed by the [MDLEA] need not have a nexus to
the United States because universal and
protective principles support its extraterritorial
reach.” Campbell, 743 F.3d at
810 (emphasis added). “The protective principle does
not require that there be proof of an actual or intended
effect inside the United States. The conduct may be forbidden
if it has a potentially adverse effect and is generally
recognized as a crime by nations that have reasonably
developed legal systems.” United States v.
Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 939 (11th Cir. 1985).
As to universality, the Eleventh Circuit has found that
“[i]nasmuch as the trafficking of narcotics is
condemned universally by law-abiding nations, we see no
reason to conclude that it is ‘fundamentally
unfair' for Congress to provide for the punishment of
persons apprehended with narcotics on the high seas.”
United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336, 1339
(11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also
United States v. Saac, 632 F.3d 1203, 1210
(11th Cir. 2011) (MDLEA's extraterritorial
reach “was justified under the universal principle of
international law … because the MDLEA criminalizes
conduct that is condemned universally”). Stateless
vessels, such as the one on which Cardenas was a crew member,
alleged to be trafficking narcotics on the high seas
“are ‘international pariahs' that have
‘no internationally recognized right to navigate freely
on the high seas.'” Campbell, 743 F.3d at
810 (citations omitted).
In
light of these unambiguous binding authorities that Cardenas
correctly acknowledges are both directly on-point and fatal
to his arguments, the Motion to Dismiss (doc. 45) is
denied.
---------
Notes:
[1] Cardenas maintains that “[t]he
power conferred by the High Seas Clause can only be exercised
when the proscribed conduct has a nexus to the United
States.” (PageID.94-95.) Eleventh Circuit holdings are
to the contrary. See, e.g., United States v. Saac,
632 F.3d 1203, 1210 (11th Cir. 2011) (“In
the MDLEA cases, the appellants argued that offenses other
than piracies may not be punished under Congress's High
Seas Clause power when there is no nexus to the United
States. In each case, the court concluded, however, that
Congress's High Seas Clause power includes the authority
to punish offenses other than piracies outside the
territorial ...