United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
F. MOORER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Section 1983 action, brought by Plaintiff Darryl Riggins, an
Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in
forma pauperis, is now before the Court on
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docs. 26, 27,
28, 33, 34, 40, 43). As set out more fully below,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be
GRANTED in part and DENIED
Summary of Plaintiff’s Allegations
Riggins brings this suit against Warden Cynthia Stewart,
Warden Terry Raybon, Warden Phillip Mitchell, Captain Jeff
Emberton, Captain Regina Bolar, Lieutenant Michael Banks,
Sergeant Kelvin Lang Classification Specialist William DeSpain,
Lieutenant Deveron Brown, Officer Harry Boudreaux, Officer
Darious House, Officer Marquino Siler, Officer Johnnie Tait,
and Officer Vencini Smith for various Eighth Amendment
violations and negligence. His asserted claims are unclear
and difficult to understand, in that they reference multiple
incidents occurring upon his return to Holman Correctional
Facility (“Holman”). However, the overriding
theme of the complaint is that the defendants, with knowledge
of a risk of harm, failed to protect him. The suit focuses
primarily on an October 8, 2017 inmate attack, which Riggins
asserts was caused by Defendants’ deliberate
indifference to his safety, but Riggins also discusses
additional incidents (occurring both before and after the
October 8, 2017 attack), and appears to ask the Court to
consider these incidents both as separate constitutional
violations and as cumulative evidence in support of his
supervisory claims, including failure of the supervisory
defendants to protect him from both inmates and correctional
staff at Holman. And, although Riggins asserts no claim of
retaliation, he does insinuate in his complaint that the
motive behind the defendants’ actions and violations
stems from hostility regarding a prior lawsuit which he filed
against Holman officials, including Regina Bolar (Defendant
in this action). Notably, Riggins was transferred from
Holman following the previous incident, but returned to
Holman during the litigation of the suit, which the
parties’ settled in November 2017.
alleges in his Amended Complaint (“complaint”)
that he was transferred back to Holman, from Kilby
Correctional Facility, on March 3, 2017, and was placed in
the segregation housing unit per order of Warden Terry
Raybon. (Doc. 13 at 9). Riggins claims he feared for his
safety at Holman after officers warned him not to go to the
healthcare unit “because he might not live” or
that the CERT team may harm him. (Doc. 41 at 3, 43).
March 14, 2017, during segregation rounds, Riggins handed an
inmate request slip to Warden Terry Raybon, asking for extra
clothing items, a washcloth and towel, laundry bag, and
sheets. Warden Raybon told Riggins to write on the request
slip, “May I go to General Population”.
(Id. at 3, 45). Riggins complied; Terry Raybon took
the request slip, and returned the slip to Riggins later that
day with instructions to answer the following questions:
Do you fear for your life in Pop?
Do you have any enemies in Population?
Are you willing to be assigned to any Population Dorm?
Are you willing to sign a Living Agreement for Population?
(Id. at 45). Fearing for his life in general
population, Riggins did not return the request slip to Warden
Raybon. And, on March 21, 2017, Riggins verbally informed
Terry Raybon that he feared for his safety at Holman.
14, 2017, Riggins handwrote two administrative
complaints. The first complaint is addressed to Warden
Cynthia Stewart and Classification Specialist William
DeSpain, in which Riggins asserts that he and inmate Antonio
Williams, who was also housed in the segregation unit, are
enemies and that inmate Williams had made continuous threats
to attack Riggins when Riggins was cuffed to the rear.
(Id. at 53). Riggins further asserts in the letter
that Inmate Williams informed him that unnamed prison
officials are “willing to pay him (Inmate Williams) or
any other inmate to do [Riggins] serious physical
harm.” (Id.). Subsequent to the
submitted letter, Riggins claims that Captain DeSpain visited
Riggins at his segregation cell and told Riggins that Warden
“Stewart ordered him to do nothing to protect
Riggins.” (Id. at 4).
second complaint, dated May 14, 2017, is addressed to Warden
Stewart and Captain Emberton, in which Riggins complains of
excessive force used against him on May 13, 2017 by the CERT
team (during their search for a cell phone) and requests an
investigation be conducted by the Internal Investigation
Unit. Riggins claims that on May 13, 2017, between 3:00 p.m.
and 3:45 p.m., he was using the toilet in his cell when he
was ordered to “cuff up” by the CERT team through
the cell tray door. (Id. at 51). Riggins responded,
“Yes, let me wipe my ass”, and was sprayed with a
chemical spray. (Id.). Riggins screamed,
“I’m coming”, but was sprayed again as he
stood at the cell door with his hands to the rear.
(Id.). Riggins again “loudly beg[ged]”
and said “I’m ready” when he alleges he was
sprayed again with the chemical agent and told by the CERT
team officer, “No you will be ready when we say
you’re ready” and was sprayed a fourth time
before the officer closed the tray door. (Id.).
Riggins contends he was forced to stay in the contaminated
cell for approximately 15 minutes “choking, coughing,
burning, and struggling to breathe”, while repeatedly
begging for help and to be removed. (Id.). Riggins
alleges that for the entire 15 minutes he remained in the
cell, the CERT team officers mocked him with insults and
stated, “suffer mother fucker we got til 5:00 p.m. to
get your ass out of that cell”. (Id. at 53).
Once removed from the cell and decontaminated, Riggins was
replaced in his cell and denied products with which to clean
14, 2017, Riggins claims he suffered a seizure in his cell
and was found unresponsive on the floor by three ADOC
officers (Officers House, Jones, and Bennett) and one nurse
(Nurse Gary) during the 1:30 a.m. pill call. (Doc. 41 at
56-59). According to Riggins, the nurse advised of the need
for medical treatment, and the three officers stated,
“he will be alright just leave him”.
(Id. at 5, 54).
further claims that a few hours later, Lieutenant Brown,
Captain Smith, Officer Bennett, Officer Tait, Officer House,
Officer Siler, Officer Stewart, and Lieutenant Banks came to
his cell, saw that he was still seizing, unresponsive, and
threw objects at him and poked him with a stick.
(Id. at 54). More specifically, he claims that
Vencini Smith beat his legs and feet with a push broom and
“water squeezy” causing pain and swelling to his
legs and feet. (Doc. 13 at 10). Riggins alleges that these
defendants made statements including, “We don’t
care about Darryl Riggins”; “We are not opening
that cell door to go get him out”; and “If he
die[, ] Oh well.” (Doc. 13 at 9 (capitalization
Riggins regained consciousness around 7:00 a.m., he claims he
was lying in a pool of urine, feces, and blood from biting
his tongue. (Doc. 41 at 5). Then, at approximately 10:00
a.m., four CERT team officers came to his cell while he was
asleep and screamed, “they would beat the shit out of
[him]” if he moved. (Id. at 55). Riggins was
handcuffed, thrown to the floor, and questioned about
possession of a cell phone. His cell and person were
searched, while Riggins repeatedly requested medical
treatment for his tongue but was told he “wasn’t
going anywhere until [he gave] them a cell phone.”
(Id. at 5). When no cell phone was produced or
found, the CERT team officers left and refused Riggins
medical treatment for his tongue. (Id. at 5-6).
alleges he again requested a body chart and medical attention
for “his chewed tongue” during the Segregation
Review Board’s rounds on June 16, 2017, but was refused
treatment by Jeff Emberton and Terry Raybon, who responded,
“I Don’t Need to See Your Tongue, and no you
cannot have a medical body chart done.” (Doc. 13 at
October 8, 2017, Riggins was released from the segregated
housing unit to general population. He was assigned to Alpha
Dormitory (A-Dorm) bed 11-A but asserts that another inmate
was occupying bed 11-A and refused to move from the bed.
Riggins reported the inmate’s refusal to move from bed
11-A to Captain Regina Bolar. Riggins claims that Captain
Bolar and Lieutenant Banks checked the computer for A-Dorm
bed assignments, and no inmate was formally assigned to bed
11-A. Riggins alleges that Captain Bolar and Lieutenant Banks
went to A-Dorm and the inmate on bed 11-A again refused to
move to his assigned bed. (Doc. 41 at 7). Captain Bolar then
ordered Riggins to go to Bravo Dormitory (also
“B-Dorm” or “Bravo Dorm”). When
Riggins entered Bravo Dorm, he claims the B-Dorm inmates
approached him and threatened to stab him for being labeled a
snitch or informant. Riggins further claims he left B-Dorm
and informed Captain Bolar and Lieutenant Banks “that
the inmates in Bravo Dormitory were threatening to stab and
beat plaintiff for being labeled a snitch if plaintiff did
not get out of Bravo Dormitory”, and Captain Bolar
responded, “Man get out of my face.” (Doc. 13 at
4). Riggins alleges that because he feared for his safety in
B-Dorm, he sneaked into Delta Dormitory
(“D-Dorm”) and hid.
9:00 p.m. pill call, Riggins entered the main hall and was
questioned by Lieutenant Devron Brown as to his dorm and bed
assignment. Riggins answered that he was assigned to bed 11-A
but was told by Captain Bolar to find a bed in B-Dorm.
Riggins alleges that Lieutenant Brown ordered Defendant
Officers Lang, Boudreaux, Tait, House and Siler to escort him
to B-Dorm “and make sure he did not get back
out.” (Id. at 8). Riggins then explained that
the inmates in B-Dorm were threatening to stab and beat him
if he came back to B-Dorm and requested to go to his assigned
A-Dorm. Lieutenant Brown ordered Lang, Boudreaux, Tait,
House, and Siler to make sure Riggins went to his
“assigned dorm”. (Id.). “[M]oments
later Defendants came and got Plaintiff to escort plaintiff
to Bravo Dormitory and plaintiff stated loudly with a clear
voice the inmates in Bravo Dormitory are threatening to stab
and beat him if he came in Bravo Dormitory again.”
(Id.). Sergeant Lang ordered Riggins “to go
back where he was”, but “Brown pulled out her
mace and threatened to spray plaintiff if plaintiff did not
go in Bravo Dormitory as ordered.” (Id.).
Riggins complied with the order and entered B-Dorm.
30 minutes of entering B-Dorm, Riggins was attacked by
several inmates with prison-made knives, broken brooms, and
mop sticks. Riggins alleges he was beaten and stabbed more
than 15 minutes and that no officer was present inside B-Dorm
at the time. Riggins claims he suffered serious stab wounds,
“some life threatening to the head, neck, back and
arm.” (Id.). Riggins further claims that when
he made his way to the front gate of B-Dorm, the Cubical 1
Officer was asleep and had to be awakened by Riggins’
“screams, hollering, and shaking of the bars for 5 more
minutes for help to respond to the code.”
(Id.). Riggins was taken to the healthcare unit,
where it was determined he needed further treatment from the
local hospital. Riggins was transported to Atmore Community
Hospital and then to Mobile Infirmary in Mobile, Alabama.
Riggins returned to Holman on October 10, 2017, and was
placed in the hospital ward. Riggins alleges that while in
the hospital ward, Terry Raybon stated to him, “I told
you so. This ain’t the same Holman prison.”
(Id.) (capitalization altered). On or around October
13, 2017, Riggins was released from the hospital ward and
reassigned to the segregation unit.
alleges that on February 28, 2018, Officer Pacheco opened his
tray door at approximately 1:30 p.m. and told him “to
sign up for sick call because he and Officer C. Arthur were
going to physically beat [his] ass.” (Doc. 41 at 67).
Officer Pacheco then sprayed a burst of mace in
Riggins’ face, closed the tray door, and “walked
away laughing saying now go tell that you snitching
mother-fucker.” (Id.). Riggins claims he was
denied a body chart and decontamination by Officers Pacheco
and Arthur and told to “burn and choke until you die
black nigga we hate your kind you black motherfuckers
ain’t shit but shit starter.” (Id). At
3:15 p.m., Riggins informed Lieutenant Banks of the situation
and was provided a body chart but never decontaminated or
given a shower. (Id.). Riggins notified Warden
Stewart of this incident, on February 28, 2018, but Warden
Stewart returned his letter, unopened. (Doc. 41 at 10).
Warden Stewart further failed to allow Riggins to explain the
incident to him on March 14, 2018, during Segregation Review
Board rounds. (Id.).
February 2018, after refusing to return to general
population, Riggins was informed by Captain Jeff Emberton
that “he would be punished by not being considered for
favorable classification considerations.” (Doc. 13 at
8-9). Captain Emberton then told Riggins, “It’s
shoot or be shot, that’s the life at the Holman
Prison”, and Emberton and a group of inmates (in
agreement) laughed. (Id. at 9).
filed this suit pursuant to § 1983 in March 2018 seeking
to recover compensatory and punitive damages, as well as a
declaratory judgment, equitable relief, costs of litigation,
and affirmative action. (Doc. 13 at 7). Riggins was
transferred from Holman in July 2018. (Doc. 16).
Standard of Review
judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("The mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment."); Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d
1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) ("[S]ummary judgment is
appropriate even if 'some alleged factual dispute'
between the parties remains, so long as there is 'no
genuine issue of material fact.'") (emphasis
party asking for summary judgment "always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the
'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence
showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing,
or pointing out to, the district court that the nonmoving
party has failed to present evidence in support of some
element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of
proof. Id. at 322-24.
Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e)
"requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings
and by [its] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, '
designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.'" Id. at 324. To avoid
summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538
(1986). On the other hand, the evidence of the nonmovant must
be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in
its favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
ThyssenKrupp Steel USA, LLC v. United Forming, Inc.,
926 F.Supp.2d 1286, 1289-90 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2013)
requirement to view the facts in the nonmoving party's
favor extends only to "genuine" disputes over
material facts. A genuine dispute requires more than
"some metaphysical doubt as to material facts."
Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1165 (internal citations
omitted). A "mere scintilla" of evidence is
insufficient; the nonmoving party must produce substantial
evidence in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Id. In addition, "[t]here is no burden upon the
district court to distill every potential argument that could
be made based upon the materials before it on summary
judgment." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar
Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). More
importantly, where "opposing parties tell two different
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court
should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of
ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167
L.Ed.2d 686 (2007); see also Logan v. Smith, 439
F.App'x 798, 800 (11th Cir. Aug. 29, 2011) ("In
cases where opposing parties tell different versions of the
same events, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record-such that no reasonable jury could believe it-a court
should not adopt the contradicted allegations."
(citations omitted) (unpublished)).
Discussion and Analysis
"In order for a plaintiff to establish a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, he must prove (1) a violation of a
constitutional right, and (2) that the alleged violation was
committed by a person acting under the color of state
law." Martinez v. Burns, 459 F.App'x 849,
850-51 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Holmes v. Crosby,
418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005)). The parties do not
dispute that Defendants, employed as correctional officers
for the State of Alabama, were acting under the color of
state law at the time of the complained of incident. Thus,
the Court must determine if Defendants have established that
there are no genuine facts with respect to Riggins’
Eighth Amendment claims.
Official Capacity Claims.
Defendants named in this action are all correctional officers
employed by the Alabama Department of Corrections. To the
extent Riggins has sued each defendant in his or her official
capacity, the defendants are immune from suit.
"Official-capacity suits ... generally represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which
an officer is an agent." Penley v. Eslinger,
605 F.3d 843, 854 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted);
see also Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d
1291, 1309 (11th Cir. 2009) ("A claim asserted against
an individual in his or her official capacity is, in reality,
a suit against the entity that employs the individual.")
(citation omitted). As a practical matter, then,
Riggins’ § 1983 claims against Defendants in their
official capacities functionally reduce to § 1983 claims
against the State itself.
Eleventh Amendment protects Defendants in their official
capacities from Riggins' claims. See, e.g., Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100,
104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (With some exceptions,
"a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or
departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the
Eleventh Amendment. This jurisdictional bar applies
regardless of the nature of the relief sought."
(citations omitted)); Harbert Int'l, Inc. v.
James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998)
("[S]tate officials sued in their official capacity are
protected by the [Eleventh A]mendment." (citing
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct.
3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)). In addition, "a state
agency and a state official sued in his official capacity
are not 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983,
thus damages are unavailable..." Edwards v. Wallace
Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)). Thus,
Defendants, in their official capacities, are immune from
suit for monetary damages.
Eighth Amendment Claims.
Eighth Amendment provides that, "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment prohibits prison officials from exhibiting
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm
to an inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 828, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); see
also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct.
1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1972) (Eighth Amendment is applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must
make both an objective and a subjective showing. In Sims
v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 1994), the court
delineated the objective and subjective portions of an Eighth
Amendment claim as follows:
An Eighth Amendment claim is said to have two components, an
objective component, which inquires whether the alleged
wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a
constitutional violation, and a subjective component, which
inquires whether the officials acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind.
25 F.3d at 983. To prevail on constitutional claims like the
ones asserted by Riggins, he must prove that there was
"a substantial risk of serious harm, " that the
defendant was subjectively deliberately indifferent to that
risk, and causation. Hale, 50 F.3d at 1582; see
also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-34. In defining
"deliberate indifference, " the Supreme Court has
With deliberate indifference lying somewhere between the
poles of negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at
the other, the Courts of Appeals have routinely equated
deliberate indifference with recklessness. See e.g.,
LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (CA111993). . .
.It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act
with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious
harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly
disregarding that risk.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. Thus, the Court concluded
that the "subjective recklessness" standard of
criminal law is the test for "deliberate
indifference" under the Eighth Amendment. Id.
at 839-40. Under this test, there is no liability for
"an official's failure to alleviate a significant
risk that he should have perceived but did not . . . ."
Id. at 838. It is not enough that an inmate proves
that the defendant should have known of the risk, but did
not, as actual knowledge is the key. See, e.g.,
Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir.
“[i]t is well established in this Circuit that
supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for
the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis
of respondeat superior or vicarious liability."
Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir.
1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If a
supervisor’s liability cannot be established based on
the supervisor’s personal participation in the
complained acts, a plaintiff must show a causal connection
between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged
constitutional deprivation. Brown v. Crawford, 906
F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990).
A causal connection may be established when: 1) a
"history of widespread abuse” puts the responsible
supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged
deprivation, and he fails to do so; 2) a supervisor's
custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights; or 3) facts support an inference that
the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or
knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to
stop them from doing so.
Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir.
2006) (citing Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360
(11th Cir. 2003)). A custom is established by showing "a
longstanding and widespread practice [such that it] is deemed
authorized by the policymaking officials because they must
have known about it but failed to stop it." Brown v.
City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir.
1991) (A custom requires showing a practice so settled and
permanent that it takes on the force of law). “The
deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to
notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant,
rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated
occurrences.” West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321,
1329 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citations
against these legal standards that the Court will analyze
May 13, 2017 Incident.
alleges that on May 13, 2017, five CERT team officers sprayed
him with a chemical agent (no less than four times) and
laughed and mocked him as he begged and pleaded for help from
the burning, coughing, and difficulties breathing. Defendants
contend that the force used against Riggins on May 13, 2017
was necessary after Riggins failed to comply with direct
orders. In support, Defendants rely on the Incident Report
and Duty Officer Report from May 13, 2017, which states that
at approximately 5:00 p.m., the Southern CERT team approached
Riggins’ cell to conduct a search for contraband, and
Riggins refused several direct orders to submit to
restraints. Officer Jermaine Bullard observed Riggins throw a
cell phone and cell phone charger into his toilet in attempt
to destroy evidence. Sgt. Jesse Wilson administered a one
second burst of “Sabre Red” to the facial area of
Riggins in attempt to preserve evidence. Riggins, however,
flushed the phone and charger before submitting to the
restraints. Riggins was then taken to the health care unit
and received a medical assessment and decontamination from
the chemical spray. Defendants contend Riggins was then
returned to the segregation unit pending disciplinary action.
(Doc. 27-13 at 1, 4). The body chart received indicates that
Riggins was examined at approximately 4:40 p.m. and noted
only a few small scratches observed on his left hand. (Doc.
27-13 at 2). The use of force was investigated by Warden
Terry Raybon and found to be justified given Riggins’
failure to obey the orders of the CERT team. (Doc. 27-13 at
unclear from Riggins’ complaint whether or not he
asserts a claim for excessive force used on May 13, 2017. To
the extent he does, his claim fails. Review of the pleadings
reveals Riggins has failed to connect liability to any named
defendant who personally participated in the May 13, 2017
incident. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for the Court to
determine whether or not excessive force was used against
Riggins. Likewise, Riggins has failed to connect the CERT
team’s alleged excessive force to a policy or custom of
a named supervisory ...