United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
L. BRASHER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Foshee's
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28), Defendant Hurst's Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 29), and Defendants Harmon and McCartney's
Joint Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 31). As explained below, the
motions filed by Hurst, Harmon, and McCartney are due to be
GRANTED. The motion filed by Foshee is due to be GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.
around 10 PM on a December night, Orrilyn Stallworth
(“Plaintiff”) decided to visit a convenience
store in Chilton County just off the Verbena exit. Doc. 27
¶10. When she drove back onto I-65, a police car began
to follow her. Id. ¶12. Although she had
violated no rule of the road, Stallworth was ordered to pull
pulling Stallworth over, Defendant Rodney Hurst
(“Hurst”), a Sheriff's deputy with the
Chilton County Sheriff's Office, was joined by Defendant
Matt Foshee (“Foshee”), who was a Clanton City
police officer, and an unnamed third party. Id.
¶14. Hurst told Stallworth that he had detected the
fetid odors of alcohol and marijuana emanating from her
vehicle. Id. ¶¶16-17. After obtaining
Stallworth's consent, the officers searched her vehicle
for both alcohol and marijuana but were unsuccessful in
locating either. Id. ¶¶18-19.
their unsuccessful search, Hurst informed Stallworth that he
would have to arrest her. Id. ¶20. She was
arrested for driving under the influence and taken to Chilton
County Jail. Id. Stallworth's vehicle was towed
and impounded, and she was subjected to a breath-alcohol
content analysis test, which revealed no alcohol in her
system, as well as a blood test. Id.
¶¶25-26. These procedures were put in place and
enforced by Defendants Corry McCartney
(“McCartney”), a corporal in the Chilton County
Sheriff's office, and Kenneth Harmon
(“Harmon”), a captain in the same office.
Stallworth was then formally charged by Hurst with driving
under the influence and booked into jail. Id.
before trial, the State's attorney moved to dismiss the
charges with prejudice and offered no explanation for this
decision. Id. ¶31. Stallworth believes that the
State dismissed the charges against her because it knew Hurst
had no probable cause for her arrest. Id. ¶32.
She filed a civil suit against the officials involved in her
arrest and requested damages.
Court previously granted a motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants McCartney and Harmon. See Doc. 25.
Plaintiff chose to file an amended complaint, (Doc. 27), and
this matter comes before the Court on various motions to
dismiss filed by the officers involved.
considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts all facts
alleged in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Keating v. City
of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010).
There are two questions a court must answer before dismissing
a complaint. First, the court must ask whether there are
allegations that are no more than conclusions. If there are,
they are discarded. Second, the court must ask whether there
are any remaining factual allegations which, if true, could
plausibly give rise to a claim for relief. If there are none,
the complaint will be dismissed. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
amended complaint contains three claims. The first arises
from 42 U.S.C. §1983 and alleges that she was detained
without probable cause in violation of her Fourth Amendment
rights. The named Defendants are Hurst, Foshee, Harmon,
McCartney, and an unknown deputy from Chilton County. The
second claim alleges malicious prosecution in violation of 42
U.S.C. §1983 and it is brought against all Defendants
except Foshee. The third count alleges false arrest under
Alabama state law and is brought only against Foshee. All
Section 1983 claims have been brought against the named
individuals in both their individual and official capacities
as employees of local governments or the State of Alabama.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and other non-economic
has moved to dismiss only the claims that have been brought
against him in his official capacity, and Plaintiff has
conceded those claims. See Doc. 36. The claims
against Hurst in his official capacity will therefore be