United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
KARON
OWEN BOWDRE CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
matter comes before the court on Defendants Pamela Casey and
Scott Gilliland's motions to dismiss. (Garcia Doc. 25;
Revill Doc. 2).[1]
This
consolidated action stems from the events of February 23,
2017. Plaintiffs Megan Garcia and Victor Revill, both
lawyers, were representing a client, Lloyd Edwards, in state
court to oppose a protection from abuse order sought by Mr.
Edwards's wife. Mr. Edwards handed over two cell phones
to Ms. Garcia that Plaintiffs believed may contain relevant
information regarding the protection from abuse proceedings.
Outside the courthouse steps, two Blount County sheriff
deputies-Sue Ashworth and Brian K. Ratliff-presented a
warrant to search Mr. Edwards. After the search, Deputy
Ashworth demanded that Ms. Garcia hand over Mr. Edwards's
two cell phones.
When
Ms. Garcia refused, Deputy Ashworth called Pamela Casey, the
Blount County District Attorney, who allegedly instructed
Deputy Ashworth to arrest Ms. Garcia and Mr. Revill for
obstructing a government investigation. Deputy Ashworth and
Deputy Ratliff proceeded to handcuff and arrest Plaintiffs.
While still outside the courthouse, Scott Gilliland, a Blount
County Assistant District Attorney, exited the courthouse and
made a statement in front of onlookers that Plaintiffs were
knowingly in possession of child pornography.
Subsequently,
Ms. Garcia and Mr. Revill each filed separate cases against
Ms. Casey, Mr. Gilliland, Deputy Ashworth, and Deputy
Ratliff, mainly raising claims under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Ms.
Casey and Mr. Gilliland jointly filed motions to dismiss in
both cases.[2] The motions are nearly identical, each
raising similar immunity arguments to support dismissal.
Specifically, in the motion to dismiss Mr. Revill's case,
they raised absolute prosecutorial immunity, qualified
immunity, and state-agent immunity. (Revill Doc. 2). In the
motion to dismiss Ms. Garcia's case, they raised absolute
prosecutorial immunity, qualified immunity, state-agent
immunity, judicial or quasi-judicial immunity, and sovereign
immunity. (Garcia Doc. 25). Both motions have been fully
briefed and are ripe for review.
On July
1, 2019, this court consolidated the two cases because of the
multiple common issues of law and fact. (Revill Doc. 26). So,
the court will now consider both motions together because
they both raise the same issues of immunity, with the
exception of judicial or quasi-judicial immunity and
sovereign immunity, which are only raised in Ms. Garcia's
case.
I.
Background
On
February 23, 2017, Ms. Garcia and Mr. Revill were
representing their client, Mr. Edwards, in Blount County
state court to oppose a protection from abuse order sought by
Mr. Edwards's wife. Before the hearing, Mr. Edwards told
his attorneys that he received explicit pictures and videos
from his wife after she filed for protection from abuse.
After the hearing, Mr. Edwards handed two cell phones, which
were no longer in service, containing the pictures and videos
to Ms. Garcia so she and Mr. Revill could retrieve the images
and texts sent by Mr. Edwards's wife. Ms. Garcia put both
phones in her satchel.
After
Ms. Garcia, Mr. Revill, and Mr. Edwards left the courthouse,
Sue Ashworth and Brian K. Ratliff, both Blount County deputy
sheriffs, confronted Ms. Garcia, Mr. Revill, and Mr. Edwards
with a warrant to search Mr. Edwards's person and
vehicle. Mr. Revill reviewed the warrant, then instructed Mr.
Edwards to consent to the search. After searching Mr. Edwards
and his car, Deputy Ashworth demanded that Mr. Revill produce
the two cell phones. Mr. Revill did not consent because the
search warrant did not extend to Ms. Garcia or her satchel.
Deputy Ashworth and Deputy Ratliff did not speak to Ms.
Garcia.
Deputy
Ashworth then told Mr. Revill that she would detain him and
Ms. Garcia until she and Deputy Ratliff could
“determine the next course of action.” (Garcia
Doc. 18 at 4). Deputy Ashworth then allegedly called Pamela
Casey, the Blount County District Attorney, and/or Mr.
Gilliland, a Blount County Assistant District Attorney.
Deputy Ashworth explained that she saw Mr. Edwards hand the
phones to his attorneys. After that phone call, Deputy
Ashworth told Mr. Revill that “we either need the phone
out of the satchel or we will have to detain you and get a
search warrant to get the phone.” (Id.).
Deputy
Ashworth then made another call, allegedly to Ms. Casey.
Plaintiffs believe that Ms. Casey instructed Deputy Ashworth
to arrest Ms. Garcia and Mr. Revill because immediately
following the call, Deputy Ashworth and Deputy Ratliff
arrested Plaintiffs for obstructing government operations.
Mr. Revill did not consent to a search or seizure not
authorized by a warrant. Neither Deputy Ashworth nor Deputy
Ratliff addressed Ms. Garcia during the arrest, so although
she did not offer to turn the satchel over, she also did not
expressly refuse to turn over the phones.
After
Plaintiffs were handcuffed, Mr. Gilliland walked out of the
courthouse and said in front of several onlookers,
“Ya'll [sic] the ones knowingly in possession of
child pornography? That was a bad mistake.” (Garcia
Doc. 18 at 5; Revill Doc. 1 at 7). Plaintiffs allege they
were unaware of any child pornography; Mr. Edwards's wife
merely claimed-without any corroboration-during the hearing
that the phones contained child pornography.
Plaintiffs
remained handcuffed outside the courthouse in public for
approximately 30 minutes, while other individuals walked
past. The incident was recorded on the body cam of a City of
Oneonta police officer. The officer was asked to keep an eye
on the two attorneys. At one point, during a discussion with
another police officer, the two officers questioned Deputy
Ashworth's actions because the search warrant did not
include Ms. Garcia's satchel. The officer with the body
cam noted that he did not want to get involved in the
situation. (Revill Doc. 1 at 7).
Plaintiffs
were then taken to Blount County Jail and booked. They
remained in custody for approximately four hours, before
being released after paying a $3, 000 bond each. When
released, they were informed that they were charged with
obstruction of governmental operations and refusing to permit
inspection.
In the
application for the warrant justifying the arrests, Deputy
Ashworth averred that she “was attempting to serve a
search warrant on Lloyd Clinton Edwards. Victor Revill and
Megan Garcia were in possession of an item subject to the
search warrant and refused to hand over said item.”
(Garcia Doc. 18 at 6). But the search warrant only stated
that it was for Mr. Edwards's person and vehicle, making
no mention of Plaintiffs or Ms. Garcia's satchel.
On
March 17, 2017, Carol Robinson, a reporter for AL.com,
published an article detailing the arrests. The article
included quotes from Ms. Casey, in which Ms. Casey explained
that “[w]ithin minutes of learning that their client
was alleged to have used his cell phone to produce and/or
view child pornography, Mr. Revill and Ms. Garcia took
possession of their client's phones and attempted to
conceal the phones from law enforcement.” (Garcia Doc.
18 at 6). Ms. Casey called Plaintiffs' actions “not
only illegal, but unethical.” (Id.). The
article has been shared at least 235 times as of December 18,
2018.
On
March 29, 2018, Robert Crocked and Anna Sparks, who were
appointed as temporary district attorneys, prosecuted
Plaintiffs for obstructing governmental operations, in
violation of Alabama Code § 13A-10-2, and refusal to
permit inspection, in violation of Alabama Code §
13A-10-3. Ms. Casey recused herself from the case and did not
attend the proceedings, but allegedly helped prepare Mr.
Edwards for the trial on or about March 16, 2018. At the
close of the prosecution's case, the court granted
Plaintiffs' motion for judgment of acquittal. Although
recused, Ms. Casey stated that she would appeal the decision,
but never did so.
On
December 18, 2018, Ms. Garcia filed her suit against the four
Defendants in their individual capacities. Her complaint
alleged five counts: (1) unreasonable seizure against all
Defendants, pursuant to § 1983; (2) defamation against
Mr. Gilliland; (3) defamation against Ms. Casey; (4)
malicious prosecution against all Defendants in violation of
Alabama common law; and (5) malicious prosecution against Ms.
Casey in violation of Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct
3.6 and 3.8(1)(a). (Garcia Doc. 18).
On
January 18, 2019, Mr. Revill filed his suit against the four
Defendants in their individual capacities. His complaint
alleged 13 counts: (1) unlawful investigatory detention
against Deputy Ashworth and Deputy Ratliff in violation of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to §
1983; (2) unlawful investigatory detention against Ms. Casey
and Mr. Gilliland in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, pursuant to § 1983; (3) unlawful arrest
against Deputy Ashworth and Deputy Ratliff in violation of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to §
1983; (4) unlawful arrest against Ms. Casey and Mr. Gilliland
in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
pursuant to § 1983; (5) false imprisonment against
Deputy Ashworth and Deputy Ratliff in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to § 1983; (6)
unlawful detention following arrest against Ms. Casey and Mr.
Gilliland in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, pursuant to § 1983; (7) malicious
prosecution against all Defendants in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to § 1983; (8)
malicious prosecution against all Defendants in violation of
state law; (9) false imprisonment against Ms. Casey and Mr.
Gilliland in violation of Alabama Code § 6-5-170; (10)
defamation against Ms. Casey; (11) defamation against Mr.
Gilliland; (12) invasion of privacy-false light against Ms.
Casey and Mr. Gilliland; and (13) wrongful interference with
business relationships against Ms. Casey and Mr. Gilliland.
(Revill Doc. 1).
II.
Standard of Review
A Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of
the complaint. Generally, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require only that the complaint provide
“‘a short and plain statement of the claim'
that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). A plaintiff must provide
the grounds of his entitlement, but Rule 8 generally does not
require “detailed factual allegations.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). It does, however,
“demand[] more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Pleadings that contain nothing more than “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not
meet Rule 8 standards nor do pleadings suffice that are based
merely upon “labels or conclusions” or
“naked assertions” without supporting factual
allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557.
The
Supreme Court explained that “[t]o survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quoting and explaining its decision in
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). To be plausible on its
face, the claim must contain enough facts that “allow[]
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Although “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement, '” the complaint
must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely
consistent with a defendant's liability, it ‘stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.'” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
But the
Defendants do not attack the sufficiency of the
Plaintiffs' factual allegations. Instead, their attack is
based on legal defenses under various immunity doctrines. So,
the court will consider the standard of review under each
immunity raised.
Prosecutorial
Immunity
The
Supreme Court has held that absolute immunity exists for
prosecutors in a § 1983 action. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (holding that a
person is immune from a civil § 1983 action arising from
his action initiating or presenting the state's case).
However, prosecutorial immunity depends on the
prosecutor's function. See Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993). A prosecutor is
not immune from prosecution for all acts, but only for those
acts “connected with the prosecutor's role in
judicial proceedings.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.
478, 494-95 (1991). These acts include the pursuit of
criminal prosecution and court appearances. See Rowe v.
Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
But this immunity does not extend to actions taken in an
investigative capacity. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273
(“A prosecutor's administrative duties and those
investigatory functions that do not relate to an
advocate's preparation for the initiation of a
prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to
absolute immunity.”).
Qualified
Immunity
Qualified
immunity protects government officials performing
discretionary functions from individual capacity suits
unless the official violates “clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). “The purpose of
this immunity is to allow government officials to carry out
their discretionary duties without the fear of personal
liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all
but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating
the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d
1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
“The
applicability of qualified immunity is a question of law to
be decided by the court.” Willingham v.
Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1184 (11th Cir. 2001). To
receive qualified immunity, a government official “must
first prove that he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts
occurred.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340,
1346 (11th Cir. 2002).
“Once
the defendant establishes that he was acting within his
discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.”
Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194. A two-prong test determines
whether qualified immunity is appropriate. See Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); see Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding that the
Saucier analysis may be performed in any order).
First, the court asks whether, “[t]aken in the light
most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the
facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a
constitutional right.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 325
F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Saucier,
533 U.S. at 201). Second, “[i]f a violation could be
made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions,
the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was
clearly established.” Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at
1234.
A right
is clearly established when “the law at the time of an
incident [provided] ‘fair warning' to the
defendants that their alleged conduct was
unconstitutional.” Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d
1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2015). In the Eleventh Circuit, the
court considers only binding precedent to create clearly
established law. See Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d
266, 277 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[The court] look[s] only to
binding precedent-holdings of cases drawn from the United
States Supreme Court, this Court, or the highest court of the
state where the events took place.”).
The
court acknowledges that qualified immunity is defense not
merely from liability, but from suit. See Blinco v. Green
Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.
2004) (“The defense of sovereign or qualified immunity
protects government officials not only from having to stand
trial, but from having to bear the burdens attendant to
litigation, including pretrial discovery.”). So, the
court should resolve questions of qualified immunity
“at the earliest possible stage of a litigation.”
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987).
A plaintiff's claim can survive qualified immunity raised
in a motion to dismiss if “the plaintiff's
allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established
law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985). But “the defendant is entitled to summary
judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence
sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the
defendant in fact committed those acts.” Id.
(emphasis added). So, even if Plaintiffs' allegations
state a claim for violations of clearly established law, such
a ruling would not preclude Ms. Casey and Mr. Gilliland from
reasserting qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.
State-Agent
Immunity
Under
Alabama's state-agent immunity doctrine:
A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or
her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the
claim against the ...