United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ZACHARY G. OWENS, Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES HILL, et al., Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES S. COODY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
This 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a
complaint filed by Zachary G. Owens, an indigent inmate
incarcerated at the Geneva County Jail on pending state
criminal charges.[1] In the complaint, Owens alleges that the
defendants have fabricated evidence against him and
slandered/defamed his character by providing alleged false
information to the news media. Doc. 1 at 3. Owens requests
that the defendants be required “to openly admit their
wrong doings[, ]” publicly apologize “for the
false information that was projected on the media” and
be “held accountable for their criminal
offenses.” Doc. 1 at 4.
Upon
thorough review of the complaint and under applicable federal
law, the undersigned finds that this case is due to be
dismissed prior to service of process in accordance with the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i).[2]
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Fabrication of Evidence
Owens
alleges that the defendants have fabricated evidence against
him to support the criminal charges pending against him
before the state courts of Geneva County, Alabama. A ruling
in favor of Owens on the admissibility of this evidence could
adversely impact the State's criminal prosecution of
Owens.
In
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme
Court held that federal courts should abstain from
entertaining civil actions by individuals seeking to enjoin
or hinder a criminal prosecution against them in state court.
401 U.S. at 44-45. “Attentive to the principles of
equity, comity, and federalism, the Supreme Court has
recognized that federal courts should abstain from exercising
jurisdiction in suits aimed at restraining pending state
criminal prosecutions.” Jackson v. Georgia,
273 Fed. App'x 812, 813 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
Younger, 401 U.S. at 37). Younger therefore
directs federal courts to abstain from granting injunctive or
declaratory relief that would interfere with ongoing state
criminal proceedings except under very limited circumstances.
401 U.S. at 43-45. “In order to decide whether the
federal proceeding would interfere with the state proceeding,
[the court] look[s] to the relief requested and the effect it
would have on the state proceedings. The relief sought need
not directly interfere with an ongoing proceeding or
terminate an ongoing proceeding in order for Younger
abstention to be required.” 31 Foster Children v.
Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted). Abstention is required under Younger when
state judicial proceedings are pending, the proceedings
implicate important state interests and the state proceedings
provide an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional
challenges. Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden
State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982); 31
Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1274.
Each of
the requisite elements for Younger abstention are
present in this case. First, Owens is awaiting trial on
criminal charges before a state court. Secondly, enforcement
of the law is an important state interest. Finally, Owens may
raise his challenge to the validity of the evidence in the
pending state court proceedings and, if unsuccessful before
the trial court and upon conviction, on direct appeal before
the state appellate courts. However, exceptions to
Younger abstention include situations where (1)
irreparable injury as a result of the prosecution is both
“great and immediate”; (2) the state law at issue
flagrantly and patently violates the federal constitution;
(3) there is a showing of bad faith or harassment; or (4)
other unusual circumstances exist that require equitable
relief. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (1972)
(citing Younger).
In this
case, Owens has failed to allege any facts which warrant
application of the exceptions to Younger abstention
as his claims challenging the validity of the evidence do not
assert the type of bad faith or harassment that would justify
the relief attendant to this claim - exclusion of the
challenged evidence from his pending state criminal cases.
Additionally, the mere fact that Owens must defend himself in
state criminal proceedings fails to demonstrate irreparable
harm. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (“[T]he cost,
anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against . . .
criminal prosecution, [is not] considered
‘irreparable' in the special legal sense of that
term.”). Consequently, Owens' challenge to the
veracity of evidence in his pending criminal cases is due to
be summarily dismissed since equity, comity and federalism
concerns require the court to abstain from considering such
claim.
B.
Slander and Defamation
Owens
alleges the defendants released information to the media
which constituted “slander and defamation of [his]
character” because it “destroyed his
reputation[.]” Doc. 1 at 3. This claim provides no
basis for relief in this cause of action.
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the complained of
“conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.” Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535,
101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on
other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330-31 (1986). A person's reputation by itself, however,
is not a “liberty” or “property”
interest that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and
its due process principles. Moncrieffe v. Broward Cnty.
State Attorney's Office, 516 Fed.Appx. 806, 807
(11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). “[N]o constitutional
doctrine [exists] converting every defamation by a public
official into a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment.” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 702,
96 S.Ct. 1155, 1161, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). That is,
”[a]n alleged act of defamation of character or injury
to reputation is not cognizable in a complaint filed under
§ 1983.” Padgett v. Mosley, CA No.
2:05-CV-0608-MEF, 2007 WL 2409464, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 20,
2007) (unpublished).
“Defamation, by itself, is a tort actionable under the
laws of most States, but not a constitutional
deprivation.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226,
233, 11 ...