United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ORDER TRANSFERRING VENUE
KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
action is before the Court on the “Unopposed Motion to
Transfer Venue of this Lawsuit from the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Houston Division, and Brief of Authorities”
(Doc. 29) filed by the Plaintiffs, Beacon Maritime, Inc. and
Better Gold Enterprises, LLC.[1] The Plaintiffs request that this
Court order the transfer of this civil action to the Houston
Division of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Texas[2] under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Though no
defendant has yet entered an appearance in this action, the
Plaintiffs represent that they have spoken with an attorney
for the Defendants in Houston, Texas, [3] who
“advises that the Defendants have their principal
office in Houston, Texas and that the company witnesses on
behalf of Defendants are located in Houston[, ]” and
“requested that Plaintiffs agree to voluntarily
transfer this case to the United States District Court,
Southern District of Texas, Houston Division for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses…” (Doc.
29 at 2). The Plaintiffs advise that they “have agreed
to the transfer in the interest of expediency and to avoid
protracted motion practice on the subject of venue.”
(Id. at 3).
Under
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought or to any district
or division to which all parties have consented.” Upon
consideration of the representations in the present motion
(Doc. 29), the undersigned finds that transfer of this civil
action to the Houston Division of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Texas, a district and division to
which all parties have consented, is warranted for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses, and is otherwise in
the interest of justice. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs'
unopposed motion to transfer venue (Doc. 29) is
GRANTED, and this civil case is
ORDERED to be TRANSFERRED
from this Court to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Houston Division, under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
administratively close the above-styled action once transfer
has been effected.
---------
Notes:
[1] Under S.D. Ala. GenLR 73(c) and 28
U.S.C. § 636(c), this case has been randomly assigned to
the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all purposes, as set out
in the “Notice of Assignment to United States
Magistrate Judge for Trial” entered July 9, 2019 (Doc.
6). The Notice of Assignment makes clear that the parties
“have the right to have this action reassigned to a
United States District Judge for trial and disposition,
” and the first Notice of Assignment states that
“[a]ny party may request reassignment by”
confidentially emailing the Clerk of Court a “Request
for Reassignment to a United States District Judge.”
See also S.D. Ala. GenLR 73(c)(3) (“Prior to
formal reference…, any party to a referred action may
obtain reassignment to a District Judge by sending the Clerk
a Request for Reassignment to a United States District Judge
for Trial and Disposition.”). Inasmuch as no party, to
date, has sent the Clerk of Court a Request for Reassignment,
there presently exists implicit consent to the undersigned
conducting all proceedings in this case, including ruling on
the present motion to transfer venue. See Chambless v.
Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 481 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir.
2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court held in Roell v.
Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 123 S.Ct. 1696, 155 L.Ed.2d 775
(2003), that consent to a magistrate judge's jurisdiction
can be inferred from a party's conduct during litigation.
Id. at 582, 123 S.Ct. 1696. The Court refused to
adopt a bright-line rule requiring express consent, instead
accepting implied consent ‘where ... the litigant or
counsel was made aware of the need for consent and the right
to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the case
before the Magistrate Judge.' Id. at 589-90, 123
S.Ct. 1696.”).
[2] See 28 U.S.C. §
124(b)(2).
[3] The Defendants are also alleged to
own, operate, or otherwise control the in rem
defendant vessel, which was previously arrested in this
district through the issuance of a maritime warrant but has
subsequently been ordered released from arrest by ...