United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES S. COODY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Edgar
Arroyo Amezquita (“Amezquita”), a federal inmate
at the Maxwell Federal Prison Camp, filed this pro
se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 on July 1, 2019.[1] Doc. # 1. Amezquita challenges
the validity of his convictions and sentence entered by the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico.[2] He argues that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over his criminal case because Article III
provided the court with no authority to try his case. Doc. #
1 at 2-3. He further argues that his indictment was void
because it was “presented to a grand jury without a
formal complaint having been presented” by the
prosecution. Id. at 3. Finally, Amezquita argues
that “the prosecution failed to allege (or prove) any
evidence of ‘injury in fact' to the United States
by way of federally prohibited conduct(s).”
Id. Thus, he asserts that the judgment under which
he is incarcerated “is, in fact and law, VOID.”
Id. at 2. For the reasons that follow, the
undersigned concludes that this case should be transferred to
the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico, the court that entered Amezquita's convictions and
sentence.
II.
DISCUSSION
Federal
courts have “an obligation to look behind the label of
a motion filed by a pro se inmate and determine
whether the motion is, in effect, cognizable under a
different remedial statutory framework.” United
States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 624-25 (11th Cir. 1990).
Although this action is brought as a habeas petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, the court must consider whether this
action is properly styled as such, or if it is more
appropriately considered as a motion to vacate under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.
Section
2241 provides an avenue for challenges to matters such as the
administration of parole, prison disciplinary actions, prison
transfers, and certain types of detention. See, e.g.,
Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348,
1351-52 (11th Cir. 2008) (petition challenging decision of
federal Parole Commission is properly brought under §
2241); Bishop v. Reno, 210 F.3d 1295, 1304 n.14
(11th Cir. 2000) (petition challenging Bureau of Prisons'
administration of service credits, including calculation,
awarding, and withholding, involves execution rather than
imposition of sentence, and thus is a matter for habeas
corpus). For purposes of venue, petitions properly filed
under § 2241 must be brought in the district in which
the petitioner is incarcerated. Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426, 442-43 (2004).
In
contrast, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) states:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established
by an Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon
the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added). For actions
properly considered under § 2255, venue and jurisdiction
lie only in the district of conviction. 28 U.S.C. §
2255(a).
Amezquita's
self-described habeas petition challenges the validity of his
convictions and sentence. Generally, a federal prisoner must
bring any collateral attack on the legality of his conviction
or sentence through a motion to vacate under § 2255
rather than a petition for writ of habeas corpus under §
2241. See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast,
Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2017); Venta v.
Warden, FCC Coleman-Low, 2017 WL 4280936, at *1 (11th
Cir. 2017). A petitioner challenging the legality of his
federal detention may do so under § 2241 only
if he shows that § 2255 would be an “inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (the so called
“saving clause”); see also Johnson v.
Warden, 737 Fed.Appx. 989, 990-91 (11th Cir. 2018).
Amezquita's
claims challenging his convictions and sentence fall squarely
within the realm of injuries that § 2255 addresses. When
a federal prisoner brings “a traditional claim
attacking his [conviction or] sentence that he could have
brought in a [§ 2255] motion to vacate, the remedy by
[such] motion is adequate and effective to test the legality
of his detention. . . . Allowing a prisoner with a claim that
is cognizable in a [§ 2255] motion to vacate to access
[§ 2241] nullifies the procedural hurdles of section
2255 and undermines the venue provisions.”
McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1090. Thus, regardless of the
label Amezquita has placed on his pleadings, his petition
challenging his convictions and sentence must be construed as
a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.[3]
Section
2255 remains Amezquita's exclusive remedy to bring his
challenge to his convictions and sentence. Because he
challenges a judgment entered in the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico, any jurisdiction to
consider his § 2255 motion lies only with the court for
the District of Puerto Rico. See 28 U.S.C. §
2255(a). This court, which sits in the Middle District of
Alabama, lacks jurisdiction to consider a § 2255 motion
challenging convictions entered by the court for the District
of Puerto Rico.
Under
28 U.S.C. § 1631, a court that finds it lacks
jurisdiction to entertain a civil action may, if it is in the
interest of justice, transfer such action to any other court
in which the action could have been brought when it was
filed. Because Amezquita is proceeding pro se, this
court finds it is in the interest of justice that this case
be transferred to the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico.
III.
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