Appeal
from Dallas Circuit Court (CV-18-900256)
Page 282
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Page 283
Kenneth J. Mendelsohn of Jemison & Mendelsohn, P.C.,
Montgomery, for appellant.
Randall Morgan, Elizabeth Brannen Carter, and Reed Morgan
Coleman of Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, Cole & Black,
P.C., Montgomery, for appellees.
BRYAN,
Justice.
Darrio
Melton ("the mayor"), as mayor of the City of Selma
("the city"), appeals from a judgment entered in
favor of the members of the Selma City Council ("the
council"). We affirm.
In
September 2018, the council adopted Ordinance No. 0108-17/18
("the ordinance"). The ordinance gives the council
the power to appoint the city's tax collector, chief of
police, and chief of the fire department "in accordance
and pursuant to [§ ] 11-43-5, [Ala. Code 1975]." In
relevant part, § 11-43-5, Ala. Code 1975, provides that
"[t]he council may provide for a... tax collector, chief
of police, and chief of the fire department and shall
specifically prescribe their duties." The mayor vetoed
the ordinance shortly after it was passed by the council.
However, the council later overrode the mayor's veto,
making the ordinance a part of the city's municipal code.
In
October 2018, the mayor sued the members of the council in
their official capacities. Named as defendants were council
members Corey D. Bowie, Angela Benjamin, Samuel Randolph,
Michael Johnson, Johnnie Leashore, Miah Jackson, Susan
Youngblood, Jannie Thomas, and Carl Bowline (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "the defendants"). In
his complaint, the mayor alleged that the ordinance violates
§ 11-43-81, Ala. Code 1975, which provides, in part,
that the mayor "shall have the power to appoint all
officers [of the city or town] whose appointment is not
otherwise provided for by law." The mayor sought a
judgment declaring the ordinance invalid; the complaint also
sought preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the
implementation of the ordinance.
The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
Ala. R. Civ. P., asserting that the complaint failed to
allege a claim on which relief may be granted. The mayor did
not file a response to the motion to dismiss. Following a
hearing, the trial court entered a judgment granting the
motion to dismiss, without providing a specific reason for
its ruling. Shortly thereafter, the mayor filed a motion to
stay the judgment pending an appeal to this Court, and the
trial court denied the motion to stay. In its order denying
the motion to stay, the trial court stated, in part, that the
law "is very clear on the issue presented in this case.
The Court finds that the [mayor] will not be successful on
the merits of an appeal, unless the Alabama Supreme Court
decides to break with years of precedent." The mayor
then appealed.
"The appropriate standard of review under Rule
12(b)(6) is whether, when the allegations of the complaint
are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it
appears that the pleader could prove
Page 284
any set of circumstances that would entitle [him] to
relief. Raley v. Citibanc of Alabama/Andalusia,
474 So.2d 640, 641 (Ala. 1985); Hill v. Falletta,
589 So.2d 746 (Ala.Civ.App. 1991). In making this
determination, this Court does not consider whether the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether [he]
may possibly prevail. Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470
So.2d 669, 671 (Ala. 1985); Rice v. United Ins. Co. of
America, 465 So.2d 1100, 1101 (Ala. 1984). We note
that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of the claim that would ...