United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
TERRY
F. MOORER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Now
pending before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment filed by the remaining defendant, Community Hospice
of Baldwin County (“CHBC”) on August 29, 2018.
Doc. 25. The Court has reviewed all the written pleadings,
motions, responses, and replies, and the relevant law, and a
hearing was held on the matter on July 10, 2019. Accordingly,
the motion is ripe for review. For the reasons discussed
below, the Court GRANTS the motion.
I.
Jurisdiction
The
Plaintiff, Terry Chaney (“Plaintiff” or
“Chaney”) asserts claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), as she alleges
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.;
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
Neither party contests either personal jurisdiction or venue
and adequate support exists for both.
II.
Background and Procedural History
Chaney,
proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in this case
asserting claims against CHBC, her former employer, of
discrimination on the bases of race, national origin,
disability, and age.[1]Doc. 1. She also asserts that CHBC
retaliated against her for reporting discrimination and
harassment. Specifically, Chaney alleges that she began
working for CHBC in October 2008, and that she was harassed
and discriminated against by Jennifer Stewart
(“Stewart”), a nurse practitioner and
administrator for CHBC, and another employee referred to as
“Dr. Dan.” Id. at 2. She asserts that
she reported the discrimination to a superior at CHBC and
filed charges alleging discriminatory conduct with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on May
6, 2017, and that Stewart retaliated against her for doing
so. Chaney alleges that “she”- presumably
Stewart-“remind[ed] me when she started back to work in
April or May, 2017 that she [was] going to terminate me from
my job, and [would] make sure I will never work again.”
Id. at 1.
Chaney
asserts she was terminated on September 25, 2017
“because of my age and in retaliation for
reporting” the discrimination and harassment to a vice
president at CHBC. Id. at 3. She alleges Stewart
stated that, “because of my age I can't do what I
used to do. I could not believe Dr. Dan told me that they
[were] firing me for that and some more, I could not believe
his words.” Id. Chaney asserts that she
received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on March 28,
2018. From this action Chaney seeks, inter alia,
back pay and reinstatement to her former job.
CHBC
moved for partial summary judgment on August 29, 2018. Docs.
25, 26. On September 11, 2018, after CHBC filed its motion
but before the Court issued a briefing schedule, Chaney filed
a response.[2] Doc. 30. Subsequently, the Court issued a
briefing schedule, and on October 17, 2018, Chaney filed
another response. Docs. 29, 32.[3] CHBC did not file a reply.
The
motion subsequently was held in abeyance pending a ruling by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Fort Bend Cty., Tex., v.
Davis, 139 S.Ct. 1843 (2019), to determine whether, in
the context of a Title VII discrimination claim, the
requirement that a plaintiff exhaust her administrative
remedies prior to filing suit is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit or a waivable claim-processing rule-a
question of relevance to this motion. See Doc. 37.
The Supreme Court ruled on June 3, 2019, holding that the
requirement is not jurisdictional. Davis, 139 S.Ct.
at 1851-52.
On June
5, 2019, this Court lifted the stay and permitted the parties
to file supplemental briefing. Doc. 38. CHBC responded on
June 17, 2019, with Defendant's Supplemental Brief
Regarding Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., Tex. Doc. 39. Chaney
did not file a supplemental response. A hearing was held on
the motion for partial summary judgment on July 10, 2019.
III.
Motion
CHBC
has moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that
Chaney's claims alleging discrimination on the basis of
race, national origin, and disability should be dismissed
because Chaney listed no such claims in her Charge of
Discrimination, and thus, those claims were not investigated
by the EEOC. Docs. 25, 26. More specifically, CHBC argues
that Chaney's Charge of Discrimination alleged only that
she was harassed and terminated from her position with CHBC
due to her age and in retaliation for reporting the
harassment, a protected activity. Defendant argues that
Chaney's claims made no mention of her race, national
origin, any disability, or any retaliation on those bases.
CHBC
argues that, because Chaney omitted those claims from her
Charge of Discrimination, they could not reasonably be
expected to have grown out of the facts contained in her
Charge of Discrimination and, as a result, did not fall
within the scope of the EEOC's investigation. CHBC
asserts that there is no genuine dispute of material fact in
relation to the claims listed in Chaney's Charge of
Discrimination or the reasonable scope of the investigation
that grew out of them. Consequently, CHBC seeks judgment as a
matter of law as to Chaney's claims of race, national
origin, and disability discrimination. CHBC attaches to its
complaint a Charge of Discrimination filed by Chaney with the
EEOC against CHBC. Doc. 26-1.
In its
supplemental response, CHBC argues that the Supreme
Court's decision in Davis confirms that
Chaney's claims are due to be dismissed because she
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Doc. 39. CHBC
notes that it pleaded failure to exhaust as an affirmative
defense in its Answer in this case and then raised it in the
instant motion, and thus, there is no reasonable argument
that this defense has been waived. CHBC attaches ...