United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ORDER
KRISTI
K. DuBOSE CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on Defendant Jaycee Doak's
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, or, in the alternative,
Motion for a New Trial. (Docs. 170, 171, 180).
The
jury convicted Jaycee Doak of six counts of aiding and
abetting in the charge of transportation of a minor with
intent that the minor engage in any sexual activity for which
any person can be charged with a criminal offense, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), (e). The question Jaycee
Doak's motion presents is whether, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Government, a reasonable
jury could have concluded she “intend[ed] to facilitate
that offense's commission, ” Rosemond v. United
States, 572 U.S. 65, 76 (2014), i.e., that she
“participate[d] in it as in something that [s]he
wishe[d] to bring about” and “s[ought] by h[er]
action[s] to make it succeed.” Id. (quoting
Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619
(1949)).
I.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (Doc. 171)
Pursuant
to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
“[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may
vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a).
“Thus, there are two grounds upon which a court may
grant a motion for new trial: one based on newly discovered
evidence . . .; and the other based on any other reason,
typically the interest of justice . . . .” United
States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1151 (11th Cir. 2006).
The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for new trial
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. United
States v. Champion, 813 F.2d 1154, 1170 (11th Cir.
1987).
Jaycee
Doak filed a one sentence motion for new trial in which she
summarily states that trial with Mack Doak “may have
prevented her from having a fair trial.” Jaycee was
ordered to supplement her motion but failed to do so with any
facts, citations or authority in support. The court does not
find that the interest of justice or any other reason
supports a new trial. Accordingly, the motion is
DENIED.[1]
II.
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL (Doc. 170 and 180)
Rule 29
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
“[a]fter the government closes its evidence or after
the close of all the evidence, the court on the
defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of
any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain
a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).[2] The Rule also
provides that “[a] defendant may move for a judgment of
acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a
guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury,
whichever is later.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1).
“A
motion for judgment of acquittal is a direct challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence presented against the
defendant.” United States v. Aibejeris, 28
F.3d 97, 98 (11th Cir. 1994). In deciding such a motion,
“district courts should apply the same standard as that
used for reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of the
evidence. The Court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government and determine whether a
reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Sellers,
871 F.2d 1019, 1021 (11th Cir. 1989) (internal citations
omitted); see also United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d
1229, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007) (“In reviewing a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,
drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in
the Government's favor.”). To sustain a conviction,
the evidence need not “exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every
conclusion except that of guilt.” United States v.
Garcia, 447 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). “The jury is free to
choose between or among the reasonable conclusions to be
drawn from the evidence presented at trial, and the court
must accept all reasonable inferences and credibility
determinations made by the jury.” Sellers, 871
F.2d at 1021 (internal citations omitted).
Jaycee
Doak argues the evidence submitted was insufficient to
convict her primarily because the Government failed to
provide evidence that Jaycee Doak “wished, sought
success, [and] chose[] with full knowledge[] to participate
in [Mack Doak]'s illegal venture.” (Doc. 180 at 6
(citing Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 689-70). She
specifically argues that the Government failed to present
evidence that she possessed intent at the time of travel that
the minors engage in criminal sexual activity.
The
Government argues that “Jaycee Doak's continual
presence at each move, her transportation of the minors, her
knowledge of Mack Doak's sexual abuse, and her acts of
concealment, readily sufficed to enable the jury to
infer” she shared Mack Doak's criminal intent.
(Doc. 211 at 17)
The
issue is whether there was sufficient evidence to support a
conviction of Jaycee Doak for aiding and abetting Mack
Doak's violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). This
provision proscribes the following:
(a) Transportation with intent to engage in
criminal sexual activity.-A person who knowingly transports
an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in
interstate or foreign commerce . . ., with intent that the
individual engage in . . . any sexual activity for which any
person can be charged with a criminal offense . . . .
The
statue does not require the Government prove a sexual
activity ultimately occurred, just that the defendant
“formed the intent to engage in sexual activity with a
minor when he crossed state lines.” United States
v. Knight, 381 Fed.Appx. 942, 945 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quoting United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233,
1245-46 (11th Cir. 2002)). The intent to engage in sexual
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal
offense need not be a significant motivating purpose for the
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