United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northwestern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
C. BURKE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Kohler Company (“Kohler”), Chris Bell, and Jeff
Bennett (collectively, “defendants”) have filed a
motion to dismiss (doc. 7). Plaintiff did respond to the
motion to dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, the
motion to dismiss is granted.
17, 2019, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
(Doc. 1, pp. 12-14). In the charge, plaintiff alleged
discrimination based on age and disability, as well as
retaliation. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that she was
hired by Kohler on October 19, 2018, injured on the job on
October 24, 2018, and then terminated on December 19, 2018.
(Id.). Plaintiff's charge stated that December
19, 2018, was the latest date on which discrimination
allegedly took place. (Id. at 12).
26, 2019, the EEOC issued a dismissal and notice of rights
letter. (Id. at 9). In the letter, the EEOC stated
that it was closing its file on plaintiff's charge of
discrimination because she did not timely file her charge
with the EEOC. (Id.). Specifically, the letter
stated, “Your charge was not timely filed with the
EEOC; in other words, you waited too long after the date(s)
of the alleged discrimination to file your charge.”
August 7, 2019, plaintiff, who is pro se, filed her
complaint. In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that
defendants violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (“ADEA”)
and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12112-17 (“ADA”) via termination of
her employment, failure to accommodate her disability, and
retaliation. The complaint alleges that the discriminatory
acts occurred on October 28, 2018. (Doc. 1, p. 4).
September 5, 2019, defendants filed the motion to dismiss.
Although ordered to do so, plaintiff failed to file a
response to the motion to dismiss. Defendants argue that the
complaint fails to state a claim for two reasons. First,
defendants argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies by filing a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. Second, defendants argue that
plaintiff attempts to assert claims against individual
defendants under federal statutes that do not provide for
individual liability. The Court will address each argument in
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies
charge must be filed “within one hundred and eighty
 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 421
F.3d 1169, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Under . . . 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), only those unlawful employment
practice[s] that are complained of in a timely-filed charge
of discrimination to the EEOC can form the basis for Title
VII liability.”) (internal quotations marks omitted).
If a plaintiff fails to file an EEOC charge before the
180-day period elapses, the claim is untimely, and the
plaintiff's claim “is procedurally barred for
failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.”
Malone v. K-Mart Corp., 51 F.Supp.2d 1287, 1300
(M.D. Ala. 1999). A plaintiff pursing ADA and ADEA claims
must comply with the same procedural requirements set forth
in Title VII, which include filing a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. EEOC v. Summer Classics,
Inc., 471 Fed.Appx. 868, 869-70 (11th Cir. 2012)
(“Plaintiffs proceeding under the ADA must comply with
the same procedural requirements articulated in Title VII,
including the duty to exhaust administrative
remedies.”); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(A)
(stating that no civil action under the ADEA may be filed
unless a charge has been filed with the EEOC within 180 days
after the alleged unlawful practice occurred); Leach v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 431 Fed.Appx. 771,
774-75 (11th Cir. 2011). “Failure to file the charge
within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice
bars the claim.” Summer Classics, 471
Fed.Appx. at 870 (citation omitted); see also Zipes v.
TWA, 455 U.S. 385, 392-98 (1982); Maynard v.
Pneumatic Products Corp., 256 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir.
2001) (per curiam) (“Timely filing a charge of
discrimination is a prerequisite to bringing suit under both
Title VII and the ADA . . . . An ADA plaintiff has the burden
of proving all conditions precedent to filing suit, including
the condition that he timely filed with the EEOC.”);
Anderson v. Embarq/Sprint, 379 Fed.Appx. 924, 926
(11th Cir. 2010) (“Before filing suit under Title VII,
the ADA, or the ADEA, a plaintiff must exhaust the available
administrative remedies by filing a charge with the
EEOC.”); Jones v. Dillard's, Inc., 331
F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that because
Alabama is a non-deferral state, ADEA plaintiffs in Alabama
must comply with § 626(d)(1)(A)'s 180-day deadline).
charge indicates that she was injured on the job on October
24, 2014, and that prior to her injury, she was harassed or
discriminated against based on her age; plaintiff's
charge also states that she was ultimately terminated by
Kohler on December 19, 2018. Using the December 19, 2018,
termination date, the180-day deadline for plaintiff to file
her EEOC charge was, at the very latest, June 17, 2019.
Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge on July 17, 2019. In other
words, plaintiff's EEOC charge was not timely filed.
Indeed, the EEOC dismissed plaintiff's charge on the
basis that it was not timely filed. Therefore, the Court
finds that plaintiff's lawsuit should be dismissed for
failure to timely file an EEOC charge and exhaust her
administrative remedies as required by law.
No individual liability for ADEA and ADA
also argue that the claims against the individual defendants
in this action should be dismissed for an additional reason:
neither the ADEA nor the ADA provide for individual
liability. The Court agrees that the claims against the
individual defendants should be dismissed for this additional
reason. See, e.g., Tobar v. Fed. Defs. Middle
Dist. of Georgia, Inc., 618 Fed.Appx. 982, 985 n.2 (11th
Cir. 2015) (“The district court correctly dismissed
Roseberry from the lawsuit because there is no individual
liability under the ADEA or the ADA.”); Albra v.
Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 2007)
(“Because individual liability is precluded for
violations of the ADA's employment discrimination
provision, we conclude that the district court properly
dismissed Albra's discrimination claim against the
Abbotts.”); Williams v. Alabama Dep't of
Corr., No. 4:12-CV-4043-KOB, 2014 WL 636977, at *7 (N.D.
Ala. Feb. 18, 2014) (granting summary judgment as to
individual defendants because “‘only the
employer, not individual employees, can be liable
under'” the ADA, as is the case with Title VII and
the ADEA.”), aff'd, 649 Fed.Appx. 925
(11th Cir. 2016).