United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES S. COODY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
Hasalee
Mims (“Mims”), an Alabama inmate proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).[1] Mims alleges enactment of
“Megan's Crime Law” is an unconstitutional
and illegal use of congressional power and authority and
therefore violates the rights of individuals convicted of sex
offenses.[2] Doc. 1 at 3. According to Mims, enactment
of Megan's Law was illegal because Congress performed
“legislative action outside the zone of it[‘s]
original assigned regulatory power of authority under the
Commerce Clause where gender violence, murder/rape could
never be confused with commerce.” Doc. 1 at 3. Mims
requests the court declare Megan's Law unconstitutional
and void. Doc. 1 at 6. The named defendants are the United
States, the United States Congress, and the Alabama Law
Enforcement Agency. Upon review, the court concludes
Mims' complaint is due to be summarily dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.[3]
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standing
1.
Commerce Clause
Mims
alleges Congress violated the Commerce Clause when it enacted
Megan's Law because the statute punishes activity that
does not substantially affect interstate commerce. Mims
maintains that his complaint:
. . .is a direct constitutional challenge to the
constitutionality of the Congress'[] creation, enactment,
and the passing of the Megan's Crime Law, as a by-law off
of the Jacob Wetterling[] Law against Children and Sexually
Violent Criminal Offenders Act. At Title 17, 108 Stat. 2038,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sect. 14071, in which this particular
United States Code is an illegal and unconstitutional use of
Congress'[] powers of authority[, ] because the laws
passed are based exclusively and entirely upon gender related
issues of violent criminal activity, such as rape/murder[]
[t]hat was passed outside the scope of the Congress'[]
power of authority under its eighteen specific, enumerated
and delegated powers granted by the Constitution under the
Commerce Clause.
Doc. 1 at 3.[4] Mims claims his constitutional challenge
to the enactment of “Megan's Crime Law” is
based on the fact that the statute violates his rights as an
individual convicted of a sex offense. Doc. 1 at 3. According
to Mims, Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce
Clause by establishing a comprehensive national system for
the registration of sex offenders which is “outside the
zone” of its regulatory power. Doc. 1 at 3. Because
Congress was not given authority under the Constitution to
regulate non-economic activity or pass laws of gender
violence crimes under the Commerce Clause, Mims seeks a
declaration that Megan's Law is unconstitutional and void
Doc. 1 at 6.
The
court takes judicial notice of both public records maintained
by the Alabama Department of Corrections and Mims'
criminal cases' consolidated case action summaries on the
Alabama Trial Court System (hosted, respectively, at
http://www.doc.state.al.us/inmatehistory and
www.alacourt.com). See Keith v. DeKalb
Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1041 n.18 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“We take judicial notice of [the state's] Online
Judicial System.”) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 201 (“The
court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to
reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.”)); see also Coney v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir.1984). These
records reflect Mims was convicted in 1980 of rape in the
Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, which subjects
him to the registration and notification requirements for sex
offenders. See Alabama Sex Offender Registration and
Community Notification Act (“ASORCNA”), Ala. Code
§ 15-20A-1, et seq. Mims' conviction
records also reflect that he has been convicted of, among
other crimes, violating state sex offender registration laws.
Mims is confined in the Alabama prison system following his
plea of guilty in October 2016, as a habitual offender, to
attempted sexual abuse of a child less than twelve which also
violated the terms of his probation on his convictions for
violations of failing to register as a sex offender. See
State of Alabama v. Mims, CC-2016-396, State of
Alabama v. Mims, CC-2011-209, and State of Alabama
v. Mims, CC-2011-148. See www.alacourt.com;
see also www.doc.state.al.us/inmatehistory (last
visited September 5, 2019).
Mims'
allegations are not well articulated but he appears to assert
that, as an individual convicted of sex offenses, he has been
subjected to a violation of his constitutional rights based
on congressional action concerning enactment of a
comprehensive national system for the registration of sex
offenders.[5] According to Mims, Congress performed
legislative action beyond its power under the Commerce Clause
in controlling the nation's “crimes of gender
violence.” Doc. 1 at 5. Beyond his contention that
Congress allegedly engaged in conduct beyond the powers
authorized under the Constitution by enacting laws regarding
sex offenders, Mims does not allege much less indicate he has
suffered any concrete or particularized injury because of the
conduct about which he complains.[6]
“Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d
1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). Therefore, federal courts have
only the power to hear cases they have been authorized to
hear by the Constitution or the Congress of the United
States, see Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, and must
inquire into their jurisdiction at the earliest possible
point in the proceeding. University of South Alabama v.
American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir.
1999). Federal courts have an independent obligation to
ensure they are presented with the type of concrete
controversy on which their constitutional grant of authority
is based. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493
U.S. 215, 231 (1990).
“Article
III, § 2, of the United States Constitution limits the
jurisdiction of federal courts to Cases and Controversies,
which restricts the authority of federal courts to resolving
the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.”
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71
(2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Both
standing and ripeness originate from Article III's
case-or-controversy requirement. Elend v. Basham,
471 F.3d 1199, 1204-05 (11th Cir. 2006). Although separate
doctrines, standing and ripeness share Article III's
requirement that “a party must suffer injury or come
into immediate danger of suffering an injury before
challenging a statute.” United States v. Veal,
322 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kirby v.
Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir.1999)
(analyzing ripeness)); see also Socialist Workers Party
v. Leahy, 145 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (11th Cir.1998)
(analyzing standing).
It is by now well settled that the irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact- an invasion
of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of. . . .
Third, it ...