United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ORDER
WILLIAM H. STEELE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to
Correct Sentence or, in the Alternative, Grant Jail Credit
(doc. 52), filed by and through his counsel of record.
Defendant's request for “correction” of a
federal sentence imposed by this Court on June 6, 2008, lacks
any citation to authority that might authorize modification
of the sentence in these circumstances. It is well settled
that sentencing courts do not possess “some sort of
inherent authority to modify a sentence” whenever they
wish. United States v. Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d 1310,
1317-18 (11th Cir. 2002). Generally speaking,
“[a] district court may not modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed, except in some cases
where modification is expressly permitted by statute or
Fed.R.Crim.P. 35.” United States v. Jackson,
613 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010). Defendant
identifies no such rule or statute that might permit
modification of his sentence here. Therefore, the portion of
his Motion petitioning this Court to “correct”
his sentence is denied.
Alternatively,
Langford requests that this Court “grant [him] credit
for the twenty-eight (28) months served following federal
sentencing in the custody of the State of Alabama Department
of Corrections.” (Doc. 52, at 2.) This Motion appears
to be procedurally defective in two critical respects.
Here's why: It is well settled that, as a general
proposition, “[t]he Attorney General through the BOP,
and not the district courts, is authorized, under 18 U.S.C.
3585(b), to compute sentence credit awards after
sentencing.” Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884, 889 (11th
Cir. 1995). The Eleventh Circuit has summarized applicable
law and procedure for defendants in Langford's position
in the following terms:
“In construing 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), the Supreme
Court has held that the Attorney General through the Bureau
of Prisons, as opposed to the district courts, is authorized
to compute sentence credit awards after sentencing. …
As a result, a federal prisoner dissatisfied with computation
of his sentence must pursue the administrative remedy
available through the federal prison system before seeking
judicial review of his sentence. … A claim for credit
for time served is brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after
the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”
United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 987, 990
(11th Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).[1] Moreover, it is black-letter law that
ordinarily § 2241 proceedings must be pursued in the
district where the petitioner is being confined, not the
district where sentencing occurred. See, e.g., Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 159
L.Ed.2d 513 (2004) (“The plain language of the habeas
statute thus confirms the general rule that for core habeas
petitions challenging present physical confinement,
jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of
confinement.”); Diaz v. United States, 580
Fed.Appx. 716, 717 (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2014)
(“A § 2241 petition by a federal prisoner must be
brought in the district where the inmate is
incarcerated.”); Garcia v. Warden, 470
Fed.Appx. 735, 736 (11th Cir. Mar. 27, 2012) (as a
general proposition, “jurisdiction for § 2241
petitions lies only in the district of confinement”).
What
does all of this mean for Langford? First of all, he has made
no showing that he has exhausted, or even attempted to
exhaust, his administrative remedies with the federal Bureau
of Prisons. He cannot skip that step and proceed directly to
§ 2241 review in federal court under the circumstances
presented here. Moreover, because he is confined in federal
prison in Yazoo City, Mississippi, any § 2241 petition
that Langford may submit after exhausting his administrative
remedies with the BOP would properly be directed to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi (his
district of incarceration), rather than this District Court.
All of
that said, the Court does have concerns with Langford's
description of the relevant events. According to the Motion,
Langford was in State custody when federally sentenced in
June 2008; was released from State custody into Federal
custody in November 2010; and received no credit on his
federal sentence for the intervening 28 months. That state of
affairs runs directly counter to this Court's findings
and expressed intentions during the sentencing hearing in
this case. Indeed, the sentencing hearing transcript reflects
the following pertinent exchange:
“MR. MAY: … Since the Defendant was arrested
yesterday, he was in State custody and was brought here on a
writ, he's still technically in State custody. So, we
would ask the Court to make a, just a finding on the record
under the Bail Reform Act because of this being a presumption
case that he comes into Federal custody today.
* * *
“THE COURT: All right. Well, that will
allow him to start serving that Federal custody immediately
so that there's no question about credit for time served.
So, I will do that, order him into Federal custody to begin
service of the sentence.”
(PageID.149-50 (emphasis added).)
For all
of the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to Correct
Sentence or, in the Alternative, Grant Jail Credit (doc. 52),
is denied, without prejudice to
Langford's ability to renew such a motion in an
appropriate court upon an appropriate showing at an
appropriate time.
DONE
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