United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Western Division
JOHN O. WAITS, as Administrator of the Estate of Jared A. Waits, deceased, Plaintiff,
v.
KUBOTA TRACTOR CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
L.
SCOTT COOLER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
John O. Waits (“Waits”) originally filed this
action in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama.
Waits seeks punitive damages for the wrongful death of his
decedent, Jared A. Waits, an Alabama citizen, resulting from
the operation of a Kubota tractor with no Falling Object
Protection System (“FOPS”). Waits sued several
defendants for common law negligence, wantonness, and
pursuant to the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability
Doctrine (“AEMLD”), including several Japanese
corporations who designed and manufactured the allegedly
defective tractor (collectively the “Kubota
Defendants”); Marty Sanders (“Sanders”), an
individual and citizen of Alabama; and Martin Truck &
Tractor Company, Inc. (“Martin Tractor”), a
corporation and citizen of Alabama.
On July
10, 2019, the Kubota Defendants removed the case to this
Court, asserting diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1332, 1441, and 1446. (Doc. 1.) The Kubota
Defendants subsequently filed a motion (doc. 5) requesting
that this Court not remand the case back to state court,
alleging that Waits had fraudulently joined nondiverse
Defendants Sanders and Martin Tractor in an effort to defeat
this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. This Court set
a briefing scheduling on the issue of fraudulent joinder. In
response, the Kubota Defendants timely filed a brief arguing
that Defendants Sanders and Martin Tractor were fraudulently
joined. (Doc. 9.) Waits timely filed his response. (Doc. 15.)
Subsequently, the Kubota Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. 19.)
For the
reasons stated below, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this action, and therefore the Kubota
Defendants' motion (doc. 5) is due to be DENIED, and this
matter is due to be REMANDED to the Circuit Court of
Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. Further, the Motions to Dismiss
filed by Defendant Martin Tractor (doc. 14) and Defendant
Sanders (doc. 20); the Motion for HIPAA Order filed by the
Kubota Defendants (doc. 24); and the Motion for Extension of
Time (doc. 25) are due to be resolved by the state court, as
this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
I.
BACKGROUND[1]
Waits
purchased a Kubota tractor and accompanying front-end loader
from Martin Tractor for use on his personal farm. Sanders, a
Martin Tractor employee, sold the tractor to Plaintiff. The
tractor did not have a FOPS. “[Waits's] decedent,
Jared Waits, was using the tractor to move branches on
[Waits's] farm when a branch traveled over the top of the
front-end loader and struck [Waits's] decedent in the
forehead, killing him.” (Doc. 1-1 ¶ 15.) Waits
alleges that a FOPS would have prevented the branch from
striking the decedent in this manner and, therefore, would
have prevented the decedent's death.
When he
sold Waits the tractor, Sanders allegedly “represented
to [Waits] that the subject tractor was suitable and safe to
use for moving and clearing trees, branches, and dirt, and
for other forestry and land-moving types of
activities.” (Doc. 1-1 ¶ 40.) Waits alleges that
Sanders's representation “was negligently made
because had Sanders exercised due care, he would have known
the subject tractor was not suitable and safe for such
activities without a FOPS.” (Id. at ¶
72). Further, Waits alleges that Martin Tractor “failed
to warn, or adequately warn, ultimate users and consumers . .
. of the [tractor's] dangers . . . when Martin Tractor
was aware of the dangers.” (Doc. 1-1 ¶ 30.) Martin
Tractor allegedly “had knowledge of existing conditions
and knew that personal injury or death from objects entering
the operator's compartment would likely or probably
result from its acts and omissions.” (Id.
¶ 35.) Martin Tractor had this knowledge “from its
experience with tractors substantially similar to the subject
tractor, from its awareness of likely work scenarios for the
subject tractor, and from reports about the actual use of
such tractors in the field, and from claims and lawsuits,
where in fact operators were injured or killed.”
(Id.)
Waits
sued several defendants in state court for wrongful death,
including Sanders and Martin Tractor. Waits alleges that
Martin Tractor is liable (1) under the AEMLD and (2) for
negligence or wantonness.[2] Further, Waits alleges that Sanders is
liable for negligent misrepresentation, and that Martin
Tractor is vicariously liable for Sanders's
misrepresentation under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This
Court, like all federal courts, is a court of “limited
jurisdiction.” Jackson-Platts v. Gen. Elec. Capital
Corp., 727 F.3d 1127, 1134 (11th Cir. 2013). It is
authorized to hear only those cases falling within “one
of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1)
jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal
question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or
(3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a).” PTA-FLA, Inc. v. ZTE USA, Inc., 844
F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Baltin v.
Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir.
1997)). A defendant may remove an action initially filed in
state court to federal court if the action is one over which
the federal court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a). “[A] defendant seeking to remove a case to a
federal court must file in the federal forum a notice of
removal ‘containing a short and plain statement of the
grounds for removal.'” Dart Cherokee Basin
Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S.Ct. 547, 553 (2014)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)).
To
remove an action filed in state court, the defendant must
file notice of removal with the district court within 30 days
of receiving a copy of the initial pleading. 28 U.S.C. §
1446(a)-(b). Where multiple defendants are involved,
“the limitations period for removal expires upon thirty
days from service on the . . . last-served defendant.”
Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d
1202, 1203 (11th Cir. 2008). “Only state-court actions
that originally could have been filed in federal court may be
removed to federal court by the defendant.”
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987).
For
removal to be proper, the court must have subject-matter
jurisdiction over the action. See Caterpillar Inc.,
482 U.S. at 392. Because Kubota Defendants removed this
action, they have the burden of establishing that the case
was properly removed. See Wilson v. Republic Iron &
Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921). Any doubt about the
existence of federal jurisdiction “should be resolved
in favor of remand to state court.” City of
Vestavia Hills v. Gen. Fid. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310,
1313 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
The
burden on the removing party to prove fraudulent joinder is a
“heavy one.” Stillwell v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(quoting Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th
Cir. 1997)). “If there is even a possibility that a
state court would find that the complaint states a cause of
action against any one of the resident defendants, the
federal court must find that the joinder was proper and
remand the case to the state court.” Id. at
1333 (quoting Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433,
1440-41 (11th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a), on other grounds as recognized in
Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1333). The pleading standard for
surviving fraudulent joinder is “is a lax one.”
Id. at 1332-33. Rather than the plausibility
standard, which requires the complaint to “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face, ”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)), a claim of fraudulent joinder can be defeated by a
showing that the claim has “a possibility of stating a
valid cause of action, ” Stillwell, 663 F.3d
at 1333 (quoting Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc.,
154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998)). When assessing
possibility, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that “[i]n
considering possible state law claims, possible must
mean more than such a possibility that a designated residence
can be hit by a meteor tonight. That is possible. Surely, as
in other instances, reason and common sense have some
role.” Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1325 n.5
(11th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). In other
words, “[t]he potential for legal liability ‘must
be reasonable, not merely theoretical.'”
Id. (quoting Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th
Cir. 2002)). Further, any ambiguities in the state
substantive law must be resolved in the plaintiff's
favor. Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1333.
To
determine whether the claim possibly states a valid cause of
action, the court must look to the pleading standards of the
state court rather than federal court. Id. at 1334.
The Supreme Court of Alabama has stated that “a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to
relief.” H ...