Smith v. Dunn

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          ABDUL K. KALLON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Kenneth Eugene Smith has petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 1996 capital murder conviction and death sentence in an Alabama state court. Smith alleges that a variety of constitutional violations require reversal of his conviction and/or sentence. The parties have fully briefed Smith's claims. After careful consideration of the record, the pleadings, and the applicable provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the court finds that Smith has not shown that he is due an evidentiary hearing on any of his claims, and he is not entitled to habeas relief. Accordingly, Smith's petition is due to be denied.

         I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         On April 7, 1988, Smith was indicted in the Colbert County Circuit Court on one count of capital murder for the death of Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett. Vol. 1, Tab 3 at 65-66.^[1] The indictment charged that Smith intentionally killed Mrs. Sennett by beating her and stabbing her with a knife, for pecuniary consideration of one thousand dollars, in violation of Alabama Code § 13A-5-40(a)(7). Id. at 65. After a trial in Jefferson County, Alabama, due to a venue transfer because of “wide publicity in the newspaper, television and radio media, ” Vol. 40 at 839-40, a jury convicted Smith of capital murder in November 1989. Vol. 1, Tab 3 at 125. The jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of 10 to 2, id. at 126, which the trial judge accepted and sentenced Smith to death, id. at 130.

         The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals overturned Smith's conviction in 1992, due to a violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Smith v. State, 588 So.2d 561 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), on return to remand, 620 So.2d 727 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), on return to second remand, 620 So.2d 732 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). Smith was retried again in Jefferson County and convicted once again in April 1996. Vol. 1, Tab 2 at 26. This time, the jury recommended by a vote of 11 to 1 a sentence of to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Vol. 1, Tab 3 at 114. However, the trial court overrode the jury's recommendation and sentenced Smith to death. Id. at 31-37.

         The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Smith's conviction and death sentence, and denied his application for rehearing. Smith v. State, 908 So.2d 273 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). The Alabama Supreme Court initially granted Smith's certiorari petition on June 4, 2003, but subsequently quashed the writ, as having been improvidently granted. Ex parte Smith, 908 So.2d 302 (Ala. 2005). The United States Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for a writ of certiorari. Smith v. Alabama, 546 U.S. 928 (2005).

         Smith timely filed a Rule 32 petition in the Jefferson County Circuit Court to vacate his conviction and sentence, Vol. 31, Tab 55 at 245-328, and amended the petition three months later, Vol. 32, Tab 57 at 428-520. The state responded, Vol. 36, Tab 74, and, in September 2007, the trial court entered a joint consent order setting a schedule for discovery, for the filing of additional pleadings, and for a status conference, Vol. 32, Tab 59. The court indicated that it would enter a schedule for discovery and an evidentiary hearing after it ruled on Smith's discovery motion and the state's motion for partial dismissal. Vol. 32, Tab 59 at 529. Smith then filed a motion for discovery, Vol. 32, Tab 60, and the state filed a motion for partial dismissal, seeking summary disposition of many of the claims raised in the amended petition, Vol. 32, Tab 61. Thereafter, the state responded to Smith's motion for discovery, ^[2] and Smith filed an opposition to the motion for partial dismissal. Vol. 32, Tab 63 at 588 - Vol. 33 at 617; Vol. 32, Tab 62. Ultimately, the trial court denied Smith's motion for discovery and summarily denied his Rule 32 petition, Vol. 30, Tab 51 and Tab 52 at 9-55, and subsequently denied Smith's motion for reconsideration, Vol. 33, Tab 64 at 620-30; Vol. 33, Tab 65 at 667-69. On December 17, 2010, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the case to the trial court to address the allegations in Smith's amended Rule 32 petition.^[3]Smith v. State, 160 So.2d 40 (Ala.Crim.App.2010).

         On remand, Smith filed a motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing, Vol. 37, Tab 76 at 346-79, and the trial court granted the motion for discovery, Vol. 36, Tab 72 at 102-03. The trial court also entered an order directing Smith to “elaborate further” on several of his claims, and allowing him to “submit any affidavits that he may choose in support of each of his claims . . . in lieu of testimony in support of” those claims. Vol. 36, Tab 72 at 100-01. Smith complied, and filed a memorandum elaborating on his claims, along with four affidavits and numerous exhibits. Vol. 38, Tab 78 - Vol. 39, Tab 82. Thereafter, the state responded to Smith's request for an evidentiary hearing and the memorandum, Vol. 37, Tab 75, and Smith filed a reply further elaborating on his claims, Vol. 40, Tab 84. The trial court issued its return to remand, again denying Smith's petition. Vol. 36, Tab 73 at 104-48.

         On February 10, 2012, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case again “because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 32.9, Ala. R. Crim. P., when it summarily dismissed some of the claims on which it had already permitted Smith to present evidence.” Smith v. State, 160 So.3d 40, 53 (Ala.Crim.App.2012). The court directed the trial court to “make specific findings relating to each material issue of fact presented on those claims involving the hair and the afghan on which the trial court permitted Smith to present evidence.” Id. at 54. And, in response, the trial court issued its second return to remand, again denying the relief. Vol. 43, Tab 90. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court had made adequate fact findings as to one of the three claims, but not to the other two, and remanded the case again. Vol. 43, Tab 94.

         On December 12, 2012, the trial court issued its third return to remand on the remaining claims. Vol. 43, Tab 96. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court, Vol. 44, Tab 100, and overruled Smith's application for rehearing, Vol. 45, Tab 102.

         After the Alabama Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for writ of certiorari, Vol. 46, Tab 104, Smith filed a § 2254 petition in this court. Doc. 1. Thereafter, Respondents filed an answer and brief, docs. 21, 25, and Smith replied, doc. 31.

         II. THE OFFENSE OF CONVICTION

         In its opinion on direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals summarized the evidence in the case:

The State's evidence tended to show the following. On March 18, 1988, the Reverend Charles Sennett, a minister in the Church of Christ, discovered the body of his wife, Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett, in their home on Coon Dog Cemetery Road in Colbert County. The coroner testified that Elizabeth Sennett had been stabbed eight times in the chest and once on each side of the neck, and had suffered numerous abrasions and cuts. It was the coroner's opinion that Sennett died of multiple stab wounds to the chest and neck.

The evidence established that Charles Sennett had recruited Billy Gray Williams, who in turn recruited Smith and John Forrest Parker, to kill his wife. He was to pay them each $1, 000 in cash for killing Mrs. Sennett. There was testimony that Charles Sennett was involved in an affair, that he had incurred substantial debts, that he had taken out a large insurance policy on his wife, and that approximately one week after the murder, when the murder investigation started to focus on him as a suspect, Sennett committed suicide. Smith detailed the following in his confession to police:

About one month prior to March 18, 1988, I was contacted by Billy Williams. Billy came over to my house and we talked out on the front porch. It was late afternoon. Billy said that he knew someone that wanted somebody hurt. Billy said that the person wanted to pay to have it done. Billy said the person would pay $1500 to do the job. I think I told Billy I would think about it and get back with him. Billy lives at the corner of Tuscaloosa Street and Cypress Street near the telephone company. Billy drives a red and white Thunderbird. Billy and I are good friends. Billy and I talked about this several times before I agreed to do it. I had already talked with John Parker about helping me.

I think I first met Charles Sennett about two weeks prior to the murder. Billy arranged the meeting. At the time I met Mr. Sennett I did not know who he was. I did not ask his name and he did not ask what my name was. Mr. Sennett told me that he wanted somebody taken care of. Mr. Sennett said that the person would be at home, that they never had any visitors. Mr. Sennett said that the house was out in the country. At that time I just listened to his proposal and told him I would get back with him. When we talked we sat in Mr. Sennett's truck in front of Billy's apartment. I gave him my phone number.

Mr. Sennett called me a couple of times to see if I had made a decision. Sometime between the Monday prior to the murder and the Thursday prior to the murder, Mr. Sennett learned that John and I would do what he wanted. I met with Mr. Sennett on Tuesday prior to the murder in the coffee[house] at ECM. At this meeting Mr. Sennett drew me a diagram of his house and told me that his wife and he would be out of town on Wednesday, to go down to the house and look around. By the time Sennett and I met at ECM I had learned through conversations with him that it was his wife that he wanted killed and the price agreed was $1, 000 each - excuse me - $1, 000 each for Billy Williams, John Parker and I.

The next meeting was on Thursday prior to the murder in front of Billy's apartment again. Billy, Mr. Sennett and I sat in Mr. Sennett's silver car and talked. I don't recall what time it was exactly. I think it was in the morning. At this meeting Sennett gave me $200 and showed us the rest of the money. Two hundred dollars was for anything we needed to do the job. John Parker sat in my car while Billy and I talked with Mr. Sennett. The murder was supposed to look like a burglary that went bad. This was Mr. Sennett's idea. Sennett told me to take whatever I wanted from the house. It was agreed for John and I to do the murder and then come back to Billy's apartment - to Billy's house - excuse me - and get the rest of our money. This meeting only lasted a short while. Sennett told us that he would be gone from 8:30 until noon. Then on 3/18 of ‘88 . . . Friday, John and I got together around 8:30. We were in John's car, a Pontiac Grand Prix, gold. John drove to Muscle Shoals, then I drove down to the Sennett house. John had brought a black handle survival knife and a black holster. At this time we still did not know how we were going to kill Mrs. Sennett.

John and I got to the Sennett house around 9:30, I think. I parked at the back of the house near a little patio that led into the house. I went to a door to the left of the car. I think there was a white freezer nearby. I knocked on the door and Mrs. Sennett came to the door. I told Mrs. Sennett that her husband had told us that we could come down and look around the property to see about hunting on it. Mrs. Sennett asked my name. I told her I was Kenny Smith. She went to the phone and called her husband and came back and told us it was okay to look around.

John and I looked around the property for a while then came back to the house. John and I went back to the door. We told Mrs. Sennett we needed to use the bathroom and she let us inside.

I went to the bathroom nearest the kitchen and then John went to the bathroom. I stood at the edge of the kitchen talking with Mrs. Sennett. Mrs. Sennett was sitting at a chair in the den. Then I heard John coming through the house. John walked up behind Mrs. Sennett and started hitting her. John was hitting her with his fist. I started getting the VCR while John was beating Mrs. Sennett. John hit Mrs. Sennett with a large cane and anything else he could get his hands on. John went into a frenzy. Mrs. Sennett was yelling just stop, we could have anything we wanted.

As John was beating up Mrs. Sennett, I messed up some things in the house to make it look like a burglary. I took the VCR out to the car.

The last place I saw Mrs. Sennett she was lying near the fireplace covered with some kind of blanket. I had gone outside to look in the storage buildings when I saw John run out to the pond and throw some things in it. I also took a small stereo from the house - “also, ” is the last word.

I don't know what brand it was or where in the house I got it. The VCR was a Samsung. I got it from under the TV set in the den. When John got back to the car we drove back to Billy's apartment to get our money.

On the way back John told me that he had stabbed her once in the neck. I never stabbed Mrs. Sennett at all. When John and I got to Billy's, we were given $900 a piece. Billy gave us the money.

At the time of the murder I never [knew] Charles Sennett's name or his wife's. It was only when it came out in the newspaper that I learned the name of the lady that was killed and Charles Sennett.

I took the Samsung VCR home with me. The last time I saw the stereo it was in John's car. It was around noon when we got to Billy's apartment. Then on 3/31/88 - . . . Thursday - my house was searched by investigators and they found the VCR. I was brought to the Colbert County Courthouse where I was advised of my rights. After being advised of my rights, I gave Investigator May this written statement.

         Smith's statement to police was corroborated at trial. Donald Buckman, a friend of Smith's, testified that Smith approached him about one week before the murder and asked him if he would be interested in participating in beating someone up in exchange for money. Another witness, Brent Barkley, testified that Smith told him that he had been hired to beat up someone. Barkley also stated that he saw Smith on the evening of the murder and that Smith's hand was “bruised and wrapped.” There was also testimony that Smith had in his possession a large amount of money immediately after the murder.

         Smith's defense at trial was that he participated in the assault of Elizabeth Sennett but that he did not intend to kill her. Counsel in opening statement stated the following:

[Smith] agreed with Sennett to go beat Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett, to rough her up, to make it look like a robbery for fast cash. That is the terms they used. It was not to kill Mrs. Sennett. It was not to take her life. As shameful and as vile, it was nothing more or nothing less than to beat her up and to take [sic]. And that plan, what they agreed to - and you will hear evidence of this - that as evil as that plan was, that is all it was.

Smith, 908 So.2d at 279-81 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).

         III. THE SENTENCE

         The trial court issued a sentencing order immediately following the sentencing hearing. Vol. 1, Tab 3 at 31-37. Thereafter, the trial court amended the sentencing order to set “out the things that the Court considered in sentencing the defendant” and “refine” the sentencing order, noting that:

The Court considering the aggravating circumstances as set out and enumerated in § 13A-5-49 of the Code of Alabama, as amended:

(A) the Court finds from the evidence introduced at the trial and re-introduced at the punishment hearing before the jury that the defendant, Kenneth Eugene Smith, committed the murder for pecuniary gain, namely for the sum of $1, 000. The court finds that said defendant was, in fact, paid that sum for said intentional killing. The court finds that this is an aggravating circumstance pursuant to § 13A-5-49(6) of the Code of Alabama, as amended, and the Court has considered said aggravating circumstance.

The Court finds that the defendant was not a person under sentence of imprisonment; therefore, the Court does not consider the aggravating circumstance listed in Section 13A-5-49(1), Code of Alabama, the Court finding that said aggravating circumstance does not exist in this case.

The Court finds the defendant was not previously convicted of another capital murder, nor previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; therefore, the Court does not consider the aggravating circumstance listed in Section 13A-5-49(2), Code of Alabama, the Court finding that said aggravating circumstance does not exist.

The Court finds that the defendant did not knowingly create a great risk of death to many persons, therefore, the Court does not consider the aggravating circumstance listed in Section 13A-5-49(3), Code of Alabama, the Court finding that said aggravating circumstance does not exist.

The Court finds that this offense was not committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to commit rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping, therefore, the Court does not consider the aggravating circumstance listed in Section 13A-5-49(4), Code of Alabama, the Court finding that said aggravating circumstance does not exist.

The Court does not find that the offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody, therefore the Court does not consider the aggravating circumstance listed in Section 13A-5-49(5), Code of Alabama, the Court finding that said aggravating circumstance does not exist.

The Court does not find that the offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws; therefore, the Court does not consider the aggravating circumstance listed in Section 13A-5-49(7), Code of Alabama, the Court finding that said aggravating circumstance does not exist.

The Court does not find that the offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel compared to other capital offenses, therefore the Court does not consider the aggravating circumstance listed in Section 13A-5-49(8), Code of Alabama, the Court finding that said aggravating circumstance does not exist.

(B) The Court now proceeds to consider the mitigating circumstances as set out and enumerated in § 13A-5-51 of the Code of Alabama, as amended, and other mitigating circumstances proved at the punishment hearing before the jury.

The Court finds 2 statutory mitigating circumstances in this cause and that is the age of the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime in that he was 22 years of age. However, the Court does find from the evidence that the defendant was normal and not retarded, had attended high school and worked several jobs, was married and had one (1) minor child.

The Court further finds that the defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity.

The Court further finds as to a non-statutory mitigating certain factors, that the defendant appeared to be remorseful for what he had done, and he gave a voluntary confession. However, the defendant did not turn himself in to the police and at the time of his arrest in his home in Florence, Alabama, there was found in his home a VCR that was the property of the victim with blood still on it.

The Court further finds as a non-statutory mitigating [factor], the defendant's good conduct in jail; and in counseling others including family members.

During his tenure in the Colbert County Jail, Tuscumbia, Alabama, he warned a jail-guard of an impending breakout of jail by other inmates. The jail-guard, Alton Hankins, testified to this. While in prison with the Board of Corrections, he has adjusted and upgraded his education and counseled other people.

The Court further finds as a non-statutory mitigating factor that the defendant was neglected and deprived in his early childhood.

The Court further finds that the capital offense was not committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, accordingly the Court does not consider the mitigating circumstance listed in Section 13A-5-51(2), Code of Alabama, the Court finding that said mitigating circumstance does not exist in this case.

The Court further finds from the evidence that the victim was not a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to it; therefore, the Court finds that the mitigating circumstance listed in Section 13A-5-51(3), Code of Alabama, does not exist and the Court does not consider it.

The Court does not find from the evidence that the defendant was an accomplice in a capital offense committed by another person and that his participation was relatively minor. The Court finds from the evidence in this case that the defendant, Kenneth Eugene Smith, and John Forrest Parker both killed the victim by beating and hitting her with different objects and stabbing her while the victim was pleading with them. Therefore, the Court finds that the mitigating circumstance listed in Section 13A-5-51(4), Code of Alabama, does not exist and the court does not consider it.

The Court does not find from the evidence that the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person; therefore, the Court finds that the mitigating circumstance listed in Section 13A-5-51(5), Code of Alabama, does not exist and the Court does not consider it.

The Court does not find from the evidence that the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; the Court had evidence before it regarding the defendant's actions during and after the murder of Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett which demonstrate[s] that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was not substantially impaired. The defendant's actions in throwing away the murder weapons after the killing, his attempting to make it look like a burglary, and other evidence that was presented, is all evidence that the defendant at the time in question appreciated that his conduct was criminal, and that he might be apprehended and for that reason did what he could to avoid apprehension. Accordingly, the Court finds that the mitigating circumstance listed in Section 13A-5-51(6), Code of Alabama, does not exist and the Court does not consider it.

The Court does find that the jury's recommendation is a mitigating factor and the Court has consider[ed] said mitigating factor at this sentence hearing. However, the jury was allowed to hear an emotional appeal from the defendant's mother. The Court does not find that the defendant's problems during his childhood is a mitigating factor.

Also, there was evidence presented to the jury that the husband of the victim was the instigator of the killing of his wife, but the fact that the victim's husband conspired with the defendant and his co-defendants to kill his wife does not make this defendant any less culpable and is not a mitigating factor.

The Court has also considered the Presentence Investigation Report as set out in Section 13A-5-47, Code of Alabama, as amended, in determining a sentence in this cause.

The Court having considered the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances, finds that the aggravating circumstances due to the nature of the crime and the defendant's involvement in it outweighs the mitigating circumstances presented, and the mitigating factor that the jury recommended a sentence of life without parole and the vote was eleven (11) for life and one (1) for death.

The Court does find that there is a reasonable basis for enhancing the jury's recommend[ed] sentence for the reasons stated herein that this was a murder for hire and the defendant had the opportunity to reflect and withdrawn [sic] from his actions and chose not to do this; he was paid for his actions; that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was not substantially impaired. Therefore, on this 21st day May, 1996, with the defendant, Kenneth Eugene Smith being present, and having been convicted by a jury of capital murder and the Court having weighed the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances and factors, and the Court having found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances and factors;

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED by the Court, and it is the judgment of the Court, and the sentence of law that the defendant, Kenneth Eugene Smith, suffer death by electrocution. The Sheriff of Jefferson County, Alabama is directed to deliver Kenneth Eugene Smith to the custody of the Director of the Department of Corrections and the designated executioner shall, at the proper place for execution of one sentenced to suffer death by electrocution, cause a current of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause death in the application and continuance of such current to pass through the said Kenneth Eugene Smith until the said Kenneth Eugene Smith is dead. May God have mercy on you!

DONE AND ORDERED this 25th day of September, 1997.

Vol. 6, Tab 4 at 1092-97.

         IV. THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW

         “The habeas statute unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue the writ to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.'” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). As such, this court's review of claims seeking habeas relief is limited to questions of federal constitutional and statutory law. Claims that turn solely upon state law principles fall outside the ambit of this court's authority to provide relief under § 2254. See Alston v. Department of Corrections, 610 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2010).

         A. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies: The First Condition Precedent to Federal Habeas Review

         A habeas petitioner is required to present his federal claims to the state court and to exhaust all of the procedures available before seeking relief in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666 (2005). That requirement ensures that state courts are afforded the first opportunity to address federal questions affecting the validity of state court convictions and, if necessary, correct violations of a state prisoner's federal constitutional rights. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

In general, a federal court may not grant habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner who has not exhausted his available state remedies. . . .

Exhaustion of state remedies requires that the state prisoner “fairly presen[t] federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has written these words:

[T]hat the federal claim must be fairly presented to the state courts . . . . it is not sufficient merely that the federal habeas applicant has been through the state courts. . . . Only if the state courts have had the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding does it make sense to speak of the exhaustion of state remedies.

Picard, 404 U.S. at 275, 92 S.Ct. at 512. . . .

Thus, to exhaust state remedies fully the petitioner must make the state court aware that the claims asserted present federal constitutional issues. “It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 5-6, 103 S.Ct. 276, 277, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982) (citations omitted).

Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998).

         B. The Procedural Default Doctrine: The Second Condition Precedent to Federal Habeas Review

         1. General principles

         It is well established that if a habeas petitioner fails to raise his federal claim in the state court system at the time and in the manner dictated by the state's procedural rules, the state court can decide the claim is not entitled to a review on the merits. Stated differently, “the petitioner will have procedurally defaulted on that claim.”^[4] Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2009). Generally, if the last state court to examine a claim states clearly and explicitly that the claim is barred because the petitioner failed to follow state procedural rules, and that procedural bar provides an adequate and independent state ground for denying relief, then federal review of the claim also is precluded by federal procedural default principles. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465 (2009) (“[W]hen a petitioner fails to raise his federal claims in compliance with relevant state procedural rules, the state court's refusal to adjudicate the claim ordinarily qualifies as an independent and adequate state ground for denying federal review.”). And, the Supreme Court defines an “adequate and independent” state court decision as one that “rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)) (emphasis in Lee). The questions of whether a state procedural rule is “independent” of the federal question and “adequate” to support the state court's judgment, so as to have a preclusive effect on federal review of the claim, “is itself a federal question.” Id. (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965)).

         To be considered “independent” of the federal question, “the state court's decision must rest solidly on state law grounds, and may not be ‘intertwined with an interpretation of federal law.'” Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990)). An example of intertwining would be when “the State has made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law, that is, on the determination of whether federal constitutional error has been committed.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). Stated differently, if “the state court must rule, either explicitly or implicitly, on the merits of the constitutional question” before applying the state's procedural rule to a federal constitutional question, then the rule is not independent of federal law. Id.

         To be considered “adequate” to support the state court's judgment, the state procedural rule must be both “firmly established and regularly followed.” Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. at 375 (quoting James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348 (1984)). The rule must be “clear [and] closely hewn to” by the state for a federal court to consider it as adequate. James, 466 U.S. at 346. That does not mean that the state's procedural rule must be rigidly applied in every instance, or that occasional failure to do so will render the rule inadequate. “To the contrary, a [state's] discretionary [procedural] rule can be ‘firmly established' and ‘regularly followed' - even if the appropriate exercise of discretion may permit consideration of a federal claim in some cases but not others.” Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 52, 60-61 (2009). The adequacy requirement means only that the procedural rule “must not be applied in an arbitrary or unprecedented fashion.” Judd, 250 F.3d at 1313 (emphasis added).

         Thus, in summary, if the procedural rule is not firmly established, or if it is applied in an arbitrary, unprecedented, or manifestly unfair fashion, it will not be considered adequate, and the state court decision based upon such a rule can be reviewed by a federal court. Card, 911 F.2d at 1517. Conversely, if the rule is deemed adequate, the decision will not be reviewed by this court.

         2. Overcoming procedural default

         Generally, there are three circumstances in which an otherwise valid state-law ground will not bar a federal habeas court from considering a constitutional claim that was procedurally defaulted in state court: (1) where the petitioner demonstrates that he had good “cause” for not following the state procedural rule, and, that he was actually “prejudiced” by the alleged constitutional violation; or (2) where the state procedural rule was not “firmly established and regularly followed”; or (3) where failure to consider the petitioner's claims will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 455 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).^[5]

         a. The “cause and prejudice” standard

         “A federal court may still address the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can show cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 (1977)) (emphasis added). This so-called “cause and prejudice” standard is framed in the conjunctive, and a petitioner must prove both parts.

         i. “Cause”

         To show “cause, ” a petitioner must prove that “some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts” to raise the claim in the state courts. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. “Objective factors that constitute cause include “‘interference by officials'” that makes compliance with the State's procedural rule impracticable, and ‘a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel.'” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-94 (1991) (citations omitted). And, while “[a]ttorney error [on direct review] that constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel” has long been accepted as “cause” to overcome a procedural default, the constitutional ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel on collateral review generally will not support a finding of cause and prejudice to overcome a procedural default. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 754. This is the case because “[t]here is no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings.” Id. at 752 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989)).^[6]

         ii. “Prejudice”

         A habeas petitioner must show also that he was actually “prejudiced” by the alleged constitutional violation. This entails showing “not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis added). If the “cause” is of the type described in Martinez v. Ryan, then the reviewing court should consider whether the petitioner can demonstrate “that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 12-15 (citing for comparison Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322');">537 U.S. 322 (2003) (describing standards for certificates of appealability to issue)).

         b. The “fundamental miscarriage of justice” standard

         In a “rare, ” “extraordinary, ” and “narrow class of cases, ” a federal court may consider a procedurally defaulted claim in the absence of a showing of “cause” for the default if either: (a) a fundamental miscarriage of justice “has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, ” Smith, 477 U.S. at 537-38 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496); or (b) the petitioner shows “by clear and convincing evidence that[, ] but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty, ” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 323-27 & n.44 (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992)).

         C. The Statutory Overlay: The Effect of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 on Habeas Review

         The writ of habeas corpus “has historically been regarded as an extraordinary remedy.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993). That is especially true when federal courts are asked to engage in habeas review of a state court conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, where “[t]he role of federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited. Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials.” Id. (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)). “Those few who are ultimately successful [in obtaining federal habeas relief] are persons whom society has grievously wronged and for whom belated liberation is little enough compensation.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440-41 (1963). “Accordingly, . . . an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 634.

         Congress legislated these principles in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which amended preexisting habeas law, ^[7] and included several provisions requiring federal courts to give even more deference to state court determinations of federal constitutional claims.

         1. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)

         Section 2254(e)(1) requires district courts to presume that a state court's factual determinations are correct, unless the habeas petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Section 2254(e)(1) “modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403-04 (2000)). The deference that attends state court findings of fact pursuant to § 2254(e)(1) applies to all habeas claims, regardless of their procedural stance. Thus, a presumption of correctness must be afforded to a state court's factual findings, even when the habeas claim is being examined de novo. See Mansfield v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 679 F.3d 1301, 1313 (11th Cir. 2012). And, the presumption of correctness also applies to habeas claims that were adjudicated on the merits by the state court and, therefore, those claims are subject to the standards of review set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2) discussed in the following section.

         2. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

         “By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim ‘adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). It does not matter whether the state court decision contains a lengthy analysis of the claim, or is a summary ruling “unaccompanied by explanation.” Id. Further, the “backward-looking language” of the statute requires an examination of the state court decision on the date rendered. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011). That is, “[s]tate court decisions are measured against [the Supreme] Court's precedents as of ‘the time the state court renders its decision.'” Id. at 182 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 588 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003)). Finally, “review under § 2254(d)(1) [and (d)(2)] is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits, ” id. at 181, and a federal habeas court conducting 2254(d) review should not consider new evidence “in the first instance effectively de novo, ” id. at 182.

         A closer look at the separate provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) reveals that when a state court has made a decision on a petitioner's constitutional claim, habeas relief cannot be granted unless it is determined that the state court's adjudication of the claim either:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).^[8] The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d) are “independent statutory modes of analysis.” Alderman v. Terry, 468 F.3d 775, 791 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-07).^[9] When considering a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claim, therefore, the habeas court must not conflate the two.

         a. The meaning of § 2254(d)(1)'s “contrary to” clause

         A state court determination can be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent in at least two ways:

First, a state-court decision is contrary to this Court's precedent if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law. Second, a state-court decision is also contrary to this Court's precedent if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. See also, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (same); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam) (same); Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2001) (same). But, as the Eleventh Circuit has noted, the majority opinion in Williams does not limit the construction of § 2254(d)(1)'s “contrary to” clause to the two examples set forth above. Instead, the statutory language “simply implies that ‘the state court's decision must be substantially different from the relevant precedent of [the Supreme] Court.'” Alderman, 468 F.3d at 791 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405).

         b. The meaning of § 2254(d)(1)'s “unreasonable application” clause

         A state court's determination of a federal constitutional claim can result in an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court precedent in either of two ways:

First, a state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court's precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case. Second, a state-court decision also involves an unreasonable application of this Court's precedent if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. But, “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Id. at 410 (emphasis in original). A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411 (emphasis added). In other words, “a federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable, ” and not whether the state court “correctly” applied Supreme Court precedent Id. at 409.^[10]

         To demonstrate that a state court's application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable, ” the habeas petitioner “must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. Stated another way, if the state-court's resolution of a claim is debatable among fairminded jurists, it is not objectively unreasonable.

         c. The meaning of § 2254(d)(2)'s clause addressing an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding”

         Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) “imposes a ‘daunting standard - one that will be satisfied in relatively few cases.'” Cash v. Maxwell, 565 U.S. 1138, 132 S.Ct. 611, 612 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 500 (9th Cir. 2010)). As the Supreme Court has noted,

in related contexts, “[t]he term ‘unreasonable' is no doubt difficult to define.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). It suffices to say, however, that a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance. Cf. Id., at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). Therefore, “even if ‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree' about the finding in question, ‘on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court's . . . determination.'” Id. (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006)) (alteration in original). Conversely, “when a state court's adjudication of a habeas claim result[s] in a decision that [i]s based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding, this Court is not bound to defer to unreasonably-found facts or to the legal conclusions that flow from them.” Adkins v. Warden, Holman Correctional Facility, 710 F.3d 1241, 1249 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jones v. Walker, 540 F.3d 1277, 1288 n.5 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).

         d. Evaluating state court factual determinations under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1)

         As set out previously, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) regulates federal court review of state court findings of fact. That provision limits the availability of federal habeas relief on any claims that are grounded in a state court's factual findings, unless the findings were “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Moreover, § 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides that factual determinations made by a state court are “presumed to be correct, ” and that the habeas petitioner bears “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). But, “no court has fully explored the interaction of § 2254(d)(2)'s ‘unreasonableness' standard and § 2254(e)(1)'s ‘clear and convincing evidence' standard.” See Cave v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 638 F.3d 739, 744-45 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gore v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 492 F.3d 1273, 1294 n.51 (11th Cir. 2007)). Still, federal habeas courts “must presume the state court's factual findings to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1177 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing § 2254(e)(1); Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835-36 (11th Cir. 2001)). And, § 2254(e)(1) “commands that for a writ to issue because the state court made an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts,' the petitioner must rebut ‘the presumption of correctness [of a state court's factual findings] by clear and convincing evidence.'” Ward, 592 F.3d at 1155 (alteration in original).

         D. The Burden of Proof and Heightened Pleading Requirements for Habeas Petitions

         Federal habeas “exists only to review errors of constitutional dimension.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). Further, “[w]hen the process of direct review . . . comes to an end, a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction and sentence.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983). Two consequences flow from those fundamental propositions: (1) the habeas petitioner bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of “legality” that attaches to the state court conviction and sentence, and of establishing a factual basis demonstrating that federal post-conviction relief should be granted, ^[11] and (2) the habeas petitioner must meet “heightened pleading requirements.”^[12] The mere assertion of a ground for relief, without sufficient factual detail, does not satisfy either the petitioner's burden of proof under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), or the requirements of Rule 2© of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, which requires a state prisoner to “specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner, ” and to then “state the facts supporting each ground.” Rule 2(c)(1) and (2), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (stating that an application for writ of habeas corpus “shall allege the facts concerning the applicant's commitment or detention”).

         In short, a habeas petitioner must include in his statement of each claim sufficient supporting facts to justify a decision for the petitioner if the alleged facts are proven true. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977) (observing that a habeas petition must “state facts that point to a ‘real possibility of constitutional error'”) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts). In addition, “[c]itation of the controlling constitutional, statutory, or other bases for relief for each claim also should be stated.” 1 Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 11.6, at 654 (5th ed. 2005). As another district court has held:

It is not the duty of federal courts to try to second guess the meanings of statements and intentions of petitioners. Rather the duty is upon the individual who asserts a denial of his constitutional rights to come forth with a statement of sufficient clarity and sufficient supporting facts to enable a court to understand his argument and to render a decision on the matter.

Nail v. Slayton, 353 F.Supp. 1013, 1019 (W.D. Va. 1972).

         E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims^[13]

         The “benchmark” standard for determining ineffective assistance is well-established. The question is whether a trial or appellate attorney provided representational assistance to a state prisoner that was so professionally incompetent as to create issues of federal constitutional proportions. In other words, the court asks “whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). If an objective answer to that question is “yes, ” then counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Strickland requires that the issue be approached in two steps:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Id. at 687 (emphasis added). A petitioner must satisfy both parts of the Strickland standard. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). And, “[b]ecause both parts of the test must be satisfied in order to show a violation of the Sixth Amendment, the court need not address the performance prong if the defendant cannot meet the prejudice prong, or vice versa.” Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

         1. The performance prong

         “The burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel's performance was unreasonable.” Stewart v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1313). To satisfy this prong, the petitioner must prove that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The standard for gauging attorney performance is “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688). “The test of reasonableness is not whether counsel could have done something more or different, ” but whether counsel's performance “fell within the broad range of reasonable assistance at trial.” Stewart, 476 F.3d at 1209 (citing Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1313). Furthermore, courts must “recognize that ‘omissions are inevitable, but, the issue is not what is possible or ‘what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.'” Id. (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)). And, because the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a defendant the very best counsel or the most skilled attorney, “[t]he test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.” White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 1992).

         The reasonableness of counsel's performance is judged from the perspective of the attorney at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances.^[14] “Under this standard, there are no “absolute rules” dictating what reasonable performance is or what line of defense must be asserted.” Michael v. Crosby, 430 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005). To the contrary, “[a]bsolute rules would interfere with counsel's independence - which is also constitutionally protected - and would restrict the wide latitude counsel have in making tactical decisions.” Id. (citations omitted). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be “highly deferential, ” because representation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Indeed, reviewing courts “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689.^[15] “Based on this strong presumption of competent assistance, the petitioner's burden of persuasion is a heavy one: ‘petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.'” Stewart, 476 F.3d at 1209 (quoting Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315) (emphasis added). “Even if many reasonable lawyers would not have done as defense counsel did at trial, no relief can be granted on ineffectiveness grounds unless it is shown that no reasonable lawyer, in the circumstances, would have done so.” Rogers, 13 F.3d at 386 (emphasis added).

         2. The prejudice prong

         “A petitioner's burden of establishing that his lawyer's deficient performance prejudiced his case is also high.” Van Poyck v. Florida Department of Corrections, 290 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002). The petitioner “must affirmatively prove prejudice, because ‘[a]ttorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial.'” Gilreath v. Head, 234 F.3d 547, 551 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693) (alteration in original). “It is not enough for the [habeas petitioner] to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Instead, to prove prejudice, the habeas petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694; see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (same). When that standard is applied in the context of the death sentence itself, “ ‘the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.'” Stewart, 476 F.3d at 1209 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). To satisfy high standard, a petitioner must present competent evidence proving “that trial counsel's deficient performance deprived him of ‘a trial whose result is reliable.'” Brown v. Jones, 255 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). In other words, “[a] finding of prejudice requires proof of unprofessional errors so egregious that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect.” Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1177 (citations omitted).

         3. Deference accorded state court findings of historical fact and decisions on the merits when evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims

         State court findings of historical fact made in the course of evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are subject to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). See, e.g., Thompson v. Haley, 255 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001). To overcome a state-court finding of fact, the petitioner bears the burden of proving contrary facts by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). And, a federal habeas court may grant relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel only if the state-court determination involved an “unreasonable application” of the Strickland standard to the facts of the case. Strickland itself, of course, also requires an assessment of whether counsel's conduct was professionally unreasonable. Those two assessments cannot be conflated into one. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101-02. Thus, habeas relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be granted with respect to a claim ...