Appeal
from Jefferson Circuit Court (CC-16-3672 and CC-17-485).
KELLUM, Judge.
Lakisha
Hampton Alexander was convicted of attempted murder, see
§§ 13A-6-2 and 13A-4-2, Ala. Code 1975, computer
tampering, see § 13A-8-112(a)(7), Ala. Code 1975, and
obtaining criminal-offender-record information under false
pretenses, see § 41-9-601, Ala. Code 1975. For the
attempted-murder conviction, the trial court sentenced
Alexander to 20 years' imprisonment but split the
sentence and ordered her to serve 3 years in confinement
followed by 2 years on probation. For the computer-tampering
conviction, the trial court sentenced Alexander to two
years' imprisonment but split the sentence and ordered
her to serve one year in confinement followed by one year on
probation. For the
obtaining-criminal-offender-record-information conviction,
the trial court imposed a $5,000 fine.
The
evidence adduced at trial indicated the following. In 2013,
Alexander, who was a deputy with the Jefferson County
Sheriff's Department, met Tyesha Charity, a long-haul
trucker, through an Internet dating Web site. Although
Charity lived in North Carolina, the two began a
relationship. In 2016, Charity moved to Alabama to live with
Alexander, and the relationship quickly deteriorated. Charity
described Alexander as bossy and controlling and said that
they argued frequently. According to Charity, most of the
arguments were verbal but "got physical" once or
twice. (R. 576.) In the days leading up to the incident
underlying this appeal, Charity and Alexander argued about
Alexander speaking with another woman.
The
State presented evidence indicating that at approximately
5:00 a.m. the morning of August 19, 2016, Alexander, who at
the time was assigned to the Jefferson County jail,
telephoned the Jefferson County 911 center and spoke with
dispatcher Gregory Barnett. Alexander asked Barnett to access
the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") and
obtain Charity's Social Security number for a report she
was completing. Barnett testified that he regularly handled
telephone calls from law-enforcement officers requesting
background checks on individuals. He searched NCIC and was
able to determine that Charity had no outstanding warrants
and he informed Alexander of that fact.[1]Barnett, however,
was unable to obtain other identifying information, including
Charity's Social Security number, and he also gave
Alexander that information.
Phillip
Lynn Shobe, a senior special agent with the Alabama Bureau of
Investigation, testified that the State of Alabama provides
law enforcement with the ability to request information about
an individual's background from various criminal-justice
information systems, such as NCIC. Agent Shobe testified that
law-enforcement officers must attend training classes and be
certified to make these requests, and that they are taught
the rules governing such requests. Specifically, Agent Shobe
said that information about an individual may be requested by
law-enforcement officers only "in furtherance of the
administration of justice," i.e., for "the
detection, apprehension, and prevention of crime," and
then only if it is part of "the official mission of the
agency the official is employed by," i.e., it is part of
the official duties of the law-enforcement officer. (R. 518.)
Law-enforcement officers who have "some personal
interest" in the information sought are not permitted to
request the information themselves or through a third party.
(R. 519.) According to Agent Shobe, Alexander had completed
the training courses, had been certified, and was fully aware
of the rules governing requests for information.
Agent
Shobe testified that on August 19, 2016, at approximately
5:00 a.m., Barnett performed a "driver query" about
Charity using her name and date of birth. (R. 524.) This type
of query automatically includes information about the status
of the subject's driver's license, as well as
identifying information about the subject and information as
to whether the subject had any outstanding arrest warrants.
Agent Shobe testified that Alexander was informed during her
training that the criminal-justice information systems are
not designed to obtain only a single piece of information,
such as a Social Security number, and that such a request
will automatically include other information, such as whether
the person has any outstanding arrest warrants.
Charity
testified that when she woke the morning of August 19, 2016,
no one was at home. Later that day, Alexander returned home
with two other law-enforcement officers, who served Charity
with a protection-from-abuse order ("PFA") and
directed her to leave the premises. Charity said that she and
Alexander exchanged words and that Alexander summoned a cab
to pick her up and take her to her truck, which was parked
near a Wal-Mart discount store in the area.[2]According to
Charity, as she was gathering her belongings from her truck,
Alexander arrived, apologized for what had happened, asked
Charity to return home, and told Charity that she would
"get rid of" the PFA. (R. 584.) Charity said that
this was typical of Alexander's behavior after they had
argued. Alexander gave Charity a key to the house and told
Charity that she was going to have the oil changed in her
vehicle. Charity did not want to go with Alexander to have
her oil changed so she took a cab back to the house. Although
Charity's truck was parked near a Wal-Mart store, the
store's security cameras showed only the rear of the
trailer and police were unable to determine whether Alexander
and Charity had spoken at Charity's truck that day.
Charity
testified that approximately 30 minutes after she arrived
home, she heard Alexander open the garage door and park her
vehicle. She then heard Alexander speaking on her cellular
telephone as she walked into the house and up the stairs to
living room, where Charity was sitting. According to Charity,
Alexander told the person on the other end of the line that
Charity had returned and that "most of her stuff in the
house was torn up." (R. 586.) Alexander then walked to
her bedroom, acting as if she did not see Charity. Charity
said that she became angry, got a knife from the kitchen, and
sliced the furniture in the living room, which she said
belonged to her. She also "turned over" the
television set and sliced up a pair of boots she had given
Alexander as a gift. (R. 588.) Charity then went to the
garage, opened the garage door, punctured the tires on
Alexander's vehicle, which Charity said she had paid for,
dropped the knife, and walked out of the garage. As she was
standing in the middle of the driveway, Charity said,
Alexander came out of the house into the garage, yelled for
Charity to stand still, and said "I'm going to shoot
you." (R. 591.) Charity turned to look at Alexander and
saw Alexander take a gun out of her purse. Charity said that
she did not believe Alexander would shoot her but she then
heard a gunshot and felt a burning sensation. The bullet
entered Charity's right buttock and lodged in her left
buttock. Charity dropped to her knees and Alexander then shot
Charity in the back; the bullet lodged near Charity's
spine. Charity denied that she had anything in her hands when
Alexander shot her and denied that she had ever threatened
Alexander or Alexander's daughter, who lived with them.
Alexander
asserted that she was acting in self-defense when she shot
Charity. Alexander denied that she asked Charity to return
home after the PFA was served on Charity. Alexander said
that, when she returned home that afternoon and walked in the
house, she saw that the furniture in the living room had been
cut and the television had been knocked over. At the time,
Alexander was speaking to a friend on her cellular telephone
and she told her friend that Charity had returned to the
house. Alexander said that she was scared and she reached for
her personal weapon but she did not see Charity and did not
know whether Charity was still in the house. Alexander
returned to the garage to leave, and she discovered Charity
in the garage. According to Alexander, Charity had something
in her hand but she could not see what it was. Charity lunged
toward her swinging what was in her hand. At that point,
Alexander said, she shot Charity twice. When asked how
Charity had been shot in the back, Alexander said that
Charity must have turned as she shot. Alexander testified
that Charity had previously hit her, threatened to stab her,
and threatened to harm her daughter and that she feared for
her life when Charity lunged at her. Alexander maintained
that Charity was in the garage when she shot her and that
Charity ran outside to the driveway after the shooting.
Immediately after the shooting, Alexander telephoned
emergency 911. Alexander admitted that she had asked Barnett
to obtain Charity's Social Security number the morning of
the shooting. She said she thought she needed it to obtain
the PFA.
After
both sides rested and the trial court instructed the jury on
the applicable principles of law, including self-defense and
second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of
attempted murder, the jury found Alexander guilty of
attempted murder, computer tampering, and obtaining
criminal-offender-record information as charged in the
indictments. This appeal followed.
I.
Alexander
first contends that the trial court erred in denying her
motion for a new trial on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain her conviction for obtaining
criminal-offender-record information by false pretenses.
'"In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true
all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all
legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in
a light most favorable to the prosecution."'
Ballenger v. State, 720 So.2d 1033, 1034
(Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Faircloth v. State, 471
So.2d 485, 488 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd, 471 So.2d 493
(Ala. 1985). '"The test used in determining the
sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction is whether,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational finder of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Nunn v. State, 697 So.2d 497, 498
(Ala.Crim.App.1997), quoting O'Neal v. State,
602 So.2d 462, 464 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). '"When there
is legal evidence from which the jury could, by fair
inference, find the defendant guilty, the trial court should
submit [the case] to the jury, and, in such a case, this
court will not disturb the trial court's
decision."' Farrior v. State, 728 So.2d
691, 696 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), quoting Ward v. State,
557 So.2d 848, 850 ...