United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ORDER
KATHERINE P. NELSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
action is before the Court sua sponte on review of
its subject matter jurisdiction.[1] This case was removed to
this Court by Defendant Andy Bauer under 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a), with the notice of removal alleging federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the sole basis
for the Court's original subject matter jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (“A defendant or
defendants desiring to remove any civil action from a State
court shall file in the district court of the United States
for the district and division within which such action is
pending a notice of removal…containing a short and
plain statement of the grounds for removal…”).
Under § 1331, federal district courts have subject
matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.” Where, as here, a case is removed from state
court, “[t]he burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction falls on the party invoking removal.”
Univ. of S. Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d
405, 411-12 (11th Cir. 1999). Accord, e.g., City
of Vestavia Hills v. Gen. Fid. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310,
1313 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The removing party bears the
burden of proof regarding the existence of federal subject
matter jurisdiction.”).
A
review of the state court filings submitted with Bauer's
notice of removal (Doc. 2-1) indicate that this case has been
pending since August 3, 2017, and that the initial complaint
was amended three times prior to removal. Count 8 of the
Third Amended Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that a
particular Gulf Shores zoning ordinance is invalid under the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14thAmendment to
the U.S. Constitution, as well as a permanent injunction
enjoining enforcement of said ordinance. (See Id. at
737). Bauer asserts that “[t]he allegation made in
Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint asserting a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution confers original jurisdiction
on the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1331 and 28 U.S.C. §1441(a).” (Doc. 1 at 2).
By
prior order dated June 13, 2019 (Doc. 6), the undersigned
questioned, sua sponte, the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction and ordered briefing on the issue. In
accordance with that order, Bauer timely filed a brief in
opposition to remand (Doc. 7), and Plaintiff Raymundo
Carbajal, Jr. timely filed a brief in support of remand (Doc.
8). The issue is now under submission. (See Doc. 6).
Bauer's brief is largely unhelpful, and the undersigned
remains convinced that the declaratory judgment claim in
Count 8 does not confer original federal question
jurisdiction.
In order to determine whether a claim arises under federal
law within the meaning of Section 1331, a court must
ascertain if a federal cause of action would appear on the
face of a well-pleaded complaint. See, e.g., Louisville
and Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29
S.Ct. 42, 43, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908). [For declaratory judgment
actions], the normal position of the parties is reversed;
therefore, we do not look to the face of the declaratory
judgment complaint in order to determine the presence of a
federal question. Instead, this court must determine whether
or not the cause of action anticipated by the declaratory
judgment plaintiff arises under federal law. See, e.g.,
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667,
671-72, 70 S.Ct. 876, 879, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950). “Where
the complaint in an action for declaratory judgment seeks in
essence to assert a defense to an impending or threatened
state court action, it is the character of the threatened
action, and not of the defense, which will determine whether
there is federal-question jurisdiction in the District Court.
If the cause of action, which the declaratory defendant
threatens to assert, does not itself involve a claim under
federal law, it is doubtful if a federal court may entertain
an action for a declaratory judgment establishing a defense
to that claim.” Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff
Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248, 73 S.Ct. 236, 242, 97 L.Ed. 291
(1952).
Hudson Ins. Co. v. Am. Elec. Corp., 957 F.2d 826,
828 (11th Cir. 1992). Here, the cause of action anticipated
by Carbajal, Jr. is a zoning enforcement action by the City
of Gulf Shores, which would not arise under federal law, and
Carbajal Jr.'s Count 8 claim for a declaratory judgment
“seeks in essence to assert a [federal Equal
Protection] defense” to that “impending or
threatened state court action.”
However,
upon further consideration of the relevant caselaw, it
appears that federal question jurisdiction is present for
reasons not addressed in the Court's prior order (Doc.
6). Count 8 requests injunctive relief (in addition to
declaratory relief) on the federal Equal Protection claim
against Bauer in his official capacity as Zoning Official for
the City of Gulf Shores, Alabama.[2] Such an action could have
been brought as a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (“Local governing
bodies … can be sued directly under § 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where …
the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements
or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body's officers.”); Haves v. City of
Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921-23 (11th Cir. 1995) (discussing
Equal Protection claims challenging zoning ordinances).
Carbajal,
Jr. does not invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or any other
federal statute, as the basis for his claim for injunctive
relief, instead invoking Ala. Code § 6-6-220, et.
seq. Generally, “since the plaintiff is the master
of the complaint, the well-pleaded-complaint rule enables
him, by eschewing claims based on federal law, to have the
cause heard in state court.” Holmes Grp., Inc. v.
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831
(2002) (quotations omitted). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has “recognized…that in certain cases
federal-question jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims
that implicate significant federal issues. The doctrine
captures the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to
be able to hear claims recognized under state law that
nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and
thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope
of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal
issues…” Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc.
v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005)
(citation omitted). “The classic example is Smith
v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 41
S.Ct. 243, 65 L.Ed. 577 (1921), a suit by a shareholder
claiming that the defendant corporation could not lawfully
buy certain bonds of the National Government because their
issuance was unconstitutional. Although Missouri law provided
the cause of action, the Court recognized federal-question
jurisdiction because the principal issue in the case was the
federal constitutionality of the bond issue.”
Id. Similarly, even though Alabama law provides the
claim for injunctive relief in Count 8, the principal issue
is the federal constitutionality of the challenged zoning
ordinance. Thus, because it appears that the Court has
federal “arising under” jurisdiction over
Carbajal's Count 8 claim for injunctive relief, [3] the Court
declines to order remand sua sponte for the reasons
stated in its prior order (Doc. 6). [4]
Because
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 has not
been invoked, the Court currently exercises supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims in this case under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, “district courts may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
… if … the claim substantially predominates
over the claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction…” 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(2). “A federal court will find substantial
predominance when it appears that a state claim constitutes
the real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only
an appendage.” Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors,
Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 744 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation
omitted). Accord Morgan v. Christensen, 582
Fed.Appx. 806, 808 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
(unpublished).
As
noted previously, this case has been pending for almost two
years, Carbajal Jr.'s the initial complaint has been
amended three times, and counterclaims have been asserted
against Carbajal and others, all prior to removal. [5] The case
has snowballed from a dispute among neighbors to challenges
to restrictive covenants and Gulf Shores zoning ordinances.
Considering the plethora of state law claims asserted,
including ones that seek to enjoin the same zoning ordinance
as the federal claim, it appears that Carbajal Jr.'s sole
federal claim for injunctive relief against Bauer (who is one
of four defendants to this action), “is only an
appendage” to the state claims that “constitute[]
the real body of [this] case…”
Upon
consideration, any interested party may, no later than
Thursday, July 25, 2019, file and
serve a brief showing cause why the Court should not decline
to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims in this case under § 1367(c)(2) and
remand them to state court, after which the matter will be
taken under submission. Once the matter is under submission,
no further submissions related to the issues raised may be
filed unless (1) the submission is in accordance with S.D.
Ala. CivLR 7(f)(3), or (2) the proponent obtains leave of
court for good cause shown. Should the Court determine that
oral argument would be beneficial, a hearing will be set by
separate order. Otherwise, this matter is being submitted
without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); S.D. Ala.
CivLR 7(h). “Oral argument requests must contain
specific reasons why oral argument would be helpful.”
S.D. Ala. CivLR 7(h).
DONE
and ORDERED.
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