Appeal
from the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida D.C. Docket No. 5:16-cv-00311-JSM-PRL
Before
TJOFLAT, MARCUS, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
NEWSOM, Circuit Judge.
Albert
Schaw, a quadriplegic, applied for a home with Habitat for
Humanity of Citrus County. Because his annual
social-security-disability income didn't meet
Habitat's minimum-income threshold, Schaw requested an
accommodation that would allow him to supplement those funds
with either food stamps or a notarized letter memorializing
the financial support that he received from his family. When
Habitat refused, Schaw sued under the Fair Housing Amendments
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et. seq., which prohibits
an entity from discriminating against a disabled individual
by failing to make "reasonable accommodations" in
policies and practices that are "necessary to
afford" the individual an "equal opportunity to use
and enjoy a dwelling." Id. §
3604(f)(3)(B). Schaw separately alleged that Habitat's
minimum-income requirement has a disparate impact on disabled
individuals receiving social-security-disability income.
The
district court granted Habitat summary judgment on the basis
that Schaw's requested accommodation wasn't
"necessary" within the meaning of the Act,
reasoning that it would alleviate only his "financial
condition-not his disability." The court also concluded
that Schaw had failed to state a disparate-impact claim.
After careful review, we conclude that while the district
court correctly rejected Schaw's disparate-impact claim,
it failed to properly analyze his failure-to-accommodate
claim. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion as to Schaw's
failure-to-accommodate claim.
I
A
Shortly
after he graduated from high school, Albert Schaw was in a
wrestling accident that left him completely paralyzed. Schaw
is now wheelchair-bound, and his current abode is ill-suited
to accommodate his quadriplegia-it isn't wheelchair
accessible, and there's no way for him to close the
bathroom door for privacy. After seeing a television
advertisement for Habitat for Humanity, a nonprofit that
builds new homes for low-income individuals, Schaw decided to
apply.
When
Schaw met to discuss the application process with
Habitat's Family Services Director, Rose Strawn, he
learned that Habitat imposes a minimum-gross-annual-income
requirement of $10,170, presumably to ensure that potential
homeowners will be able to pay their mortgages. According to
Schaw, his disability prevents him from working, so his main
source of income is a Social Security Disability Insurance
stipend of $778 per month, which equates to a gross annual
income of $9,336. Given the fixed nature of his SSDI, Schaw
asked Habitat to consider one of two other sources of income
toward its requirement. First, Schaw receives $194 per month
in food stamps. With the food stamps, Schaw's gross
annual income would be $11,664-enough to qualify. Second,
Schaw receives $100 per month in familial support from his
father. With that gift, his gross annual income (even
excluding the food stamps) would be $10,536-also enough to
qualify. On Strawn's recommendation, Schaw provided a
notarized letter from his father confirming that he gives
Schaw $100 each month.
Habitat's
Board of Directors reviewed Schaw's application and
determined that it couldn't accept either of the two
additional sources of income. It wouldn't consider the
food stamps because Habitat follows HUD guidelines, which
provide that food stamps don't count as income. And it
wouldn't accept the notarized letter from Schaw's
father because the letter wasn't a legally enforceable
guarantee that the monthly support would continue. The Board
therefore rejected Schaw's application. It did, however,
indicate that it would reconsider if the familial support
took the form of a trust or an annuity.
Shortly
thereafter, Schaw's attorney, Rebecca Bell, contacted
Strawn to explain that a trust wouldn't work because it
could jeopardize Schaw's ability to receive government
benefits. When Strawn then suggested an annuity, Bell
explained that she didn't handle annuities but knew
financial advisors who did, and Strawn took that to mean that
Bell would discuss the annuity option with Schaw. Strawn then
sent Schaw a "Letter of Intent" explaining the
conditions he needed to meet in order to qualify. One of
those requirements was that he "[p]rovide documentation
for [an] Annuity Plan, (for minimum of five years), as
verification of monthly support provided by [his]
Father." Later, Schaw (through his aunt, Susan Hale)
sent an email to Habitat inquiring as to the status of his
application. George Rusaw, Habitat's president and CEO,
responded that Schaw needed to provide "legally
codified" evidence of the familial support and that
"the notarized letter from [Schaw's] father [was]
legally insufficient."
B
Schaw
sued Habitat under the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f), bringing two separate claims. First, he
asserted that Habitat violated § 3604(f)(3)(B), which
requires "reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be
necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling." Habitat failed to provide a
reasonable accommodation for his disability, Schaw asserted,
by refusing to consider his food stamps or familial support
as income in lieu of wages earned. Second, Schaw alleged that
Habitat's minimum-income requirement has a disparate
impact on applicants receiving SSDI.
After
discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment on both claims. Habitat accepted the facts alleged
by Schaw and conceded (1) that Schaw is disabled within the
meaning of the Act, (2) that Schaw asked Habitat to consider
his food stamps and familial support as supplemental income,
and (3) that Habitat refused to consider the food stamps and
the familial support-other than in the form of a trust or
annuity-as income for purposes of his application. Habitat
disputed, however, that the accommodation that Schaw
requested was "reasonable" within the meaning of
the Act.
Shortly
after the parties filed their motions, Schaw moved for leave
to amend his complaint, seeking to clarify the effect that a
trust or annuity would have on his government benefits. At
the time he filed the complaint, Schaw believed that a trust
or annuity would render him ineligible for SSDI benefits. He
then learned that while a trust or annuity wouldn't
affect his SSDI, it could risk his eligibility for other
needs-based assistance, such as Medicare. Because the
district court didn't believe that these changes would
affect its analysis as to the relevant questions of law, it
declined to address the motion for leave to amend before
ruling on the summary-judgment motions.
The
district court granted Habitat's motion for summary
judgment. The court didn't address the
"reasonable[ness]" of Schaw's request,
concluding instead that the accommodation wasn't
"necessary" within the meaning of the Act because
it "went solely to his financial condition-not his
disability." The court also concluded that summary
judgment was appropriate because Schaw had failed to attempt
in good faith to take advantage of Habitat's proposed
"alternative accommodation"-namely, to have his
father set up familial support in the form of a trust or
annuity. As to Schaw's second claim, the court determined
that he had failed to provide any evidence that Habitat's
requirements had a disparate impact on SSDI recipients. This
appeal followed.
II
The
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 exists "to prohibit
discrimination based on handicap and familial status."
Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201,
1212 (11th Cir. 2008). As relevant here, discrimination
includes refusing "to make reasonable accommodations in
rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford [a disabled] person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42
U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
To
prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must
prove (1) that he is disabled, (2) that he requested a
"reasonable accommodation," (3) that the requested
accommodation was "necessary to afford [him an] equal
opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling," and (4) that
the defendant refused to make the requested accommodation.
Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213,
1225–26 (11th Cir. 2016). The first and last elements
are undisputed in this case-no one here disputes that Schaw
is disabled or that Habitat refused to accommodate his
request that it consider his supplemental sources of income.
Accordingly, we focus on the middle two elements-whether the
accommodation that Schaw requested was "reasonable"
and whether it was "necessary to afford [him] an equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." Id.
at 1225. The district court ...