United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ORDER
KRISTI
K. DUBOSE CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
matter is before the Court on Defendant Jaycee Doak's
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, or, in the alternative,
Motion for a New Trial. (Doc. 180).[1] The jury convicted Jaycee
Doak of six counts of aiding and abetting in the charge of
transportation of a minor with intent that the minor engage
in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged
with a criminal offense, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
2423(a), (e). The question Jaycee Doak's motion presents
is whether a reasonable jury could have convicted her. The
answer to that question turns on whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a
reasonable jury could have concluded she “intend[ed] to
facilitate that offense's commission, ”
Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 76 (2014),
i.e., that she “participate[d] in it as in something
that [s]he wishe[d] to bring about” and “s[ought]
by h[er] action[s] to make it succeed.” Id.
(quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S.
613, 619 (1949)). Upon consideration, the Government is
ORDERED to supplement its response as set
forth below.
I.
ARGUMENTS
Jaycee
Doak argues the evidence submitted was insufficient to
convict her primarily because the Government failed to
provide evidence that Jaycee Doak “wished, sought
success, [and] chose[] with full knowledge[] to participate
in [Mack Doak]'s illegal venture.” (Doc. 180 at 6
(citing Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 689-70). She
specifically argues that the Government failed to present
evidence that she possessed intent at the time of travel that
the minors engage in criminal sexual activity. In addition,
for the first time, she challenges the Court's jury
instructions regarding the proof necessary to convict her of
aiding and abetting. She takes issue with the Court's
failure to instruct the jury that to convict Jaycee Doak the
jury had to find evidence of her “advance
knowledge.”
The
Government argues that it presented sufficient evidence of
Jaycee Doak's guilt because it introduced evidence that
she assisted in the transportation of the children and
because she did it “knowing that there was ongoing
sexual abuse.” (Doc. 184 at 10). Further, the
Government argues that Jaycee Doak's aiding and abetting
liability is supported by the evidence that she attempted to
conceal the abuse.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 29
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
“[a]fter the government closes its evidence or after
the close of all the evidence, the court on the
defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of
any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain
a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).[2] The Rule also
provides that “[a] defendant may move for a judgment of
acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a
guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury,
whichever is later.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1).
“A
motion for judgment of acquittal is a direct challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence presented against the
defendant.” United States v. Aibejeris, 28
F.3d 97, 98 (11th Cir. 1994). In deciding such a motion,
“district courts should apply the same standard as that
used for reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of the
evidence. The Court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government and determine whether a
reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Sellers,
871 F.2d 1019, 1021 (11th Cir. 1989) (internal citations
omitted); see also United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d
1229, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007) (“In reviewing a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,
drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in
the Government's favor.”). To sustain a conviction,
the evidence need not “exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every
conclusion except that of guilt.” United States v.
Garcia, 447 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). “The jury is free to
choose between or among the reasonable conclusions to be
drawn from the evidence presented at trial, and the court
must accept all reasonable inferences and credibility
determinations made by the jury.” Sellers, 871
F.2d at 1021 (internal citations omitted).
Pursuant
to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
“[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may
vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a).
“Thus, there are two grounds upon which a court may
grant a motion for new trial: one based on newly discovered
evidence . . .; and the other based on any other reason,
typically the interest of justice . . . .” United
States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1151 (11th Cir. 2006).
The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for new trial
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. United
States v. Champion, 813 F.2d 1154, 1170 (11th Cir.
1987).
III.
DISCUSSION
a.
Jury Instruction
The
Court begins with the challenge to the aiding and abetting
jury instructions.[3] The Court is unpersuaded that the advance
knowledge requirement set forth in Rosemond, a case
involving 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), applies with equal force
to the offense with which Jaycee Doak was charged. This is
because the Supreme Court in Rosemond specifically
addressed a statute of a “compound nature.”
United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1334
(11th Cir. 2016). The Supreme Court held that for an aider
and abettor to be criminally liable under that statute,
“the § 924(c) defendant's knowledge of a
firearm must be advance knowledge-or otherwise said,
knowledge that enables him to make the relevant legal (and
indeed, moral) choice.” Rosemond, 572 U.S. at
78. He must have advance knowledge that a firearm would be
used or carried.
Unlike
§ 924(c), which, in part, requires participation in an
underlying drug crime and using or carrying a
firearm during that crime, Seabrooks, 839 F.3d at
1334 (citing § 924(c)), 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) does
not share the compound characteristics. In addition, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that the Supreme Court in
Rosemond “did not hold that its ruling applied
beyond aiding or abetting § 924(c) offenses.”
United States v. Persaud, 605 Fed.Appx. 791, 801
(11th Cir. 2015).[4]Moreover, “Rosemond did not
purport to change the law of aiding and abetting generally,
only to clarify its application to a § 924(c) firearm
offense. Since [the defendant's] case does not involve a
conviction under § 924(c), Rosemond has no
direct application here.” United States v.
Aplesa, 690 Fed.Appx. 630, 634 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 138 S.Ct. 524 (2017).[5]
b.
Sufficiency ...