United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
RASHEDA L. HODGES, Plaintiff,
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER [1]
STACI
G. CORNELIUS U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This
matter-arising from a slip-and-fall-was removed to this court
from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County on the basis of
federal diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). Presently pending
is the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Doc. 17). The plaintiff, Rasheda L.
Hodges, responded within the time provided in the court's
initial order. (Doc. 21; see Doc. 9 at 4). Wal-Mart
has not filed a reply, and the time to do so has expired.
Accordingly, this matter is ripe for adjudication. For the
reasons that follow, the motion for summary judgment is due
to be granted in part.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always
bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of
the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of
the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at
323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e)
requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and
by his own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific
facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See
Id. at 324.
The
substantive law identifies which facts are material and which
are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the
facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of
the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta,
2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine
“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted. See id. at 249.
II.FACTS
On the
morning of August 5, 2014, the plaintiff visited the
Trussville Wal-Mart, as she had many times before. (Doc. 18
at 2). It was a dry day. (Id. at 4). Because she was
only picking up a couple of items, the plaintiff did not
retrieve a shopping cart. (Id. at 3). After entering
the store, the plaintiff proceeded to the bakery department,
which is located directly in front of the produce department.
(Id. at 2-3). After selecting a lemon cake from a
display table, the plaintiff walked to the produce department
to pick out some bananas. (Id. at 3). The store was
not crowded and was well lit, and the plaintiff's view of
the floor was unobstructed. (Id. at 3-4). However,
the plaintiff has no memory of looking down at the floor at
any time prior to her fall. (Id. at 4-5).
As the
plaintiff left the area of the banana display, both of her
feet slipped out from under her, causing her to fall
backwards on the floor. (Doc. 18 at 4). After the plaintiff
fell, she noticed a puddle of clear, unscented
liquid-presumably water- on the floor near her feet.
(Id. at 5). The plaintiff assumes her fall was
caused by stepping in the puddle and slipping. (Id.
at 6-7). The plaintiff testified the puddle was larger than a
baseball but could not say whether it was larger than a
basketball. (Id. at 5). The plaintiff acknowledged
that, had she looked down at the floor, she could have seen
the puddle from fifteen or twenty feet away; if she had seen
the puddle, she would have avoided it. (Id. at 5-6).
The plaintiff did not know how long the puddle had been on
the floor, but she described it as a “fresh
spill.” (Id. at 6-7; Doc. 19-3 at 7). The
plaintiff did not notice any tracks in the puddle and did not
observe any other liquid on the floor. (Doc. 18 at 6-7).
There
was another patron in the vicinity when the plaintiff
fell-Assunita Susie Cooley. (Doc. 21 at 2). Ms. Cooley was
shopping in the produce department when she “heard a
commotion” and turned to see the plaintiff lying on the
floor. (Id.). Ms. Cooley avers she did not initially
notice any water on the floor when she looked in the
plaintiff's direction. (Id.). However, upon
closer inspection Ms. Cooley noticed “several water
streaks or drops on the ground” around the plaintiff;
she notes the “water was difficult to see because of
the light, color of the floor, and clearness of the
water.” (Id.). Ms. Cooley followed the trail
of water to a cart laden with fresh produce, which a Wal-Mart
employee was using to restock the produce displays.
(Id.). Ms. Cooley avers it was apparent “that
the employee, and the cart he controlled, was the source of
the water.” (Id.). When Ms. Cooley spoke to
the employee, he acknowledged he had been restocking items in
the produce department. (Id.). Finally, Ms. Cooley
avers that even after she notified the employee of the water
on the floor, it was difficult for both of them to see it due
to “the pattern and coloring of the floor;” she
states they could only see the water if they tilted their
heads to a “certain angle.” (Id.).
III.
DISCUSSION
The
complaint asserts claims for negligence and wantonness under
Alabama state law. (Doc. 1-1 at 2-10). The plaintiff did not
respond to Wal-Mart's arguments concerning wantonness,
which the undersigned construes as her abandonment of that
claim. In any event, the plaintiff has not presented any
evidence Wal-Mart acted with “a reckless or conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Ala. Code
§ 6-11-20(b)(3). Accordingly, there are no genuine
issues of material fact regarding wantonness, and Wal-Mart is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to this claim.
Wal-Mart
seeks summary judgment on the grounds the water was an open
and obvious hazard. (Doc. 18 at 8-13). In response the
plaintiff argues traditional negligence-not premises
liability-principles govern because the Wal-Mart employee was
the source of the water on the floor; thus, whether the water
was an open and obvious hazard is irrelevant. (Doc. 21 at
3-4). Alternatively, the plaintiff contends the water was not
an open and obvious hazard. (Id. at 4-6). As
explained below, the undersigned concludes this case is
governed by premises liability theories-not traditional
negligence. However, even applying premises liability
principles, genuine issues of material fact preclude summary
judgment on any negligence claim.
As the
plaintiff notes, Alabama tort law distinguishes between
situations in which traditional negligence or premises
liability applies. See Baldwin v. Gartman, 604 So.2d
347 (Ala.1992). The key inquiry in this regard is whether
“the injury is caused by some affirmative conduct of
the landowner, rather than by the mere condition of the
premises.” Id. at 349. In Baldwin, a
concrete slab left unbalanced and unattended by the
defendant's employee fell on an invitee on the
defendant's premises. The plaintiff in Baldwin
argued traditional negligence governed because the
employee's conduct caused the injury. However, the
Alabama Supreme Court disagreed, explaining “leaving
the slab unattended did not, in and of itself, cause the
injury; rather, it produced a dangerous condition.”
Id. The court found “[t]he balanced slab was a
condition of the premises, no matter how briefly it was
balanced, ” and the defendant's conduct was not the
“immediate cause of injury.” Id.
Thus,
courts applying Alabama law draw a distinction between a
dangerous condition created by a defendant and an actual
injury directly caused by a defendant. Compare
Baldwin, 604 So.2d at 349, and Rigsby v. United
States, No. 11-2314-WMA-TMP, 2013 WL 5230649, at *2
(N.D. Ala. Sept. 16, 2013) (box which plaintiff tripped over
was a condition of the premises when employee left it on the
floor before the fall), with Powell v. Piggly Wiggly Ala.
Distrib. Co., 60 So.3d 921, 925-26 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)
(traditional negligence applied where employee struck
plaintiff with a fork lift), and Costa v. Sam's E.,
Inc., 524 Fed.Appx. 548, 550 (11th Cir. 2013)
(traditional negligence applied where employee dislodged a
box which struck plaintiff). Here, the plaintiff has
presented evidence that Wal-Mart's employee created a
dangerous ...