Appeal
from Houston Circuit Court (CV-18-134)
THOMPSON, PRESIDING JUDGE.
The
Alabama Department of Labor ("the DOL") appeals
from a judgment of the Houston Circuit Court ("the trial
court") in this unemployment-compensation case. The
judgment permitted Eddie L. Griggs to receive the maximum
amount of unemployment- compensation benefits allowed, with
no disqualifications. Initially, the DOL decided that Griggs
was disqualified from receiving any unemployment-compensation
benefits. Griggs appealed that decision to a DOL hearing
officer. After conducting a hearing by telephone with Griggs
and other witnesses, the hearing officer entered a decision
disqualifying Griggs from receiving unemployment-compensation
benefits for eight weeks and declaring that the maximum
amount to which he could "become entitled after that
period of disqualification was reduced by eight times the
weekly benefit amount." The DOL then appealed the
hearing officer's decision to the trial court for a trial
de novo. See § 25-4-95, Ala. Code 1975
(providing for appeal to the circuit court in
unemployment-compensation cases and stating that
"[t]rial in the circuit court shall be de novo").
The
evidence presented to the trial court indicated the
following. For 15 months, Griggs, who is not disabled, worked
for Dothan Ambulance Service, Inc., also known as
Pilcher's Ambulance Service ("Pilcher's"),
driving a wheelchair van. His job was to transport patients
who are confined to wheelchairs to and from various
appointments. The van was equipped with a handicapped-parking
placard. Elaine Hughes Culp, the general manager of
Pilcher's, testified before the trial court that, when
clients were in the wheelchair van, drivers were permitted to
park in spaces designated for handicapped parking. However,
she said, if there were no clients with disabilities on
board, drivers were not permitted to use those spaces. Culp
also said that all of Pilcher's drivers were made aware
that they had to follow all state rules and regulations and
that, under state law, a driver who is not transporting a
disabled person cannot park in a space reserved for people
with disabilities. Section 32-6-233.1, Ala. Code 1975,
provides that it is unlawful for a person who does not have a
disability or who is not transporting a person with a
disability to park in a parking space designated as a
handicapped space.
Griggs
testified that, on August 1, 2018, he was driving the
wheelchair van while on duty but that he was not transporting
anyone at the time. He stated that he pulled into a
convenience-store parking lot and that the only parking space
available was designated for handicapped parking. Griggs said
that it was raining heavily and that two handicapped spaces
were empty, so he parked in one of them and went inside the
convenience store to use the restroom and to buy a soft
drink. Griggs said that he was inside the store for only a
few minutes. He stated that he left the store and that, as he
approached the van, he was approached by an "older
lady." Griggs said that she asked him why he had parked
in the handicapped space, because he was not handicapped.
Griggs testified that he responded, "Ma'am, I
apologize for [the] inconvenience. I just stopped there just
to use the bathroom just for a minute. And I'm very sorry
if I caused you any difficulty." According to Griggs,
the woman told him again that he was not supposed to park in
a handicapped space. He said that he apologized again and
"politely asked" her where she had parked. Griggs
said that the woman, who apparently was disabled, told him
she had parked in the handicapped space next to the van. The
woman also video-recorded Griggs and took his photograph,
Griggs said. He denied that he was rude to the woman.
Culp
testified that, the day of Griggs's encounter with the
woman, the woman came to the station from which Pilcher's
operated to make a complaint against him. According to Culp,
the woman said that she had contemplated posting the video to
the Facebook social-media web site, which, Culp said, would
have been "horrible" and would have put
Pilcher's in a bad light with the public.
Culp
said that she spoke with the woman and watched the video the
woman had recorded. From watching the video, Culp said, it
was apparent that the woman had difficulty walking. The woman
also had recorded Griggs inside the store "fixing him a
coke." Culp said that the video shows the woman speaking
with Griggs when she followed him out of the store and
approached the van. Culp said: "She is speaking with
him. And he is not responding very well to her." When
the woman asked Griggs his name, Culp said, Griggs did not
tell her. Culp added: "[W]hile she's asking him all
these questions, he has the van in reverse, and the beeping
noise is going on constantly. And he eventually just drives
off, right after she tells him that she has recorded the
whole thing." Culp said that she did not hear Griggs
apologize to the woman on the recording.
Before
the incident at the convenience store, Culp said, a previous
supervisor had reprimanded Griggs after he received a
speeding ticket while driving the van. Culp also said that,
following another incident, she had warned Griggs against
"rude, loud behavior" at the workplace. That
warning was documented in writing. On that occasion, Culp
said, Griggs was on the telephone with another employee in
the office and could be heard yelling at that other employee.
Culp said that she warned Griggs that, if his behavior did
not change, he could lose his job. Griggs acknowledged that,
before the incident at the convenience store, he had received
warnings from his supervisors for misconduct, including being
"smart mouthed and rude and loud." Griggs conceded
that he had been told that if his attitude did not
"straighten up," he would lose his job and that he
was "on thin ice." However, Griggs also testified
that Pilcher's had not told him "actually what they
[were] terminating [him] for." He denied having received
previous warnings, adding: "I never had no
write-ups."
Griggs
testified that, when he was driving the van,
"[r]egardless if [clients were] in the vehicle or not, I
usually park in [handicapped spaces] with them or not."
Just a few questions later, however, Griggs said that he
parked in a handicapped space "just that once." He
said that, when he was driving his personal vehicle, he did
not park in handicapped-parking spaces and that he knew doing
so was illegal.
On
February 11, 2019, the trial court entered a judgment stating
that the DOL's initial notice of determination advising
Griggs that he was disqualified from receiving any
unemployment compensation was based on § 25-4-78(3)b.,
Ala. Code 1975. That statute is applicable when an employee
loses his or her job because of misconduct after a previous
warning. The trial court then noted that the hearing officer
had modified that initial decision and had "removed the
disqualification under the provisions of §
25-4-78(3)b.," but had found Griggs was "partially
disqualified under the provisions of §
25-4-78(3)c.," Ala. Code 1975. That provision is
applicable when an employee loses his or her job because of
misconduct but has not received a prior warning. After
considering the evidence presented at the trial, the trial
court reversed the partial denial of benefits based on §
25-4-78(3)c. In the judgment, the trial court removed the
partial disqualification and stated that "the reduction
of the maximum amount of benefits parable [sic] is
restored." In entering the judgment, the trial court
noted that Griggs was the only party to file a notice of
appeal seeking judicial review of the hearing officer's
decision.
The DOL
filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. Griggs did not
favor this court with a brief on appeal. On appeal, the DOL
argues that the trial court misapplied the applicable law to
the facts that, it says, are undisputed regarding
Griggs's misconduct and his previous warnings. Therefore,
the DOL contends, the evidence demonstrates that a complete
disqualification from receiving unemployment-compensation
benefits is warranted in this case.
Based
on language used in the trial court's judgment noting
that Griggs was the only party who had sought judicial review
of the hearing officer's decision that Griggs was
partially disqualified from receiving
unemployment-compensation benefits, it appears that the trial
court was acting under the belief that it could review the
propriety of the hearing officer's decision only to the
extent that it was adverse to Griggs. If so, that belief was
incorrect.
"'"'[A] trial de novo means that
the slate is wiped clean and a trial in the Circuit Court is
had without any consideration being given to prior
proceedings in another court.'"' Mahoney v.
Loma Alta Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 84 So.3d 907,
916 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (quoting Ex parte Dison,
469 So.2d 662, 665 (Ala. 1984) (overruled on other grounds by
Ex parte City of Dothan, 501 So.2d 1136 (Ala.
1986)), quoting in turn Yarbrough v. City of
Birmingham, 353 So.2d 75, 78 (Ala.Crim.App.1977))."
N.J.D. v. Madison Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 110
So.3d 387, 390 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). Thus, the trial court
was to determine the amount of unemployment-compensation
benefits Griggs was entitled to receive, if any, ...