United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ZP NO. 314, LLC, Plaintiff,
v.
ILM CAPITAL, LLC, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
SONJA
F. BIVINS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
action is before the Court on Defendants' motion to
alter, amend, or vacate judgment. (Doc. 191). The Court finds
that Defendants' motion can be resolved without the aid
of briefing from Plaintiff, and for the reasons set forth
herein, DENIES Defendants' motion.
I.
Standard for Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate
Judgment.
“The
only grounds for granting [a Rule 59] motion are
newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or
fact.” Ogburia v. Alabama Agric. & Mech.
Univ., 2009 WL 10688644, *1 (N.D. Ala. May 4,
2009)(quoting In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119
(11th Cir. 1999)). “[A] Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be
used] to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present
evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.” Id. (quoting Michael Linet,
Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763
(11th Cir. 2005)).
“In
the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial
resources, reconsideration of an order is an extraordinary
remedy and is employed sparingly.” Gougler v.
Sirius Products, Inc., 370 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1189 (S. D.
Ala. 2005); see also Spellman v. Haley, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27308, *1, 2004 WL 866837, *2 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 22,
2002)(“litigants should not use motions to reconsider
as a knee-jerk reaction to an adverse ruling”);
Gipson v. Mattox, 511 F.Supp.2d 1182, 1185 (S.D.
Ala. 2007)(a party may not “utilize a motion to
reconsider as a vehicle for rehashing arguments considered
and rejected in the underlying order.”). “Motions
to reconsider are not a platform to relitigate arguments
previously considered and rejected.” Gougler,
370 F.Supp.2d at 1189 n.1 (“It is well established in
this circuit that ‘[a]dditional facts and arguments
that should have been raised in the first instance are not
appropriate grounds for a motion for
reconsideration.'”); see also American Home
Assur. Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assoc., Inc., 763 F.2d
1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985)(cautioning against use of motion
to reconsider to afford a litigant “two bites at the
apple”); Rossi v. Troy State University, 330
F.Supp.2d 1240, 1249 (M.D. Ala. 2002)(denying motion to
reconsider where plaintiff failed to submit evidence prior to
entry of order and failed to show good cause for the
omission).
The
Eleventh Circuit has also stressed that “a motion to
reconsider should not be used by the parties to set forth new
theories of law.” Mays v. U.S. Postal Service,
122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997); accord Russell
Petroleum Corp. v. Environ Products, Inc., 333 F.Supp.2d
1228, 1234 (M.D. Ala. 2004); Coppage v. U.S. Postal
Service, 129 F.Supp.2d 1378, 1379-81 (M.D. Ga. 2001).
II.
Analysis.
In
their motion, Defendants argue that the Court applied the
incorrect legal standard to ZP's Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)) and state law trademark infringement/unfair
competition claims, when the Court ruled on the parties'
summary judgment motions over one year ago, on September 27,
2018.[1] (Docs. 130, 191). Specifically, Defendants
state that the Court “conflated the less stringent
‘confusingly similar' standard used in analyzing
[cybersquatting] claims with the more comprehensive, and more
difficult to satisfy, ‘likelihood of consumer
confusion' standard used in analyzing unfair competition
and trademark infringement claims.” (Doc. 191 at 2-3).
Defendants further state that:
[I]n the context of analyzing ZP's cybersquatting claim
at summary judgment, the Court determined that the Domain
Names and ZP's trademarks were ‘confusingly
similar.' Then, in the context of analyzing ZP's
unfair competition/trademark infringement claims, the Court
short-circuited the ‘likelihood of confusion'
analysis by referencing its finding that the Domain Names
were confusingly similar to ZP's marks. The Court carried
this same analysis over into the Trial Order.
(Doc. 191 at 2).
In the
Court's summary judgment order of September 27, 2018, the
Court analyzed ZP's claims under the Anti-Cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”), 15 U.S.C.
§1125(d)(1)(A), explaining that a defendant violates the
ACPA if it registers, traffics, or uses a domain name that is
identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive mark with a
bad faith intent to profit from its act(s). (Doc. 130 at 14).
In the order, the Court concluded, as a matter of law, that
Defendants' domain names were identical or confusingly
similar to ZP's protectible marks. (Id. at 33).
In the
Court's summary judgment order of September 27, 2018, the
Court also analyzed ZP's Lanham Act and state law
trademark infringement/unfair competition claims.
(Id. at 39-51). With respect to ZP's Lanham Act
claim, the Court explained:
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), was intended to
make “actionable the deceptive and misleading use of
marks[, ]” and “to protect persons engaged in . .
. commerce against unfair competition.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127. The Act provides a cause of action for unfair
competition by stating:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of
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