United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
R.
DAVID PROCTOR, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
case is before the court on two Opposed Motions to Intervene.
(Docs. # 96, 98).
The
first motion was filed by the States of New York, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Virginia, and Washington; the District of Columbia;
the cities and counties of Cameron County, Texas; Central
Falls, Rhode Island; Chicago, Illinois; Hidalgo County,
Texas; Monterey County, California; New York, New York;
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Providence, Rhode Island; and
Seattle, Washington; and the United States Conference of
Mayors (collectively, “the State and Local Government
Movants”). (Doc. # 96).
The
second motion was filed by Arlington County, Virginia and the
City of Atlanta, Georgia. (Doc. # 98). For clarity and
convenience, both groups of Proposed Defendant-Intervenors
will be referred to collectively as “the Proposed State
and Other Defendant-Intervenors, ” or
“Movants.” The Proposed State and Other
Defendant-Intervenors have filed their Motions pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and (b). (Docs. # 96,
98). They are opposed, fully briefed (Docs. # 96-98, 103,
106-07), and ripe for review. For the reasons explained below
and in the court's December 13, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
(see Doc. # 53), both Motions are due to be granted
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1)(B), as the
court concludes the Proposed State and Other
Defendant-Intervenors are entitled to permissive
intervention.
I.
Procedural Background
Plaintiffs--the
State of Alabama and Representative Morris J.
“Mo” Brooks, Jr.--filed suit on May 21, 2018,
challenging the final rule regarding the 2020 Census
Residence Criteria and Residence Situations (“Residence
Rule”), which was finalized in February 2018. (Doc. # 1
at ¶ 1). Plaintiffs raise three constitutional and two
statutory challenges to the Residence Rule, contending that
the inclusion of undocumented persons in the 2020 Census will
negatively affect Alabama's access to federal funding as
well as the State's political representation in the House
of Representatives and the Electoral College. (See
generally Doc. # 1). Plaintiffs request (1) that the
Residence Rule be declared unlawful, and (2) that the
congressional apportionment following the 2020 Census exclude
undocumented persons from population figures. (Id.
at ¶ 158).
Before
the Proposed State and Other Defendant-Intervenors filed the
currently pending motions, the Martinez Defendant-Intervenors
and the Local Government Defendant-Intervenors filed similar
motions to intervene (Docs. # 6, 9). The court held that both
motions were timely and satisfied the requirements for
permissive intervention, as set forth in Rule 24(b), and the
court granted the motions. (Doc. # 53 at 3-4).
Here,
Plaintiffs oppose both motions to intervene (Docs. # 96, 98),
arguing (1) that the motions are untimely, and (2) that
allowing the Proposed Defendant-Intervenors to intervene
would be redundant because their interests are already
adequately represented.[1] (Doc. # 103 at 5- 6). The court
addresses each argument, in turn.
A.
Proposed State and Other Defendant-Intervenors' Motion to
Intervene is Timely
With
regard to Plaintiff's first argument--that the motion to
intervene is untimely--the court has already ruled that the
intervention motions filed by the Martinez Movants and the
Local Government Movants were timely. (Doc. # 53).
Admittedly, the instant motions were filed later than those
filed by the Martinez and Local Government
Defendant-Intervenors, who filed approximately two months
after the case was initially filed. The Proposed State and
Other Defendant-Intervenors filed their motions fifteen
months after the case was initially filed. Therefore, further
analysis is warranted. After careful review, however, the
court concludes the motions are timely.
First,
the decision to allow a party to permissively intervene is
“wholly discretionary with the court.” Worlds
v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 929
F.2d 591, 595 (11th Cir. 1991). Second, “the court
[has] yet to take significant action, ”[2] and thus granting
the Proposed State and Other Defendant-Intervenors'
motion would not prejudice Plaintiffs. Georgia v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 302 F.3d 1242, 1259-60 (11th
Cir. 2002) (reversing the district court's denial of the
defendant-intervenor, noting that “intervention did not
delay the proceedings and the court had yet to take
significant action”). In fact, there is little
indication that Plaintiffs would be prejudiced if the
Proposed State and Other Defendant-Intervenors were allowed
to intervene. On the other hand, Movants assert that the
prejudice that would befall them if they were denied
intervention is substantial.
In
particular, Movants contend that this litigation puts at risk
their “possible loss of seats in Congress, impairment
of their ability to conduct intrastate redistricting in
compliance with their own state constitutions and laws, and
the risk to hundreds of billions of dollars in public
funds.” (Doc. # 107 at 3). The court finds that the
Movants would be prejudiced if not allowed to intervene, and
that, because the court has yet to take significant action,
the motions to intervene are timely.
B.
Proposed State and Other Defendant-Intervenors' Interests
are Not Currently Adequately
Represented
Plaintiffs
also argue that granting the Proposed State and Other
Defendant-Intervenors' motions would be essentially
redundant because their interests are adequately represented.
They also contend that granting the motion to intervene would
not add value to the litigation ...