United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
EMILY
C. MARKS CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Now
pending before the Court are a motion to dismiss filed by
Defendant Wayne Farms, LLC (“Wayne Farms”) (Doc.
10) on June 14, 2019, and a motion to amend filed by
Plaintiff Zacorius Glanton (“Glanton”) (Doc. 16)
on July 15, 2019.
On May
7, 2019 Glanton filed a complaint against Wayne Farms,
bringing a hostile work environment claim pursuant to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (count one), a claim of
constructive discharge pursuant to Title VII (count two), a
state-law claim of outrageous conduct (count three), a
state-law claim of invasion of privacy (count four), a
state-law battery claim (count five), and a state-law
negligent supervision claim (count six) (Doc. 1).
After
Wayne Farms moved to dismiss the complaint, Glanton moved to
file an amended complaint, attaching a proposed amended
complaint, and stating that the amendment would cure
deficiencies identified by Wayne Farms. (Doc. 16 & 16-1).
Upon
consideration of the complaint, the proposed amended
complaint, and the briefs of the parties, and for the reasons
that follow, the motion to amend is due to be GRANTED to the
extent that Glanton will be allowed the opportunity to file
an amended complaint.
I.
FACTS
The
allegations of the complaint are as follows:
Glanton
was an employee of Wayne Farms from March 1 to July 18, 2018.
Glanton's employment was constructively terminated on
July 18, 2018.
Glanton
identifies another employee of Wayne Farms, Allen Stephenson
(“Stephenson”), as a person who sexually harassed
him. Glanton complained about unwanted touching to his
supervisor who at first laughed off the behavior, and then
agreed to move Glanton to another line. Glanton alleges that
management observed Glanton and Stephenson later that same
day, and that Glanton then went to the office and reported
Stephenson's conduct. (Doc. 1, at p. 3-4).
Glanton
acknowledges that management moved him after his complaint,
but states that Stephenson did not stop his inappropriate
behavior. According to Glanton, Stephenson touched him
inappropriately on a weekly basis. On June 29, 2018, after
Stephenson threatened to physically fight Glanton, members of
management took Glanton to human resources where he again
complained. Glanton alleges that Stephenson was still trying
to get his attention after the meeting with human resources,
so Glanton left the floor and has not returned to Wayne
Farms. (Doc. 1, at p. 5-7).
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
Motion to Dismiss
A Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the
complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8:
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is]
... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. at 663 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Conclusory allegations that are merely
“conceivable” and fail to rise “above the
speculative level” are insufficient to meet the
plausibility standard. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
570. This pleading standard “does not require
‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
...