United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
JEFFREY S. CLEGG, Plaintiff,
v.
DR. TAHIR SIDDIQ, Defendant. JEFFREY SCOTT CLEGG, Plaintiff,
v.
JESSICA DUFFELL, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
SUSAN
RUSS WALKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action for damages and injunctive relief
involves a dispute over the adequacy of medical care and
treatment afforded Plaintiff Jeffrey Clegg during his
incarceration at the Bullock Correctional Facility
(“Bullock”) in Union Springs,
Alabama.[1] Clegg names as defendants Dr. Tahir Siddiq
and Health Services Administrator Jessica
Duffell.[2]
Defendants
filed an answer, special report, and supporting evidentiary
materials addressing Clegg's claims for relief. In these
documents, Defendants deny that they acted in violation of
Clegg's constitutional rights. Defendants also contend
that the complaint is due to be dismissed because Clegg
failed to exhaust an administrative remedy available to him
through the prison system's medical care provider
regarding the medical claims against Dr. Siddiq prior to
filing the complaint. Doc. 25. Defendants base their
exhaustion defense on Clegg's failure to submit any
medical grievance appeals regarding the claims presented
against Dr. Siddiq. Doc. 25-2. In addition, Defendants
maintain that Clegg's medical records indicate that he
received appropriate medical treatment during the time
relevant to the matters alleged. See Docs. 25-1,
25-2, 25-3, 25-4.
Upon
receipt of Defendants' special report, the court issued
an order providing Clegg an opportunity to file a response.
This order directed Clegg to address Defendants'
arguments that “he [] failed to exhaust his available
administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”) [prior to filing this federal civil
action] . . ., ” and that “the complaint fails to
establish that they in any way acted violation of
Plaintiff's constitutional rights.” Doc. 27 at 1-2
(footnote omitted). The order advised Clegg that his response
should be supported by affidavits or statements made under
penalty of perjury and other evidentiary materials. Doc. 27
at 2-3. The order further cautioned Clegg that unless
“sufficient legal cause” is shown within ten days
of entry of this order “why such action should not be
undertaken, . . . the court may at any time [after expiration
of the time for his filing a response to this order] and
without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special
reports and supplemental special report and any supporting
evidentiary materials as a motion for summary judgment or
motion to dismiss, whichever is appropriate and (2) after
considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on
the motion in accordance with law.” Doc. 27 at 3-4.
Clegg
took advantage of the opportunity to file a response to
Defendants' special report. Docs. 36, 37. In response to
Defendants' exhaustion defense, Clegg argues that Duffell
refused to process a grievance regarding Dr. Siddiq, so he
filed a grievance with the Board of Medical Examiners to
exhaust administrative remedies. Doc. 37 at 5. However,
Duffell maintains that Clegg failed to exhaust the available
prison grievance procedure regarding the medical issues
raised in his complaint against Dr. Siddiq.
Specifically, Duffell contends that Clegg filed a variety of
medical grievances during his incarceration at Bullock but,
prior to filing this action, he never submitted a medical
grievance appeal regarding Dr. Siddiq. Defendants produced
Clegg's inmate medical file, maintained at the
institution, which reflects that Clegg had access to and used
the medical grievance procedure on numerous occasions to
submit grievances, grievance appeals, and medical requests,
but failed to submit a grievance or grievance appeal
regarding the subject matter of his claim against Dr. Siddiq
prior to filing this action. Docs. 25-2, 25-3, 25-4. While
Clegg maintains that he exhausted his claim against Dr.
Siddiq by writing to the Board of Medical Examiners, because
Duffell refused to process a grievance, the Board is not part
of the grievance procedure provided by the institutional
medical provider.[3] See Bock, 549 U.S. at 218
(“The level of detail necessary in a grievance to
comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to
system and claim to claim, but it is the prison [medical
provider's] requirements, and not the PLRA, that define
the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”). Contrary to
Clegg's conclusory and unsupported assertions, the
documents and records before the court demonstrate that
during all times relevant to the allegations made, Clegg had
access to the institutional medical provider's grievance
process to exhaust his claims.
“[A]n
exhaustion defense . . . is not ordinarily the proper subject
for a summary judgment [motion]; instead, it should be raised
in a motion to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a
motion for summary judgment.” Bryant v. Rich,
530 F.3d 1368, 1374-1375 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotations omitted); Trias v. Florida Dept. of
Corrections, 587 Fed.Appx. 531, 534 (11th Cir. 2014)
(District court properly construed defendant's
“motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies[.]”).
Therefore, the court will treat Defendant Siddiq's
special report as a motion to dismiss. The court will treat
Defendant Duffell's special report as a motion for
summary judgment.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Exhaustion
In
addressing the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
exhaustion, the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized that [t]he plain language of th[is] statute makes
exhaustion a precondition to filing an action in federal
court. This means that until such administrative remedies as
are available are exhausted, a prisoner is precluded from
filing suit in federal court.
Leal v. Ga. Dept. of Corrs., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279
(11th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore, “the question of exhaustion under the PLRA
[is] a ‘threshold matter' that [federal courts
must] address before considering the merits of the case,
” and that cannot be waived. Myles v. Miami-Dade
Cnty. Corr. & Rehab. Dept., 476 Fed.Appx. 364, 366
(11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Chandler v. Crosby, 379
F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004)).
“When
deciding whether a prisoner has exhausted his remedies, the
court should first consider the plaintiff's and the
defendants' versions of the facts, and if they conflict,
take the plaintiff's version of the facts as true.
‘If in that light, the defendant is entitled to have
the complaint dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, it must be dismissed.'” Myles,
476 Fed.Appx. at 366 (quoting Turner v. Burnside,
541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008)). “If the
complaint is not subject to dismissal at this step, then the
court should make specific findings in order to resolve the
disputed factual issues related to exhaustion.”
Id. (quoting Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082).
Consequently, a district court “may resolve disputed
factual issues where necessary to the disposition of a motion
to dismiss for failure to exhaust [without a hearing]. The
judge properly may consider facts outside of the pleadings to
resolve a factual dispute as to exhaustion where doing so
does not decide the merits, and the parties have a sufficient
opportunity to develop the record.” Trias, 587
Fed.Appx. at 535. Based on the foregoing, the Eleventh
Circuit has rejected an inmate-plaintiff's argument that
“disputed facts as to exhaustion should be
decided” only after a trial either before a jury or
judge. Id. at 534.
B.
Summary Judgment
“Summary
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine
[dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d
1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)
(“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”). The party moving for summary judgment
“always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the [record, including
pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by
presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of
material fact or by showing the non-moving party has failed
to present evidence to support some element on which it bears
the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.
Defendant
Duffell has met her evidentiary burden. Thus, the burden
shifts to Clegg to establish, with appropriate evidence
beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his
case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929
F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3); Jeffery v. Sarasota White
Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-594 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding that, once the moving party meets its burden,
“the non-moving party must then go beyond the
pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or sworn statements],
or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, ” demonstrate there is a genuine dispute of
material fact) (internal quotations omitted). This court will
also consider “specific facts” pled in a
plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering his
opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI
Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A
genuine dispute of material fact exists when the non-moving
party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable
factfinder to return a verdict in its favor.
Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of
Public Educ., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007).
Although
factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party and pro se complaints are
entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro
se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing
by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact.
See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006);
Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir.
1990). Clegg's pro se status alone does not
compel this court to disregard elementary principles of
production and proof in a civil case.
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
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