United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
L.
Scott Coogler United States District Judge
Plaintiff
Ivory Jean Seay (“Plaintiff” or
“Seay”), who is proceeding pro se,
brings this action against her former employer, Eagle
Cleaning Service (“Defendant” or
“Eagle”), alleging claims for disability
discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et
seq. (“the ADA”). Presently before the Court
is Eagle's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 24.) For
the reasons stated below, Eagle's motion (doc. 24) is due
to be granted.
I.
BACKGROUND [1]
On
March 7, 2017, Eagle hired Seay to work as a cleaning service
agent. On September 19, 2017, Seay told Debra Lewis
(“Lewis”), her supervisor, that she was
experiencing pain and needed to go to the hospital. Seay was
then informed that she needed to work, so she waited to go to
the hospital until after her last cleaning assignment. On
September 20, 2017, Seay's physician advised her not to
return to work the next day due to the medication she had
been provided. That same day, after Seay provided this
information to Lewis, Lewis terminated Seay's employment.
Seay
claims to suffer from degenerative arthritis in her arms,
hips, and lower back. Seay receives injections for this
condition. According to Seay, after a fellow employee
resigned, Eagle assigned her extra work, which caused her
medical condition to deteriorate. Seay states that she told
Lewis that the extra work was too much and that additional
help was needed. However, even after Lewis informed Seay that
a new employee had been hired, she was still being assigned
extra work.
Eagle
submitted an affidavit from its President and Owner stating
that Seay was terminated because she could not get along with
co-workers and because she had 13 absences from work in less
than 7 months. (Doc. 25-1 ¶¶ 6-7.) Eagle further
avers that it terminated Seay just like it has terminated
“all employees with multiple absences over a short time
period.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Further, Seay never
requested “a reasonable or any accommodation.”
(Id. ¶ 8.)
II.
STANDARD
Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact[2] and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). A dispute is genuine if “the record taken as a
whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party.” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co.,
Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). A genuine
dispute as to a material fact exists “if the nonmoving
party has produced evidence such that a reasonable factfinder
could return a verdict in its favor.” Greenberg v.
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental
Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001)). The
trial judge should not weigh the evidence, but determine
whether there are any genuine issues of fact that should be
resolved at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
In
considering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must
give deference to the nonmoving party by “view[ing] the
materials presented and all factual inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Animal
Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 789 F.3d
1206, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). However,
“unsubstantiated assertions alone are not enough to
withstand a motion for summary judgment.” Rollins
v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.
1987). Conclusory allegations and “mere scintilla of
evidence in support of the nonmoving party will not suffice
to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Melton
v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1219 (11th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (quoting Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d
859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004)).
In
making a motion for summary judgment, “the moving party
has the burden of either negating an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case or showing that there is no
evidence to prove a fact necessary to the nonmoving
party's case.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender
Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013).
Although the trial courts must use caution when granting
motions for summary judgment, “[s]ummary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules
as a whole.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Further, “Rule 56(c) mandates the
entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Id. at 322.
III.
DISCUSSION
Seay
alleges that Eagle violated the ADA by (1) terminating her
and (2) retaliating against her. Eagle asserts that summary
judgment should be granted in its favor because Seay produced
no evidence to demonstrate that she met her prima
facie case as to either claim, and that even if she had,
she failed to produce any evidence that Eagle's proffered
reasons for terminating her were mere pretext for unlawful
disability discrimination or retaliation.
The
Eleventh Circuit applies “the burden-shifting analysis
of Title VII employment discrimination claims” to ADA
discrimination and retaliation claims. Holly v. Clairson
Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365
(11th Cir. 2000)); Durley v. APAC, Inc.,
236 F.3d 651, 657 (11th Cir. 2000) (ADA); Stewart v.
Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117
F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (retaliation). Under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff carries
the initial burden of producing circumstantial evidence
sufficient to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Schoenfeld v.
Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 1999). If the
plaintiff meets her initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to
the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action. Trask v.
Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179,
1191 (11th Cir. 2016). If the defendant is successful,
“the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce
evidence that the employer's proffered reasons are a
pretext for discrimination.” Id. (quoting
Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d
1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010)).
A.
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