United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES S. COODY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
On July
1, 2019, Donald Ray White, a federal inmate at the Maxwell
Federal Prison Camp in Montgomery, Alabama, filed this
pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241.[1] Doc. # 1. In his petition, White
challenges the constitutionality of his 2010 conviction and
sentence entered by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama for the offense of unlawful
transport of weapons by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). White claims that the trial court
lacked authority over his case because, he says, Article III
provides the court with no authority to try his case. Doc. #
1 at 2-3. He further argues that the indictment in his case
is void because it was “presented to a grand jury
without a formal complaint having been presented” by
the prosecution. Id. at 3. Finally, White argues
that “the prosecution failed to allege (or prove) any
evidence of ‘injury in fact' to the United States
by way of federally prohibited conduct(s).”
Id. at 4. Thus, he asserts that the judgment under
which he is incarcerated “is, in fact and law,
VOID.” Id. at 3.
Because
White's § 2241 habeas petition attacks his
conviction and sentence, this court entered an order in
compliance with Castro v. United States, 540 U.S.
375 (2003), notifying White of its intention to
recharacterize his petition as a motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. # No. 2
at 2-3. The court advised White that because he is
challenging his conviction and sentence, the construed §
2255 motion should be transferred to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the
court of conviction. Id. at 3. In further compliance
with Castro, this court cautioned White that its
recharacterization of his petition as a § 2255 motion
would render the § 2255 motion and any subsequent §
2255 motion susceptible to the procedural limitations imposed
on § 2255 motions, specifically the one-year limitation
period and the successive-motion bar. Id. The court
then directed White to inform the court of his wishes to do
one of the following: (1) proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
only on the claims in the construed § 2255 motion; or
(2) amend the construed § 2255 motion to assert any
additional claims he wished to assert under § 2255 in
challenging his conviction and sentence; or (3) withdraw the
construed § 2255 motion and dismiss this action.
Id. The court cautioned White that if he failed to
file a response in compliance with its order, the cause would
proceed as an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as to only
those claims presented in the construed § 2255 motion.
Id. at 3-4.
White
failed to file a response that complied with this court's
orders. Instead he filed objections insisting that his
petition should be treated as one seeking habeas relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Doc. # 6. Because White
did not file a response that complied with this court's
orders, this cause is proceeding as an action under §
2255 as to only those claims presented in the construed
§ 2255 motion. And as further discussed below, the
undersigned concludes that this action should be transferred
to the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama.
II.
DISCUSSION
Federal
courts have “an obligation to look behind the label of
a motion filed by a pro se inmate and determine
whether the motion is, in effect, cognizable under a
different remedial statutory framework.” United
States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 624-25 (11th Cir. 1990).
Although brought as a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
this court must consider whether this action is properly
styled as such, or if it is more appropriately considered as
a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Section
2241 provides an avenue for challenges to matters such as the
administration of parole, prison disciplinary actions, prison
transfers, and certain types of detention. See, e.g.,
Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348,
1351-52 (11th Cir. 2008) (petition challenging decision of
federal Parole Commission is properly brought under §
2241); Bishop v. Reno, 210 F.3d 1295, 1304 n.14
(11th Cir. 2000) (petition challenging Bureau of Prisons'
administration of service credits, including calculation,
awarding, and withholding, involves execution rather than
imposition of sentence, and thus is a matter for habeas
corpus). For purposes of venue, petitions properly brought
under § 2241 must be filed in the district in which the
petitioner is incarcerated. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426, 442-43 (2004).
In
contrast, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) states:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established
by an Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon
the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added). For actions
properly considered under § 2255, venue and jurisdiction
lie only in the district of conviction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a).
White's
self-described § 2241 petition challenges the legality
of his conviction and sentence. Generally, a federal prisoner
must bring any collateral attack on the legality of his
conviction or sentence through a motion to vacate under
§ 2255 rather than a petition for writ of habeas corpus
under § 2241. See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill
Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir.
2017); Venta v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Low, 2017 WL
4280936, at *1 (11th Cir. 2017). A petitioner challenging the
legality of his federal detention may do so under § 2241
only if he shows that § 2255 would be an
“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (the
so called “saving clause”); see also Johnson
v. Warden, 737 Fed.Appx. 989, 990-91 (11th Cir. 2018).
White does not show that § 2255 would be an inadequate
vehicle to present his claims. Indeed he cannot, because his
claims challenging the validity of his conviction and
sentence fall squarely within the realm of injuries that
§ 2255 addresses.
When a
federal prisoner brings “a traditional claim attacking
his [conviction or] sentence that he could have brought in a
[§ 2255] motion to vacate, the remedy by [such] motion
is adequate and effective to test the legality of his
detention. . . . Allowing a prisoner with a claim that is
cognizable in a [§ 2255] motion to vacate to access
[§ 2241] nullifies the procedural hurdles of section
2255 and undermines the venue provisions.”
McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1090. Here, regardless of the
label White places on his pleadings, his petition challenging
his conviction and sentence must be considered as a motion
under § 2255, rather than § 2241. Section 2255
remains White's exclusive remedy to bring his challenge
to his conviction and sentence. Because he challenges a
judgment entered in the Northern District of Alabama,
jurisdiction to consider the § 2255 motion lies only in
the Northern District of Alabama as the district of
conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Under
28 U.S.C. § 1631, a court that finds it lacks
jurisdiction to entertain a civil action may, if it is in the
interest of justice, transfer such action to any other court
in which the action could have been brought when it was
filed. Because White is proceeding pro se, this
court finds that it is in the interest of justice that this
...