United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
R.
DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
matter is before the court on the United States' Motion
to Preclude the expert testimony of Dr. Daniel A. Schwarz
(Doc. #151). Dr. Schwarz was designated as an expert by
Defendant Ifebida. There are unique issues in this case based
upon the timing of the expert disclosure by Ifebida. Although
the Government objects to Dr. Schwarz's testimony, it has
not filed a formal motion to exclude Schwarz's proposed
testimony because the report was only produced on the Friday
before trial started. The court allowed the late disclosure
because the Government would have time to review the report
and the court would have an opportunity to conduct a
Daubert hearing to more thoroughly evaluate
Schwarz's proposed testimony. (See Doc. # 162 at 3-4).
The Government's objections to Dr. Schwarz's
testimony were lodged after those events. For the reasons
explained below, the motion (Doc. #151) is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.
I.
Legal Standard
Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of
an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.
Under
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993) and its progeny, Rule 702 requires district courts to
perform a critical “gatekeeping” function
concerning the admissibility of scientific and technical
expert testimony. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d
1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). To perform
their role as gatekeeper, courts “engage in a rigorous
three-part inquiry.” Id. District courts must
consider whether: “(1) the expert is qualified
to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to
address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his
conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined
by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3)
the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the
application of scientific, technical, or specialized
expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d
548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)). Though there is some overlap
among them, these three basic requirements -- qualification,
reliability, and helpfulness -- are distinct concepts which
the district court must be careful not to conflate.
Id.
The
proponent of expert testimony always bears the burden to show
that the requirements of qualification, reliability, and
helpfulness are met. Id. That remains true whether
the proponent is the Government or the accused in a criminal
case. Id. And in addition to Rule 702, Rule 403 also
applies to expert testimony. Id. at 1263. Thus,
expert testimony that is otherwise admissible under Rule 702
and Daubert may still be excluded under Rule 403 if
the probative value of the testimony “is substantially
outweighed by its potential to confuse or mislead the
jury.” Id.
A.
Expert Qualifications
Experts
may be qualified in various ways, including training,
education, or experience in a given field. Id. at
1260-61. Often what is at issue under the qualification prong
is not whether the proffered expert is qualified in the
abstract, but whether his training, education, or experience
qualify him to render an opinion on a specific
topic. Particularly where an expert's qualifications
rest on his experience (as opposed to scientific or technical
training), the expert “must explain how that
experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that
experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how
that experience is reliably applied to the facts.”
Id. at 1261. It is not enough for the court to
simply take the expert's word for it. Id.
B.
Reliability of the ...