United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
L.
SCOTT COOGLER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I.
Introduction
The
plaintiff, Barbara Jackson, proceeding pro se,
appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying
her applications for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”), a period of disability, and Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Ms. Smith timely
pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies and the
decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Ms.
Smith was 60 years old at the time of the Administrative Law
Judge's (“ALJ's”) decision. (Tr. at 27.)
She completed two years of college and her past work
experiences include employment as an accountant/bookkeeper.
(Id. at 28-30.) According to the administrative
record, Ms. Jackson claimed that she became disabled on April
27, 2013, due to congestive heart failure, hypertension,
shortness of breath, asphyxiation, and palpitations.
(Id. at 26.)
The
Social Security Administration has established a five-step
sequential evaluation process for determining whether an
individual is disabled and thus eligible for DIB or SSI.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920;
see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th
Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in order
until making a finding of either disabled or not disabled; if
no finding is made, the analysis will proceed to the next
step. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to
determine whether the plaintiff is engaged in substantial
gainful activity (“SGA”). See Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the
plaintiff is not engaged in SGA, the evaluator moves on to
the next step.
The
second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined
severity of the plaintiff's medically determinable
physical and mental impairments. See Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An
individual impairment or combination of impairments that is
not classified as “severe” and does not satisfy
the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will result in a finding of
not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). The decision depends
on the medical evidence contained in the record. See Hart
v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971)
(concluding that “substantial medical evidence in the
record” adequately supported the finding that plaintiff
was not disabled).
Similarly,
the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the
plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments
meets or is medically equal to the criteria of an impairment
listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed impairment
and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1509 and 416.909 are satisfied, the
evaluator will make a finding of disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
If the
plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments does
not meet or medically equal a listed impairment, the
evaluator must determine the plaintiff's residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to
the fourth step. See Id. §§ 404.1520(e),
416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to
determine whether the plaintiff has the RFC to perform the
requirements of his past relevant work. See Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the
plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments does
not prevent him from performing his past relevant work, the
evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. See
id.
The
fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the
plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and work experience in
order to determine whether the plaintiff can make an
adjustment to other work. See Id. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the plaintiff can
perform other work, the evaluator will find him not disabled.
Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the plaintiff cannot perform
other work, the evaluator will find him disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g),
416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).
Applying
the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms.
Jackson has not engaged in SGA since the alleged onset of her
disability. (Tr. at 13.) According to the ALJ,
Plaintiff's congestive heart failure and hypertension are
considered “severe” based on the requirements set
forth in the regulations. (Id.) However, he found
that these impairments neither meet nor medically equal any
of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (Tr. at 14.) The ALJ determined that Ms. Jackson
has the following RFC: sedentary work with no climbing of
ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasional climbing of ramps and
stairs; occasional balancing, kneeling, crouching, crawling
and stooping; avoiding concentrated exposure to extreme heat
and cold, fumes, odors, chemicals, gases, dust, and poorly
ventilated areas; and avoiding all hazardous machinery and
unprotected heights. (Id.)
According
to the ALJ, Ms. Jackson is able to perform her past relevant
work as a bookkeeper/accountant, as it is generally and was
actually performed. (Tr. at 17.) The ALJ concluded his
findings by stating that Plaintiff “has not been under
a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from
April 27, 2013, through the date of this decision.”
(Id.)
II.
Standard of Review
This
Court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social
Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is
limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial
evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of
the Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards
were applied. See Stone v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
544 Fed.Appx. 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th
Cir. 2004)). This Court gives deference to the factual
findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are
supported by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny
to the legal conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84
F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).
Nonetheless,
this Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir.
2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232,
1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). “The substantial evidence
standard permits administrative decision makers to act with
considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency's finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.'” Parker v.
Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar.
Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if
this Court finds that the proof preponderates ...