United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
K. DuBOSE, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
action is before the Court on Defendant Christopher Lee
Singleton's “request that the Court issue an order
to time served, because the sentence imposed was to be served
concurrently with the State” (doc. 165). Upon
consideration and for the reasons set forth herein, the
motion is DENIED, or in the alternative, DISMISSED for lack
March 10, 2016, Singleton was arrested by Alabama law
enforcement officers in Dallas County, Alabama for the
conduct underlying his federal offense. He was brought into
federal custody on March 22, 2016, upon execution of a writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and arrest warrant.
Singleton and four co-defendants were indicted in a
seven-count indictment for marijuana trafficking offenses and
possession of a firearm by a prohibited person (doc. 14).
Singleton pleaded guilty to Count 1, conspiracy to distribute
marijuana. On November 10, 2016, he was sentenced to a term
of 33 months (doc. 148). The remaining counts against
him, including possession of a firearm, were dismissed
returned to state custody and was sentenced February 3, 2017,
to a term of 180 months “to be served concurrently with
the federal sentence” (doc. 165, p. 4 (State of Alabama
Felony Sentencing Order)). The sentence was a “split
sentence” whereby he would serve 36 months with the
Alabama Department of Corrections beginning
“immediately” and that “[f]ollowing
incarceration, the unserved portion of the sentence shall be
suspended . . .” (Id., p. 5). Two years later,
on February 12, 2019, Singleton was placed in the custody of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to begin serving his
federal sentence. His estimated release date is July 5, 2021.
2019, Singleton filed this request for a time served
sentence. He argues that his federal sentence was to be
served concurrent with his state sentence and because he has
served his state sentence, his federal sentence has been
served. He moves the Court to “issue an order to time
served” (doc. 165).
review of the judgment shows that Singleton's federal
sentence was not imposed to serve concurrent
with his state sentence (doc. 148). Instead, the judgment
states as follows:
The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the
United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total
term of 33 months as to count 1.
(Doc. 148, p. 2).
federal law, “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed
at different times run consecutively unless the court orders
that the terms are to run concurrently” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3584(a). Singleton was sentenced in federal court on
November 10, 2016 and sentenced in state court on February 3,
2017. Thus, his sentences were “imposed at different
times” and this Court did not order “that the
terms are to run concurrently.” Id.
extent Singleton's request could be
construed as a motion to modify his sentence to time
served or to modify his sentence to serve concurrent with the
state court sentence, his motion is DENIED. The district
courts have limited authority to modify a sentence after it
has been imposed and may do so only in certain procedural
postures, none of which are now before the Court.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); Fed. R. Crim. P. 36;
United States v. Brennan, 766 Fed.Appx. 911, 913
(11th Cir. 2019) (“We have recognized § 3582(c)
imposes a jurisdictional limitation on a district court's
ability to modify a sentence, noting a district court has
‘no inherent authority' to modify a sentence that
has already been imposed. [ ] Accordingly, a district court
lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence unless §
3582(c)(1) or (c)(2), another statute, or Rule 35 expressly
permits a sentence modification.”) (quoting United
States v. Phillips, 597 F.3d 1190, 1194-96 (11th Cir.
the Court may construe Singleton's request as a petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because a “claim for
credit for time served is cognizable under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 as a challenge to the execution of a sentence.”
United States v. Roberson, 746 Fed.Appx. 883, 885
(11th Cir. 2018) (citing Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P.
Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 987, 990 (11th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340,
1345 (11th Cir. 2000)).
issues preclude the Court's consideration. First, the
Attorney General acting through the BOP, not the district
courts, has the authority to calculate and award credit for
time spent in custody or to make a nunc pro tunc retroactive
designation of the location where a sentence may be served.
United States v. Chavez, 712 Fed.Appx. 963, 969
(11th Cir. 2017); 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b); 18 U.S.C. §
3621(a)-(b). However, Singleton has not provided the Court
with any evidence that he has initially presented his request
to the BOP and exhausted the administrative remedies
available therein, before seeking relief from this Court.
United States v. Chavez, 712 Fed.Appx. at 969
(“granting of credit for time served is in the first
instance an administrative, not a judicial function. …
The district court, therefore, cannot circumvent the Attorney
General's initial discretion concerning whether to credit
a defendant's time in custody prior to
sentencing.”) (citations omitted).
a § 2241 petition must be filed in the district where
Singleton is incarcerated. See Rumsfield v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426, 443-444 (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
According to the BOP website, Singleton is now incarcerated
in Anthony, New Mexico, which is not in the Southern District
of Alabama. Thus, ...