United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
KARON
OWEN BOWDRE, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter comes before the court on Plaintiff Roche's motion
for partial reconsideration of the court's memorandum
opinion and order of September 27, 2019. (Doc. 215.) Roche
argues that the court improperly dismissed seven Defendants
from the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 215 at
1-2.) Because the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act provides an independent basis for personal
jurisdiction that the court failed to consider, Roche
contends that the court committed a manifest error of law by
dismissing without prejudice these seven Defendants. Four of
the seven dismissed Defendants-Phillip Anthony Minga, Wesley
Minga, Christopher Daniel Knotts, and Daniel Baker-filed an
opposition memo (Doc. 217) that the other three dismissed
defendants-Geneva Oswalt, Melissa Sheffield, and Ashley
Tigrett- joined. (Doc. 219.) Roche also filed a reply to
Defendants' opposition brief. (Doc. 221.)
The
issue before the court is whether Roche, in a motion to
reconsider, can assert a legal argument that it failed to
raise at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Because Roche failed to
present a statutory personal jurisdiction argument prior to
the court's ruling on Defendants' 12 motions to
dismiss, the court finds that Roche waived the issue and will
DENY Roche's motion.
Background
Roche's
Amended Complaint features eight counts and 40 Defendants.
Roche brought Count One, a RICO claim, against Priority
Healthcare Corporation and five individual Defendants: Konie
Minga, Phillip Minga, Sammy Carson, William Austin, and
Melissa Sheffield.
In its
Amended Complaint, Roche provides the following reasons why
this court should exercise personal jurisdiction over the
Individual Defendants:
The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants
because Defendants have their principal place of business in
Alabama; own or exercise control over businesses operating in
Alabama; perpetrate fraudulent activities in, and through
businesses operating in, Alabama; and/or knowingly
participate in a fraudulent scheme employing pharmacies and
pharmacists operating in Alabama.
(Doc. 90 at 14.) This paragraph composed the Amended
Complaint's entire treatment of the matter of personal
jurisdiction. Roche's response brief expounded on these
arguments and contended that this court possessed personal
jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants based on either
of two theories: (1) the Individual Defendants participated
in a conspiracy that included overt acts within the forum
state, and/or (2) the Individual Defendants personally
participated in torts that occurred in Alabama. (Doc. 141 at
34-38.) Nowhere in its brief did Roche ever assert RICO as a
basis for jurisdiction over the Defendants.
In
their motions to dismiss, seven of the 11 Individual
Defendants-including three of five individual RICO
Defendants, Phillip Minga, William Austin, and Mellissa
Sheffield- argued that neither of these theories applied and
asked the court for dismissal based on lack of personal
jurisdiction. The other four Individual Defendants waived the
issue by failing to raise the matter of personal
jurisdiction.
When
ruling on Defendants' motions to dismiss, the court
considered both the conspiracy and tortious conduct theories
and determined that neither theory subjected the seven
Individual Defendants to personal jurisdiction in this court.
(Doc. 212 at 12-16.) The court dismissed all seven from the
case without prejudice but allowed the RICO claim to proceed
against the Defendants who failed to challenge personal
jurisdiction.
At no
time prior to the instant motion did Roche present any
argument concerning the RICO statute's nationwide
service-of-process provision.
Standard
Roche
brings this motion to reconsider pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e). A motion to reconsider presents
“an extraordinary remedy [that] is employed
sparingly.” Rueter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc.,440 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1267-68 (N.D.
Ala. 2006). A party cannot use a motion for reconsideration
“to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or
present evidence that could have been raised prior to the
entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008). Rather, only
“newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or
fact” justify granting such a ...