United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northwestern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
C. BURKE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Chelsea Gentry alleges discrimination and retaliation under
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, against Defendant City of Russellville, Alabama. (Doc.
1, No. 3:16-cv-01466 and Doc. 1, No. 3:17-cv-01127).
Plaintiff also asserts a wage and hour claim under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207. (Doc. 1,
No. 3:17-cv-01127). This matter is before the Court on
Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 32). For
the reasons set forth below, the Court shall grant
STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). To demonstrate that there is a genuine
dispute as to a material fact that precludes summary
judgment, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must
cite “to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.”
considering a defendant's motion for summary judgment, a
district court must view the evidence in the record and draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Asalde v. First Class Parking
Sys. LLC, 898 F.3d 1136, 1138 (11th Cir. 2018).
Accordingly, the Court presents the facts in this opinion in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See also Feliciano
v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir.
2013) (“[W]hen conflicts arise between the facts
evidenced by the parties, [courts] must credit the nonmoving
party's version.”). “The court need consider
only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials
in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
began her employment with the Russellville Police Department
(RPD) in December 2011, at the age of 21. (Doc. 28-1 at 12).
Plaintiff has a bachelor's degree in criminal justice.
(Id. at 6). She attended the police academy in
January 2012. (Id. at 12).
worked as a police officer during the first three years of
her employment. (Id. at 12, 17). Between October
2012 to September 2013, the RPD disciplined Plaintiff due to
some problems, but on December 2, 2014, the RPD gave
Plaintiff a good annual review. (Doc. 28-1 at 70-71; Doc.
28-4 at 11; Doc. 28-5 at 11-12; Doc. 39-13).
summer of 2015, Defendant's Civil Service Board (CSB)
posted a sergeant position at the RPD. (Doc. 28-1 at 17; Doc.
28-4 at 6). The RPD instructed officers to sign their name to
a list if they were interested in applying for the position.
(Doc. 28-4 at 6). Plaintiff was the only officer who signed
the list. (Doc. 28-1 at 18). Despite reservations based on
her prior work history, Chief Hargett recommended Plaintiff
to the CSB for promotion. (Doc. 28-4 at 6, 10-11). In August
2015, the CSB promoted Plaintiff to sergeant and gave her a
pay raise. (Doc. 39-65; Doc. 28-7, ¶ 4). The CSB has a
policy that newly promoted employees are placed on a
six-month probation. (Doc. 28-1 at 31-32, 72; Doc. 28-4 at
13; Doc. 28-5 at 22-23).
her promotion, Chief Hargett and Cpt. Prince told Plaintiff
that RPD would assign her to a field training officer and she
would undergo a supervisor field training program. (Doc. 28-1
at 18-19). The RPD did not have a written policy for a
training program until October 29, 2015. (Doc. 28-4 at 16).
Plaintiff was the first participant in the program.
(Id. at 11). Over the course of Plaintiff's
participation, the RPD made changes to the program because
the program was still being developed. (Doc. 28-1 at 18; Doc.
28-7, ¶ 4).
the RPD paired Plaintiff with Sgt. Miller. (Doc. 28-1 at 19).
Sgt. Miller evaluated Plaintiff stating that she failed to
exhibit command presence, failed to demonstrate an ability to
control situations when responding to calls, had difficulty
organizing officers and distributing calls for service,
appeared to lose track of service calls and whereabouts of
her officers, and appeared to be unfamiliar with certain
department policies and procedures. (Id. at 19-20,
120).Sgt. Miller also noted that Plaintiff was
not receptive to feedback, sleeps during shifts, is
insubordinate, and overall has leadership and professional
weaknesses. (Id. at 123-24). Subsequently, Sgt.
Franks evaluated Plaintiff, remarking that Plaintiff had
displayed poor leadership skills, poor professionalism, poor
knowledge of general orders, and appeared to be sleeping in
her patrol car. (Id. at 121-22).
admitted to occasionally sleeping during a shift.
(Id. at 21-22). She also testified that she
questioned the qualifications of the training officers
assigned to her. (Id. at 20-21). Plaintiff admitted
defending or justifying her actions when receiving criticism
from her supervisors. (Id.).
Miller and Franks recommended that Plaintiff not continue as
sergeant (Doc 28-1 at 121-24). On October 29, 2015, Chief
Hargett demoted Plaintiff to patrol officer after reviewing
her evaluations and speaking to Sgts. Miller and Franks and
Cpt. Prince. (Doc. 28-1 at 27; Doc. 28-7, ¶ 5; Doc. 28-5
at 26; Doc. 39-22).
time of Plaintiff's demotion, Mickey Gentry,
Plaintiff's husband, served as a volunteer reserve
officer at the police department. (Doc. 28-7, ¶ 9).
Since 2004, Defendant had also employed Mr. Gentry as a
firefighter. (Doc. 28-3 at 16). Mr. Gentry went to Mayor
Grissom to discuss his wife's demotion. (Doc. 28-1 at 41,
78). Among other things, Mr. Gentry told the mayor that Chief
Hargett demoted Plaintiff because Plaintiff was not one of
Chief Hargett's “drinking buddies.” (Doc.
28-3 at 9, 23-26).
Hargett removed Mr. Gentry from the reserve officer program
and told him not to come to the police station. (Doc. 28-7,
¶ 9). Cpt. Prince told Plaintiff that Mr. Gentry was not
allowed at the police station. (Doc. 39-83,
recording). After the RPD demoted Plaintiff, the RPD
placed Plaintiff into the position of a patrol officer. (Doc.
28-1 at 131). On November 1, 2015, Plaintiff appealed her
demotion to the CSB. (Doc. 28-1 at 79; Doc. 39-27). On
November 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC. (Doc. 28-1 at 80; Doc. 39-28).
December 14, 2015, Cpt. Prince reviewed Plaintiff's
performance, noting that her job knowledge was “average
considering her years of experience, ” she does not
take constructive criticism well or follow directions, and
she “tends to maximize any opportunity to use her sick
leave.” (Doc. 39-34). On December 15, 2015, Lt.
Shackelford reviewed Plaintiff's performance, confirming
many of Cpt. Prince's statements. (Doc. 39-35). For
example, Lt. Shackelford stated that Plaintiff was not
dependable and that he “was in full support of
[Plaintiff's] removal [as sergeant], and I still stand
beside that decision.” (Id.).
January 2016, Plaintiff informed Chief Hargett that she was
pregnant and requested that he keep the information private.
(Doc. 28-1 at 83).
March 5, 2016, during the night shift, Sgt. Franks observed
Plaintiff sitting in her patrol vehicle in the police station
parking lot. (Id. at 132-33). Sgt. Franks believed
Plaintiff was sleeping and took a picture of her.
(Id. at 134, photograph). Plaintiff testified that
she was not asleep, but she does not dispute that Sgt. Franks
believed she was asleep. (Id. at 22, 35-36).
March 7, 2016, Mr. Gentry and Plaintiff went to the police
station to speak to Chief Hargett about Sgt. Franks. (Doc.
28-1 at 36-37, 41). The RPD's General Order No. 100 I.
(O.) provides that employees are required to follow the chain
command to report department related issues unless an
employee has a complaint of sexual harassment. (Doc. 28-1 at
135-36, 141; Doc. 28-7, ¶ 10). Plaintiff testified that
she was not reporting sexual harassment. (Doc. 28-1 at 40).
March 10, 2016, Plaintiff interviewed for another sergeant
position. (Id. at 84). That same day, Chief Hargett
suspended Plaintiff for five days without pay for sleeping on
duty and an additional five days without pay for bypassing
the chain of command. (Doc. 39-39).
gave Chief Hargett a note from her doctor, dated March 21,
2016, requesting that she be placed in the office, preferably
on a day shift. (Doc. 39-43). Chief Hargett requested
clarification from Plaintiff's physician as to the extent
of her medical limitations, which he received on April 1,
2016. (Doc. 28-2 at 35; Doc. 28-4 at 24, 39, 42). The
physician's note stated that Plaintiff could not wear her
utility belt,  and she could not be on the street because
of a risk of being hit in the abdomen. (Doc. 28-4 at 42).
March 24, 2016, Plaintiff filed a second charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. (Doc. 39-9 at 8).
did not have a “light duty” position. (Doc. 28-1
at 88). Therefore, the RPD placed Plaintiff on a medical
leave and required her to use sick or personal leave to take
time off. (Doc. 28-1 at 88; Doc. 28-4 at 39; Doc. 28-8 at 7).
Plaintiff could request leave donations from other employees
if she exhausted her own leave time. (Doc. 28-8 at 7).
Several Fire Department employees donated sick leave time to
Plaintiff. (Doc. 28-1 at 63). No. RPD employees donated time
to Plaintiff, despite her requests to RPD employees for
donated time. (Id. at 65).
her medical leave, the RPD offered Plaintiff dispatch shifts
when available so she would not have to use her own leave
time or donated leave time. (Doc. 28-1 at 42-43; Doc. 28-4,
at 40). On June 18, 2016, while Plaintiff was working a
dispatch shift, Mr. Gentry came to the police station and
went inside the dispatch room with Plaintiff. (Doc. 28-1 at
42-43). Lt. Shackelford observed the incident and reported it
to Cpt. Prince. (Doc. 28-4 at 27; Doc. 28-5 at 19). Plaintiff
was suspended for 14 days without pay. (Doc. 28-1 at 44-45).
September 2016, Plaintiff's child was born. (Id.
at 6, 94). On October 12, 2016, the RPD disciplined Plaintiff
for taking her sick leave donation forms to City Hall, rather
than turning them in to Chief Hargett. (Doc. 28-1 at 45, 95;
Doc. 39-52; Doc. 39-53). On November 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed
a third charge of discrimination with the EEOC related to her
demotion. (Doc. 39-8 at 12).
November 7, 2016, Plaintiff returned to full-time duty. (Doc.
28-1 at 95). Plaintiff told Cpt. Prince that she needed to
pump breast milk for her child. (Id.). The RPD told
Plaintiff she could use the break room or go home during
breaks to pump breast milk. (Id. at 50). Plaintiff
chose to go home during her paid breaks. (Id.). The
RPD required Plaintiff to remain on duty while traveling home
until she went out of her service area, at which time she was
required to call or text. (Id.).
instructed Plaintiff to make up extra time at the end of her
shift because her breaks took longer than the allotted hour
and Plaintiff sometimes arrived at work late. (Doc. 28-4 at
30; Doc. 39-55). On December 12 and 27, 2016, the RPD
counseled Plaintiff and gave her a written directive
regarding her breaks, but the RPD did not discipline her.
(Doc. 28-1 at 82, 96; Doc. 28-2 at 51; Doc. 28-5 at 21-22;
Doc. 39-55; Doc. 39-56).
point, Plaintiff's physician instructed her to breastfeed
her baby instead of pumping milk. (Doc. 28-1 at 49-50, 97;
Doc. 39-84, recording).Plaintiff worked a 12-hour shift and
needed three breastfeeding breaks, which were about 20
minutes each. (Doc. 39-84, recording).
this time, a shooting occurred in Russellville, Alabama,
during which the suspect was injured and required medical
care. (Doc. 28-1 at 47). The RPD transported the suspect to
Huntsville Hospital in Huntsville, Alabama. (Doc. 28-4 at
32). The RPD scheduled Plaintiff to guard the suspect at the
hospital in Huntsville. (Id.) Plaintiff raised
concerns about breastfeeding while guarding the suspect.
(Doc. 28-1 at 47). The RPD told Plaintiff to take her
concerns up the chain of command, which she did.
(Id.). The RPD rearranged the schedule and
reassigned Plaintiff that day. (Id.). The RPD
scheduled Plaintiff for a night shift that evening in
Russellville. (Doc. 28-1 at 97-99; Doc. 28-4 at 33-34).
weeks later, Cpt. Prince made a schedule change and
reassigned some officers, including Plaintiff to the night
shift. (Doc. 28-5 at 27; Doc. 28-1 at 46; Doc. 30, Ex. L,
recording). Plaintiff complained to her lieutenant and then
to Cpt. Prince about the schedule change. (Doc. 30, Ex. L,
recording). Cpt. Prince told her it was a temporary
assignment until the new sergeants gained experience. (Doc.
28-1 at 49; Doc. 30, Ex. L, recording). Plaintiff submitted a
written request to speak to the City Council instead of
taking her complaints to Chief Hargett. (Doc. 28-1 at 46,
52). Plaintiff did not tell anyone that she had requested to
speak to the City Council. (Id. at 52).
City Council held a regularly scheduled meeting, and at
Plaintiff's request, the City Council spoke to her in a
private executive session. (Doc. 28-4 at 30). Plaintiff hoped
the City Council would “step in and just tell my
supervisors to back off a little bit and just let me do my
job.” (Doc. 28-1 at 46). Plaintiff spoke to the City
Council about the assignment to guard the suspect at
Huntsville Hospital. (Id. at 47-48). The City
Council questioned Chief Hargett about this matter and others
issues related to Plaintiff. (Doc. 28-4 at 30). Based on the
questions, Chief Hargett understood that Plaintiff had led
the City Council to believe that the RPD required Plaintiff
to travel to Huntsville to guard a suspect. (Doc. 28-4 at 30,
32, 34; Doc. 28-6 at 4). The next working day, the RPD placed
Plaintiff on paid administrative leave. (Doc. 28-1 at 55;
Doc. 28-4 at 32, 34).
following day, the RPD instructed Plaintiff to come to the
station with her police equipment. (Doc. 28-1 at 56; Doc.
28-4 at 34). Plaintiff testified that she thought the RPD
would terminate her employment and spoke to her father, who
was with her at the time in Birmingham, about her anticipated
termination. (Doc. 28-1 at 56). When Plaintiff arrived, Chief
Hargett told her that she had violated the chain of command
and could resign or be terminated. (Doc. 28-1 at 57-58; Doc.
28-4 at 32, 35; Doc. 39-79, recording). Plaintiff opted to
resign. (Doc. 28-1 at 60-61). She asked if she should go home
to write her resignation letter. (Id. at 58). Chief
Hargett told her she could use the computer that was in their
room. (Id.). She did not request additional time to
consider her decision. (Id.).
April 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed a third charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. (Doc. 39-59).
September 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit --- (Doc. 1,
No. 3:16-cv-01466-MHH),  --- and on July 4, 2017, Plaintiff
filed a second lawsuit --- (Doc. 1, No.
3:17-cv-01127-AKK). On November 30, 2017, another judge on
this Court consolidated these two cases under case number
3:16-cv-01466. (Doc. 21).
alleges that Defendant retaliated against her in violation of
Title VII. (Doc. 1 at 18-21, ¶¶ 141-45, No.
3:17-cv-01127). The burden-shifting analysis established
by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies to Plaintiff's
retaliation claim because she has not put forth direct
evidence of retaliation. Under McDonnell Douglas,
Plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case of
retaliation. Id. If she is able to establish a prima
facie case of retaliation, then the burden shifts to
Defendant to produce a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for
the action. Id. Once Defendant meets its burden,
then Plaintiff must show that the proffered reason is a
pretext for retaliation. Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus,
LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016).
establish a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected
activity, (2) she suffered a materially adverse action, and
(3) there was a causal connection between the protected
activity and the materially adverse action. Howard v.
Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010). As
to the first element, Defendant does not dispute that
Plaintiff's filing of three EEOC charges and two lawsuits
constitute statutorily protected activity. (Doc. 50, p.
35). Accordingly, the Court proceeds with its
analysis of the other factors under the burden-shifting
the next prong of the prima facie case, Plaintiff alleges
that she suffered 13 different materially adverse actions:
 [Plaintiff's] husband was banned from the premises
and taken out of reserves,  she was not given the right to
appeal her demotion contrary to policy,  her co-workers
were told not to associate with her,  she was followed and
verbally harassed and told she was disgruntled and she needed
to quit,  she was written up on March 10, 2015 wherein she
was docked 5 days' pay for sleeping and 5 more days for
her complaint of disparate treatment/harassment to the chief,
[ 6 ] her doctor's excuse was refused,  she was not
donated hours by anyone in her department,  she was only
given half of the hours donated to her,  she was written
up for pump/breastfeeding breaks,  she was written up and
docked 14 days' pay because her husband came to the
department to bring her lunch,  she was written up just
three days later because her husband did not come to the
department to turn in forms,  she was not promoted to
Sergeant, and  she was involuntarily terminated.
(Doc. 52 at 39-40) (citations omitted). With respect to these
actions, the Court considers each of the alleged adverse
actions in turn.
Mr. Gentry's ban from police station and removal from
argues that Mr. Gentry's ban from the police station and
removal from officer reserves was “because of
[Mr. Gentry's] discussion with the Mayor threatening a
lawsuit.” (Doc. 52 at 40). Defendant's argument
focuses on Plaintiff not having engaged in a statutorily
protected activity yet because Mr. Gentry's accusations
occurred “the very day [Plaintiff] was demoted.”
(Doc. 53 at 8). However, Plaintiff's argument of a
statutorily protected activity concerns Mr. Gentry's
alleged threat of a lawsuit to the mayor.
Plaintiff cites a recording to support her statement that Mr.
Gentry threatened a lawsuit when talking to the mayor.
(See Doc. 39-83). However, this recording does not
support her assertion that Mr. Gentry actually threatened a
lawsuit. (Id.). Second, Plaintiff generally cites to
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP,
562 U.S. 170 (2011) without any discussion. In
Thompson, the defendant fired the plaintiff three
weeks after his fiancée, who was also an employee of
the defendant, filed an EEOC charge alleging sex
discrimination. The plaintiff in Thompson then filed
an EEOC charge based on retaliation. Id. at 172. The
facts in Thompson are clearly distinguishable from
the facts in the instant case. Thus, the Court finds that
Plaintiff's reliance on Thompson is misplaced,
and Thompson is inapplicable. Accordingly, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case.
arguendo, that Plaintiff could establish a prima
facie case, Defendant has asserted a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for restricting access, i.e.,
Chief Hargett had “discretion as police chief to
restrict access to the police station due to [Mr.
Gentry's] baseless accusation.” (Doc. 53 at 8).
Mr. Gentry's conversation with Mayor Grissom, Mr. Gentry
told the mayor that one of the reasons Plaintiff was demoted
was because she was not one of Chief Hargett's
“drinking buddies.” (Doc. 28-3 at
24). Chief Hargett attested that
“[w]hen [Mr.] Gentry told  Mayor David Grissom that I
demoted Ms. Gentry because she was not one of my
‘drinking buddies,' I decided that Mr. Gentry could
no longer serve as a reserve officer and was not welcome at
the police station. I instructed him not to come down to the
police station for any reason. I did not discipline Plaintiff
in any way for her husband's statements.” (Doc.
28-7, ¶ 9). Plaintiff has not shown that her
husband's ban and removal from officer reserves was a
pretext for retaliating against her. Thus, Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Right to appeal demotion
asserts that “she was not given the right to appeal her
demotion contrary to policy” (Doc. 52 at 39), and that
“[a]ny permanent employee, which [she] was, can appeal
disciplinary decisions, and demotion is disciplinary.”
(Id. at 42-43). Defendant argues that pursuant to
City policy, “only permanent (i.e., not
probationary) employees are permitted to appeal
demotions” and Plaintiff was not a permanent employee.
(Doc. 53 at 9). In other words, Defendant argues that it had
a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for not allowing
Plaintiff to appeal her demotion.
policy grants a permanent employee “the right to appeal
any disciplinary action . . . .” (Doc. 39-38, Rule X -
Rights of Review and Appeal). Plaintiff acknowledges that she
was on “promotional probation” when she became a
sergeant. (Doc. 28-1 at 104). Thus, Plaintiff was not a
permanent employee with respect to the sergeant position.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff “has presented no
evidence to invalidate the City's showing that she was
not permitted to appeal her demotion due to her probationary
status.” (Doc. 53 at 9). With no other factual support
or authority, Plaintiff has failed to show that that the
City's reason for not allowing her to appeal her demotion
was a pretext for retaliation. Accordingly, summary judgment
is granted on this claim.
Associating with co-workers
asserts that she suffered an adverse action when “her
co-workers were told not to associate with her.” (Doc.
52 at 39). Plaintiff does not discuss the action or provide
any evidence in support thereof. Plaintiff testified that
when she and her husband had a conversation with Officer
Brett Evans about not returning phone calls or texts, he
responded that he was “told just to kind of keep my
distance from you, that I - until all your stuff is over, I
can't really talk to you.” (Doc. 28-1 at 66). Mr.
Gentry also testified that Officer Evans told him he was
“no longer allowed to talk to us” and that he did
not want to lose his job. (Doc. 28-3 at 11). However,
Officer Evans did not tell Plaintiff or her husband who told
him to keep his distance. (Doc. 28-1 at 67). Plaintiff does
not demonstrate who told her co-workers not to associate with
her. Plaintiff fails to show an adverse action and thus
cannot establish a prima facie case. Accordingly, the Court
grants summary judgment on this issue.
asserts that she suffered an adverse action when she was
“followed” and “verbally harassed.”
(Doc. 52 at 39). Specifically, Plaintiff states,
“Supervisor Franks told [her] she was disgruntled and
needed to quit,  and when [she] told [Officer]
Shackelford she could not watch an inmate and breastfeed, he
told her she needed to quit again.” (Id. at
42). Plaintiff's only argument is that Sgt. Franks and
Lt. Shackelford were supervisors telling her to quit based on
“gender based issues.” (Doc. 52 at 42). With no
evidence or authority, Plaintiff fails to establish the
elements of a prima facie case based on this single
Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, Defendant
asserts that Sgt. Franks's actions in monitoring
Plaintiff's whereabouts and activities were legitimate
and nonretaliatory because his actions were consistent with
his job duties. (Doc. 53 at 11). Sgt. Franks was
Plaintiff's supervisor and thus was responsible for
keeping track of her, as well as other officers under his
supervision. (Doc. 28-1 at 37). Plaintiff agreed that she had
a GPS for that purpose and had no evidence of how much
supervision was being given to other officers. (Id.
at 37-38). Plaintiff's questioning of how Sgt. Franks
could be doing his job properly if he was constantly
following her around does not establish pretext. (Doc. 28-1
at 37). Plaintiff does not show that Defendant's reason
was a pretext for retaliation. Accordingly, summary judgment
is granted on this claim.
Docked pay for sleeping and violating chain of
asserts that “she was written up on March 10, 2015,
wherein she was docked 5 days' pay for sleeping” in
her patrol car on March 5, 2016. (Doc. 52 at 40; Doc. 39-39).
Defendant does not address whether the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case. Accordingly, for purposes of
this motion, the Court will assume that Plaintiff has
satisfied her burden. Defendant asserts it had a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for Plaintiff's discipline.
RPD's Rule of Conduct 100, IV(C)(i)(d) states that
“sleeping on duty” is considered a serious
violation. (Doc. 28-1 at 138). Plaintiff argues that she was
not asleep, but that Sgt. Franks “thought that I was
sleeping.” (Id. at 35). This
statement does not establish that Defendant's reason for
disciplining Plaintiff was a pretext for retaliation. See
Williams v. Fla. Atl. Univ., 728 Fed.Appx. 996, 999
(11th Cir. 2018) (holding that “[a]n employer who fires
an employee under the mistaken but honest impression that the
employee violated a work rule is not liable for
discriminatory conduct”) (quoting Damon v. Fleming
Supermarkets of Fla., 196 F.3d 1354, 1363, n.3 (11th
also argues that “the Chief made it clear [sleeping] is
okay for safety purposes and admitted everyone does
it.” (Doc. 51 at 42). The Plaintiff offers a
photograph of Lt. Shackelford sleeping inside the police
station. (Doc. 39-18). Plaintiff does not discuss or provide
the context of this photograph. Furthermore, Plaintiff has
failed to produce evidence of officers sleeping in their
patrol cars, as she was, and Chief Hargett being
aware of these incidents. (See Doc. 28-4 at 38).
Plaintiff has not been able to show ...