United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
BESSIE M. BRISTOW, Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW SAUL, [1] Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Stephen M. Doyle, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff
Bessie M. Bristow seeks judicial review of the Commissioner
of Social Security’s final decision denying her
applications for disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act
(the “Act”) and for supplemental security income
benefits (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act.
Bristow filed her DIB and SSI applications on January 18,
2016, alleging a disability onset date of December 16, 2015.
(R. 186). The applications were denied at the initial
administrative level, after which Bristow requested and
received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (R. 298-309, 230-262). On December 6,
2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, (R. 183-197),
and the Appeals Council denied Bristow’s request for
review of that decision on September 4, 2018, (R. 1-4). The
ALJ’s decision consequently became the
Commissioner’s final decision. See Chester v.
Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). This court
has jurisdiction over Bristow’s action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of
all proceedings and entry of a final judgment by the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.
Bristow
argues that in consequence of erroneously rejecting and/or
failing to consider specified medical evidence, the
Commissioner failed to properly assess her residual
functional capacity after completing the third step of the
five-step sequential process and that the Commissioner failed
to consider all of her impairments at the fifth step of the
process, and for those reasons failed to carry his burden to
establish that Bristow was not disabled for purposes of the
Act.
The
undersigned has considered the parties’ briefs and all
of the evidence in the administrative record. For the reasons
set forth below, the Commissioner’s final decision is
AFFIRMED.
DISABILITY
ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
To
establish disability within the meaning of the Act, a
claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected . . . to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The
Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process
for determining whether a claimant has made the required
demonstration. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,
140 (1987); see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). At the first four steps of the
process, the burden of proof is on the claimant; only at the
fifth and final step does the burden of proof shift to the
Commissioner. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d
1232, 1237-1239 (11th Cir. 2004).
At the
first step, an Administrative Law Judge considers the
claimant’s work activity, if any. See Bowen,
482 U.S. at 140; see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the ALJ finds that
the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the
claimant will be found not disabled. See Bowen, 482
U.S. at 140; see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(i), 404.1520(b), 416.920(a)(4)(i), 416.920(b).
Otherwise, the evaluation will proceed to the second step.
At the
second step, the ALJ considers the medical severity of the
claimant’s impairments. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at
140-141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An impairment is
“severe” if it significantly limits the
claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities and
is expected to persist for a period of twelve months or
longer. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see
also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). The
ability to perform basic work activities is defined as
“the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most
jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b);
see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. If the ALJ finds
that the claimant’s impairments are not severe or do
not meet the duration requirement, the claimant will be found
not disabled. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see
also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii),
404.1520(c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(c). An impairment or
combination of impairments can be found not severe only if
the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has
'no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s
ability to work. S.S.R. 85-28 (S.S.A. 1985).
If the
claimant's impairments are severe, the evaluation will
proceed to the third step, at which the ALJ determines
whether the claimant’s impairments meet or equal
“one of a number of listed impairments that the
[Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to preclude
substantial gainful activity.” Bowen, 482 U.S.
at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), and
416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairments are
equivalent to one of the impairments enumerated in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404, subpt. P, app. 1, the claimant will conclusively
be found disabled. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141;
see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d).
If the
claimant’s impairments are not equivalent to one of the
enumerated impairments, between the third and the fourth
steps the ALJ is required to assess the claimant's
residual functional capacity (“RFC”), based on
all the relevant medical and other evidence in the
claimant’s case record. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The RFC is an estimate
of the claimant’s capacity to perform sustained,
work-related physical and/or mental activities on a regular
and continuing basis, [2] despite the limitations imposed by the
claimant’s impairments. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a); see also
S.S.R. No. 96-8p (S.S.A. July 2, 1996).
At the
fourth step of the evaluation process, the ALJ considers the
RFC in relation to the claimant’s past relevant work.
See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
If, in light of the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ determines
that the claimant can still perform his or her past relevant
work, the claimant will be found not disabled. See
Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(f),
416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f). In the event the claimant is
no longer capable of performing his or her past relevant
work, the evaluation will proceed to the fifth and final
step, at which the burden of proof shifts, for the first
time, to the Commissioner.
At the
fifth step of the evaluation process, the ALJ considers the
RFC in relation to the claimant’s age, education, and
work experience to determine whether a person with those
characteristics and RFC could perform any jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy. See
Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142; see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c),
404.1566, 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g), 416.960(c), 416.966.
If the Commissioner meets his burden to demonstrate the
existence in significant numbers in the national economy of
jobs capable of being performed by a person with the RFC
assessed by the ALJ between the third and fourth steps of the
five-step process, the claimant is found not to be disabled.
See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142; see also 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g),
404.1560(c), 404.1566, 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g),
416.960(c), 416.966. A claimant will be found entitled to
benefits if the Commissioner fails to meet that burden at the
fifth step. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142; see
also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).
LEGAL
STANDARD
The
Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is
limited. The Court’s sole function is to determine
whether the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial
evidence, and whether the proper legal standards were
applied. See Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228
(11th Cir. 1999); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d
1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, a reviewing court
must affirm an ALJ’s decision if the ALJ applied proper
legal standards and his or her findings are supported by
substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); see also Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d
1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); Graham v. Apfel, 129
F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). “Substantial evidence
is more than a scintilla and is such ...