United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Middle Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION [1]
JOHN
H. ENGLAND, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Darrell Edward Smith (“Smith”) seeks review,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), § 205(g) of the
Social Security Act, of a final decision of the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”), denying his application for a
period of disability, disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”).[2] (Doc. 1). Smith timely pursued and
exhausted his administrative remedies. This case is therefore
ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The
undersigned has carefully considered the record and, for the
reasons stated below, the Commissioner’s decision is
AFFIRMED.
I.
Factual and Procedural History
Smith
protectively filed an application for a period of disability
and DIB on October 15, 2014, and an application for SSI on
November 5, 2014, alleging he became unable to work beginning
July 10, 2014. (Tr. 204-219). The Agency initially denied
Smith’s application and Smith requested a hearing,
where he appeared on October 19, 2016. (Tr. 62-80). After the
hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
denied Smith’s claim on January 31, 2017. (Tr. 45-57).
Smith sought review by the Appeals Council, but it denied his
request on October 6, 2017. (Tr. 1-7). On that date, the
ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner. On December 8, 2017, Smith initiated this
action. (See doc. 1).
Smith
was thirty-nine on his hearing date. (Tr. 66). Smith has an
eighth-grade education and past relevant work as a CNC
machinist. (Tr. 55, 66-68).
II.
Standard of Review [3]
The
court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is
narrowly circumscribed. The function of this Court is to
determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is
supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal
standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d
1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This Court must
“scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the
decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d
1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less
than a preponderance.” Id.
This
Court must uphold factual findings supported by substantial
evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ’s legal
conclusions de novo because no presumption of
validity attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the
proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v.
Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the
court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the
law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient
reasoning for determining the proper legal analysis has been
conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision.
Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th
Cir. 1991).
III.
Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To
qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her
entitlement for a period of disability, a claimant must be
disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the
Regulations promulgated thereunder.[4] The Regulations define
“disabled” as “the inability to do any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To
establish entitlement to disability benefits, a claimant must
provide evidence of a “physical or mental
impairment” which “must result from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be
shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.
The
Regulations provide a five-step process for determining
whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in
sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is currently employed;
(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
(3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals
an impairment listed by the [Commissioner];
(4) whether the claimant can perform his or her past work;
and
(5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in
the national economy.
Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993)
(citing to the formerly applicable C.F.R. section),
overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189
F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v.
Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “Once
the claimant has satisfied steps One and Two, she will
automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed
impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment
but cannot perform her work, the burden shifts to the
[Commissioner] to show that the claimant can perform some
other job.” Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord
Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995).
The Commissioner must further show such work exists in the
national economy in significant numbers. Id.
IV.
Findings of the Administrative Law Judge
After
consideration of the entire record and application of the
sequential evaluation process, the ...