United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
T.C., a minor, by and through his guardian, mother, and next friend, LESA CASH, Plaintiff,
v.
LIFESOUTH COMMUNITY BLOOD CENTERS, INC., Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
TERRY
F. MOORER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending
before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 6, filed November 26,
2018), to which Plaintiff responded (Doc. 11, filed December
17, 2018) and Defendant replied (Doc. 13, filed January 2,
2019). Defendant’s motion to dismiss is fully submitted
and ripe for review. After a careful review of the pleadings,
motion, response, reply, and the relevant law, the Court
DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss
for the reasons articulated below. Plaintiff also has filed a
Joint Consent Motion to Set Hearing for Defendant
LifeSouth Community Blood Centers, Inc.’s Motion to
Dismiss on behalf of both parties, asking the Court to
set a date for a hearing on the motion to dismiss (Doc. 16,
filed 9/10/19). The Court finds that a hearing is unnecessary
for a determination on the motion. And, in light of this
ruling, the Court DENIES the motion as moot.
I.
Parties and Jurisdiction
Plaintiff
T.C. (“Plaintiff” or “T.C.”), a
minor, brings this lawsuit by and through Lesa Cash, his
guardian, mother, and next friend, asserting state-law claims
under this Court’s diversity jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332.[1] Diversity jurisdiction requires (1) that
the suit is between citizens of different states and (2) that
the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000. 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a). Where a party is a corporation, it is “deemed
to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it
has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where
it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c)(1). Plaintiff and Lesa Cash are residents and
citizens of Elmore County, Alabama. The defendant, LifeSouth
Community Blood Centers, Inc. (“Defendant” or
“LifeSouth”), is a Florida corporation with its
principal place of business in Gainesville.[2] Thus, the parties
are diverse.
Plaintiff
seeks from the suit unspecified damages and does not state
whether the damages he seeks from his claims exceed the
jurisdictional minimum for a federal diversity suit. However,
even where the complaint does not claim a specific damages
amount, the district court may determine that the $75, 000
threshold has been met if is “facially apparent from
the pleading itself that the amount in controversy exceeds
the jurisdictional minimum.” Roe v. Michelin North
Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010). The
Eleventh Circuit “permits district courts to make
reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other
reasonable extrapolations from the pleadings in making such
determinations.” Id. at 1061-62 (internal
quotations and citation omitted). In other words, “a
district court need not ‘suspend reality or shelve
common sense in determining whether the face of the complaint
… establishes the jurisdictional amount.’”
Id. at 1062 (quoting Pretka v Kolter City Plaza
II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 770 (11th Cir. 2010)); see
also Williams v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319
(11th Cir. 2001) (“When the complaint does not claim a
specific amount of damages, removal from state court is
proper if it is facially apparent from the complaint that the
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
requirement.”).
Here,
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that, as a result of the
incidents underlying this lawsuit, T.C. was involved in a
serious car accident in which T.C.’s vehicle hit a
tree; T.C. was airlifted to a hospital and placed under the
care of a trauma team; and T.C. suffered a long list of
injuries- including extensive skull base fractures, traumatic
brain injury, hearing loss, and multiple lacerations,
fractures, and dislocations-that were life-threatening and
resulted in permanent life changes. See Doc. 1
¶¶ 31-39. Based on the pleading, the Court finds it
is facially apparent that resulting damages from the incident
alleged easily could exceed $75, 000. Thus, the
jurisdictional requirement has been met.
II.
Factual and Procedural Background
The
facts of this case center on a blood drive conducted November
1, 2016, by Defendant on the campus of Marbury High School in
Deatsville, Ala., where T.C., was then a 16-year-old student.
Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 12-13. According to the complaint,
LifeSouth employees or agents permitted T.C. to donate blood
despite being underage and having no parental consent.
Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 14-15. The complaint alleges
that LifeSouth employees or agents, in contravention of the
company’s own standards and procedures, failed to
verify T.C.’s age; failed to have T.C. fill out the
55-question donor history questionnaire and asked him only
whether he had tattoos or allergies or was sexually active;
failed specifically to ask him whether he had eaten in the
last three hours, which he had not; performed an extensive
double red blood cell donation to which T.C. had not agreed;
caused T.C. to miss lunch due to the lengthiness of the more
extensive donation process; and failed to provide T.C.
adequate nutrition following the donation. Id.
¶¶ 3-6, 15-20, 23-29. The complaint alleges that,
as a result of LifeSouth’s actions, T.C. passed out
while driving his car three hours later, hitting a tree and
sustaining life-threatening and, in some cases permanent,
injuries. Id. ¶¶ 30-39.
Plaintiff
filed his complaint in this Court on October 31, 2018,
asserting the following claims against LifeSouth: negligence
(Count 1); wantonness (Count 2); negligent hiring, training,
and supervision (Count 3); and respondeat superior (Count 4).
From each claim, Plaintiff seeks unspecified damages plus
interest and costs. Id. ¶¶ 40-61.
III.
Standard of Review
A Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. Gilmore v. Day, 125 F.Supp.2d 468, 471
(M.D. Ala. 2000). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, the plaintiff must allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
In considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the
“court must view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and accept all the
plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true.” Am.
United Life Ins. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th
Cir. 2007) (citing St. Joseph’s Hosp. Inc. v. Hosp.
Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948, 954 (11th Cir. 1986)). In
other words, in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
Court will accept the petitioner’s allegations as true.
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104
S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Ellis v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 706 (11th Cir.
1998); Roberts v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 146
F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Lopez v. First
Union Nat’l Bank of Fla., 129 F.3d 1186, 1189
(11th Cir. 1997)). However, “[c]onclusory allegations,
unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.”
Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262
(11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v.
Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)); see
also Associated Builders, Inc. v. Ala. Power Co., 505
F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1974) (conclusory allegations and
unwarranted deductions of fact are not admitted as true).
Thus, a
complaint should be dismissed “when the allegations in
a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of
entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
558, 127 S.Ct. at 1966. Further, “this basic deficiency
should ... be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of
time and money by the parties and the court.”
Id. (citations omitted). “While a complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (citations
omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level. Id. Thus, it
does not require a heightened fact pleading of specifics, but
only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at
1974. It is not enough that the pleadings merely
“le[ave] open the possibility that the plaintiff might
later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support
recovery.” Id. at 561, 127 S.Ct. at 1968
(internal quotation and alteration omitted). Consequently,
the threshold for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss
is “exceedingly low.” Ancata v. Prison Health
Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985).
IV.
Discussion and Analysis
In its
motion to dismiss, Defendant argues that all of
Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because (1)
LifeSouth qualifies as an “other health care
provider” under the Alabama Medical Liability Act
(“AMLA”), Ala. Code § 6-5-540 et
seq., and thus, Plaintiff’s claims are subject to
the requirements of the Act, and (2) Plaintiff failed to
properly state his claims under AMLA. Doc. 6. Defendant
argues that Alabama case law supports that a blood collector
and processor qualifies as an “other healthcare
provider” under AMLA, and that claims related to the
collection and processing of blood are subject to AMLA,
citing Wilson v. Am. Red Cross., 600 So.2d 216, 217
(Ala. 1992). Defendant also specifically asserts that Count 3
of Plaintiff’s ...