Ball v. McCoullough

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          R. DAVID PROCTOR, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         This case is before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the following Defendants: the City of Birmingham, Verlyne Moten^[1], Freida Taylor, Lawerence Singleton, Deidre Daniels, Emantic Bradford, Timothy Brown, Coyrrie Campbell, and Kathie Davis (collectively, “the Movants”).^[2] (Doc. # 182). Consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in McBride v. Sharpe, 981 F.2d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 1993), the court gave the pro se Plaintiff, Jim Henry Ball, Jr., “express, ten-day notice of the summary judgment rules, of his right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition to the motion, and of the consequences of default.” (Doc. # 184).^[3] The parties have fully briefed the motion. (Docs. # 183, 190, 191). For the reasons explained below, the Movants' Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

         I. Procedural History

         A. The Second Amended Complaint Is the Operative Complaint

         Mr. Ball filed this civil action in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama on May 20, 2016. (Doc. # 1-1 at 1). On July 7, 2017, Dr. Paul O'Leary, who is no longer a party, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. (Id.).^[4]On August 29, 2016, the Middle District of Alabama transferred the case to this district. (Doc. # 1 at 10; Doc. # 13). Mr. Ball filed an Amended Complaint on January 9, 2017. (Doc. # 43).

         On May 3, 2017, this court appointed attorney David Gespass “for the limited purpose of drafting a second amended complaint which raises cognizable claims and complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Doc. # 73 at 1). On June 19, 2017, Mr. Gespass filed a Second Amended Complaint on Mr. Ball's behalf. (Doc. # 74). The claims in the Second Amended Complaint relate to (1) Mr. Ball's confinement in the Birmingham City Jail (the “Jail”), and (2) Mr. Ball's treatment while at Grandview Medical Center^[5] in January 2015. (Doc. # 74). The Second Amended Complaint named the following parties as Defendants:^[6]

• the City of Birmingham (Doc. # 74 at 3, ¶ 9);

• “[Kathie Davis, ]^[7] [who] was, at all relevant times, the chief correctional officer at the jail” (Doc. # 74 at 3, ¶ 10);^[8]

• “[Lawerence Singleton]^[9], [Freida Taylor]^[10], [Coyrrie Campbell]^[11], Nunn, Sheffield, Debra[, ] and Rogers[, ] [who] were, at all relevant times, correctional officers at the jail (Doc. # 74 at 4, ¶ 11);^[12]

• “[Timothy Brown]^[13], [Verlyne Moten, ]^[14] and Drake[, ] [who] were[, ] at all relevant times, employed as sergeants at the jail” (Doc. # 74 at 4, ¶ 12);^[15]

• “[Emantic Bradford, ]^[16] [who] was, at all relevant times, the chief steward at the Jail” (Doc. # 74 at 4, ¶ 13);^[17]

• “[Deidre Daniels]^[18] [who] was, at all relevant times, a social worker in the jail” (Doc. # 74 at 4, ¶ 14); and

• “Karen E. Callahan[, ] [who] was, at all relevant times, a doctor employed at Grandview Medical Center (formerly Trinity Medical Center) who treated [the] [P]laintiff while he was there” (Doc. # 74 at 4, ¶ 15).

         On June 22, 2017, the court dismissed the Defendants (including the Defendant identified only as “W. Fowler”) who Mr. Ball named in the Complaint and/or First Amended Complaint, but did not name in the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 76). In its Order, the court specifically noted that “[t]his action will proceed against Defendants City of Birmingham, Davis, Singleton, Taylor, Campbell, Nunn, Sheffield, Debra, Rogers, T. Brown, Moten, Drake, Bradford, Daniels, and Callahan.” (Doc. # 76, at 1, n. 1). The parties and the court have come to refer to the individually named Defendants as the “City Defendants.”

         On August 1, 2017, the court gave Mr. Ball leave to amend his complaint and provided the following instructions:

His amendment should detail the specific facts alleged regarding Defendant Fowler, as well as the legal claims Plaintiff intends to pursue against Defendant Fowler. Plaintiff SHALL include any other changes he desires to make to his complaint in this amendment.

(Doc. # 88 at 1). On August 11, 2017, Mr. Ball filed a Third Amended Complaint which added claims only against Defendant Fowler. (Doc. # 97). On October 17, 2017, the court severed Mr. Ball's claims against Defendant Callahan into a separate case, dismissed Mr. Ball's federal claims against Defendant Callahan, and remanded Mr. Ball's case against Defendant Callahan to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama. (Doc. # 118).

         On November 1, 2017, Defendant Fowler filed a Motion for More Definite Statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. # 123). On November 6, 2017, the court granted that motion and ordered Mr. Ball to re-plead his claims against Defendant Fowler. (Doc. # 124). On November 13, 2017, Mr. Ball filed a Fourth Amended Complaint asserting claims only against Defendant Fowler. (Doc. # 127). To be clear, the Third and Fourth Amended Complaints were actually only “amendments to” the Second Amended Complaint, as each merely added Fowler as a party and asserted claims against Fowler alone. The court dismissed Defendant Fowler on January 22, 2018, and the Second Amended Complaint once again became the “operative complaint in this case.” (Doc. # 145 at 9).

         B. Mr. Ball Has Not Perfected Service on Several of the City Defendants

         The record reflects that Mr. Ball executed service on several of the City Defendants on March 21, 2017. (Doc. # 65). On April 4, 2017, those Defendants contested service arguing that service “was improperly accomplished, by attempting to serve the City of Birmingham's Legal Department and/or Birmingham City Clerk's office, by hand delivery on or about March 15, 2017.” (Doc. # 66 at 5; see also Doc. # 67). On June 22, 2017, after the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, the court noted:

Before Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint, certain Defendants maintained that they were improperly served. The court will conduct a telephone conference on July 5, 2017 at 11:00 a.m. to discuss this issue with Plaintiff and the remaining Defendants.

(Doc. # 76 at 2). The court held the telephone conference as scheduled, but Mr. Ball did not attend. (Minute Entry July 5, 2017). Following that conference, the court entered the following Order:

Defendants Nunn, Sheffield, Debra, T. Brown, and Drake have not been served for purposes of this action. Plaintiff is DIRECTED to request service and provide sufficient identifying information for these Defendants on or before July 21, 2017. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of this action against those Defendants.

(Doc. # 79 at 1).

         The court held a hearing in this matter on August 11, 2017, after which, at the direction of the court, Mr. Ball met with counsel for the Defendants upon whom he had perfected service at that time. (Doc. # 88 at 1). Thereafter, the City provided the Clerk of Court the name and address of “Timothy Brown” for “T. Brown, ” and “George Drake” for “Drake.” (Doc. # 89 at 1). The City represented that it “does not have the personal addresses or knowledge of the location of ‘Nunn', ‘Sheffield' and ‘Debra' as they are not employed by the City and have never been employed with the City.” (Doc. # 89 at 2).

         Thereafter, service was executed upon Timothy Brown, but was returned unexecuted as to George Drake. (Docs. # 94, 133). On December 4, 2017, after Mr. Ball referred to George Drake as “non-existing, ” and “not [a] Defendant[] to this instant [case], ” the court dismissed George Drake and ordered Mr. Ball to provide the court with the full name [and address] of Drake.” (Doc. # 137 at 1) (citing Doc. # 131 at 2). The court's December 4, 2017, Order “terminated” Drake in the court's CM/ECF system (Doc. # 137), and Drake remains terminated.^[19]

         Thereafter, despite the fact that the court did not name Rogers as an unserved Defendant, Mr. Ball served discovery requests upon the Defendants seeking the full name and last known address of Rogers, as well as Drake, Nunn, Debra, and Sheffield. (See Doc. # 168). The City eventually identified a person known as “Judy Drake” who might be the “Drake” Mr. Ball wished to sue. On September 4, 2017, the court Ordered the City of Birmingham to provide the full name and last known address, if they had it, of Judy Drake. (Doc. # 171 at 2). The court did not issue a similar order regarding Nunn, Debra, Rogers, and Sheffield, because the City of Birmingham “[had] previously advised the court and Plaintiff that it does not have the personal addresses or knowledge of the location of [these individuals] because they are not, and never have been, employed by the City.” (Doc. # 171 at 2) (citing Doc. # 89 at 2)). On September 6, 2018, the City of Birmingham confirmed that they did not have the address of Judy Drake. (Doc. # 173).

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court--on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff--must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” More than 90 days has passed since the operative complaint naming Defendants Nunn, Sheffield, Debra, and Rogers was filed. (Doc. # 74 at 4, ¶ 11) (filed June 19, 2017). As noted above, the court gave Mr. Ball notice on July 5, 2017 that failure to serve these defendants could result in dismissal of this action against the unserved defendants. (Doc. # 79). Mr. Ball has neither requested service for, nor perfected service upon, Defendants Nunn, Sheffield, Debra and Rogers since this court's Order of July 5, 2017. Accordingly, all claims in this action against unserved Defendants Nunn, Sheffield, Debra, and Rogers are due to be dismissed without prejudice under Rule 4(m). Thus, there are nine Defendants who remain in this case: the City of Birmingham, Verlyne Moten, Freida Taylor, Lawrence Singleton, Deidre Daniels, Emantic Bradford, Timothy Brown, Coyrrie Campbell, and Kathie Davis. As noted above, each of these Defendants has moved for summary judgment.

         II. Standard of Review

         Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and -- by pointing to affidavits, or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on file --designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.

         The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Id. at 249.

         When faced with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the nonmoving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere allegations.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson teaches, under Rule 56(c) a plaintiff may not simply rest on her allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of proof at trial, she must come forward with at least some evidence to support each element essential to her case at trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' ” Id. at 248 (citations omitted).

         Summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “Summary judgment may be granted if the non-moving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative.” Sawyer v. Sw. Airlines Co., 243 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51).

         “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Essentially, the inquiry is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'” Sawyer, 243 F.Supp.2d at 1262 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52); see also, LaRoche v. Denny's, Inc., 62 F.Supp.2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“The law is clear . . . that suspicion, perception, opinion, and belief cannot be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”).

         III. Factual Background

         The court has gleaned the facts set out in this opinion from the parties' submissions and the court's own examination of the evidentiary record. All reasonable doubts about the facts have been resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. See Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002). These are the “facts” for summary judgment purposes only. They may not be the actual facts that could be established through live testimony at trial. See Cox v. Adm'r U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 (11th Cir. 1994).^[20]

         A. Mr. Ball's Affidavit

         Before delving into the Rule 56 record, the court addresses the “Affidavit” Mr. Ball submitted in opposition to the Movants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. # 191 at 5, 7-23). While they do not move to strike that document, the Movants argue that “[Mr.] Ball's ‘affidavit' is not signed, witnessed and notarized under oath before a certified notary public. Rather, Ball executes his own ‘affidavit'. Thus, it is not a true affidavit required under FRCP Rule 56(c)(4).” (Doc. # 190 at 2).

         “An affidavit is a sworn statement in writing made under oath or on affirmation before a notary public or other authorized officer.” Holder v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2008 WL 3887632, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2008). Since it is not sworn, Mr. Ball's submission is not an affidavit. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1746 provides, in pertinent part:

Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation, order, or requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same . . ., such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form:

(2) If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: “I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date).

(Signature)”.

28 U.S.C. § 1746. Furthermore, this court previously advised Mr. Ball that “[a]ffidavits must either be notarized or be subscribed as true under penalty of perjury. (Doc. # 184 at 3) (emphasis added). Mr. Ball's submission is dated and signed “under . . . penalty of perjury.” (Doc. # 191 at 23). Mr. Ball's submission substantially follows the form required by 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and complies with this court's Order. The court concludes that Mr. Ball's submission is therefore a declaration submitted in opposition to the instant motion.

         Whether the court may consider Mr. Ball's submission is another matter. “An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). In their reply brief, the Movants do not address the substance of Mr. Ball's submission (Doc. # 191), calling it “mere incoherent and editorial rambling which the Defendants, at times, cannot defend or understand.” (Doc. # 190 at 2). The Movants also contend that Mr. Ball's submission “presents nothing substantive, ” that Mr. Ball's “‘facts' and ‘arguments' are based on his own opinions, ideas, and conspiracy[-]fueled theories, ” and that Mr. Ball “at times, merely repeats the allegations in the [Second] Amended Complaint.” (Doc. # 190 at 2). The Movants cite no examples to support these claims. The court will consider Mr. Ball's submission, but it will also assess whether the Movants are correct as to some portions of Mr. Ball's submission and determine the extent to which the submission complies with Rule 56(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

         B. The Traffic Accident and Mr. Ball's Arrest

         On May 3, 2014, Mr. Ball was involved in a car accident in Birmingham, Alabama. (Doc. # 183-1 at 9(35-36); Doc. # 183-5 at 2).^[21] When the Birmingham Police arrived on the scene, they discovered that Mr. Ball had an outstanding arrest warrant and arrested him. (Doc. # 183-1 at 10(37-38); Doc. # 183-5 at 2). The arresting officers transported Mr. Ball to the University of Alabama at Birmingham Medical Center (UAB) for psychiatric evaluation and treatment. (Doc. # 183-1 at 10(39-40), 12(46); Doc. # 183-5 at 2).^[22] Mr. Ball stayed at UAB for a few hours. (Doc. # 183-1 at 10(40), 12(46); Doc. # 183-5 at 2). Thereafter, Birmingham police officers transported Mr. Ball to the Birmingham City Jail. (Doc. # 183-1 at 11(41); Doc. # 183-5 at 2). Mr. Ball was held at the Jail from May 3, 2014, until March 17, 2015. (Doc. # 183-1 at 12(45)).

         Kathie Davis was the City Jail Chief or Chief Correctional Officer at the Jail at the time Mr. Ball was there. (Doc. # 163-1 at 20; Doc. # 183-8 at 1). Her responsibilities in that role were to “manage, coordinate and supervise all the employees at the Birmingham City Jail, ” and to “observe the conduct and behavior of inmates to prevent disturbances and escapes.” (Doc. # 183-8 at 1). Officer Davis admits that while Mr. Ball was at the Jail, it was her responsibility to train and supervise her subordinates to prevent constitutional violations. (Doc. # 163-1 at 31). However, in her affidavit she denies any familiarity with Mr. Ball. (Doc. # 183-8 at 3).

         C. The Conditions of Mr. Ball's Confinement

         Mr. Ball testified to being in a cell “without any exercise, without any showers[, ] and without the proper recommended diet.” (Doc. #183-1 at 14(56)). In his declaration, Mr. Ball states:

On December 9, 2014 . . . the Plaintiff sat in his stripped, cold, suicidal observation cell hemorrhaging from the inside of his body[.] [S]aid cell only had a sink and commode[.] [T]he sink did not work properly; it only trickle[d] hot water[] [and] not enough to drink[.] I had to request water from a cooler in the cell block day area.

I wasn't issued soap, toilet paper, [a] tooth brush, [or] tooth paste[.] Also, [my] cell windows were broken out and [there was] inadequate heat in the cell[.] [The] cell lights were broken, I wasn't allowed to shower, [and] the day room showers did not work either[.] I was denied any opportunity to exercise[.] I smelled horrible and felt worse. . . .

I wasn't allowed eating utensils to eat with[.]

(Doc. # 191 at 16). Mr. Ball also states that he was “in complete isolation from others, ” with no contact with others except “food [and medications] being passed through a tray slot in the cell door.” (Doc. # 191 at 17). Mr. Ball states that Jail personnel fixed his cell lights on or about January 3, 2015. (Doc. # 191 at 17).^[23]

         D. Jail Personnel Leave Mr. Ball Naked in His Cell

         Jail personnel placed Mr. Ball on suicide watch, isolated in segregation, where he stayed from December 19, 2014, to January 5, 2015. (Doc. # 183-1 at 12(45), 14(55-56); see also Doc. # 183-8 at 15). Mr. Ball testified that Defendants Brown and Moten left him naked in his cell without a reason. (Doc. # 183-1 at 19(73)). Defendant Timothy Brown was a corrections officer (“C.O.”) at the Jail while Mr. Ball was there. (Doc. # 183-8 at 9). His responsibilities were “to maintain security and enforce order and discipline among inmates to ensure a safe jail environment.” (Doc. # 183-8 at 9). Officer Brown is familiar with Mr. Ball. (Doc. # 183-8 at 9).

         Mr. Ball states that Jail personnel gave him a gown typically given to people on suicide watch, but that on December 9, 2014, Officer Brown took it from Mr. Ball and gave it to someone else, leaving Mr. Ball naked. (Doc. # 183-1 at 14(56)-15(57), 19(75-76); Doc. # 191 at 17). In his answers to Mr. Ball's First Interrogatories, Officer Brown states that he does not recall whether he confiscated Mr. Ball's gown on December 9, 2014. (Doc. # 141-1 at 10).^[24]Officer Davis agrees that while Mr. Ball was on suicide watch, Jail personnel should have given Mr. Ball a gown to wear. (Doc. # 163-1 at 24).

         Defendant Verlyne Moten was a sergeant at the Jail while Mr. Ball was there. (Doc. # 183-8 at 6). Her responsibilities included supervising and coordinating the correctional officers and prisoners at the Jail. (Doc. # 183-8 at 6). Officer Moten also maintained security and enforced order and discipline to ensure a safe jail environment. (Doc. # 183-8 at 6). Officer Davis was Officer Moten's supervisor. (Doc. # 183-8 at 6). Officer Moten says she is not familiar with Mr. Ball. (Doc. # 183-8 at 7). In her answers to Mr. Ball's First Interrogatories, Officer Moten states that she “had no contact with Mr. Ball.” (Doc. # 141-1 at 15).

         Although Mr. Ball testified in his deposition that he had direct conversations with Officers Moten and Brown, the nature and substance of those conversations is not in the Rule 56 record. (Doc. # 183-1 at 19(74)).^[25]

         E. The Altercation with Defendant Singleton

         Defendant Lawrence Singleton was a C.O. at the Jail while Mr. Ball was there. (Doc. # 163-1 at 2; Doc. # 183-8 at 21). Officer Moten was Officer Singleton's supervisor. (Doc. # 163 at 3). As a C.O., Officer Singleton is responsible for maintaining security and enforcing order and discipline among inmates to ensure a safe jail environment. (Doc. # 183-8 at 21). Mr. Ball testified that on December 10, 2014, Officer Singleton entered Mr. Ball's cell and “assaulted [him] and used force that wasn't warranted.” (Doc. # 183-1 at 21(81, 82)).

         Mr. Ball admitted in his deposition that he did not know why Officer Singleton came to the cell on that date. (Doc. # 183-1 at 21(84) (“I don't know why he was there.”), 22(85) (“I don't know what his purpose for entering my cell [was].”)). Officer Singleton explains that he came to get Mr. Ball because either Mr. Ball asked to see the nurse, or the nurse asked to see Mr. Ball- Officer Singleton could not remember which. (Doc. # 163-1 at 3). Officer Singleton states in his affidavit:

Mr. Ball needed to see the nurse but was naked. He had been given a suicide gown which is made o[f] paper or some other easily torn material but he had taken or torn [it off] and was completely naked. I opened the cell to give him a regular uniform.

In order to see the nurse, Mr. Ball needed to get dressed as he was naked at the time. I gave Mr. Ball a regular uniform.

(Doc. # 183-8 at 21-22; see also, Doc. # 163-1 at 3).

         Mr. Ball refused to dress himself in the uniform Officer Singleton gave him. (Doc. # 163-1 at 4; Doc. # 183-8 at 22; Doc. # 191 at 8). Mr. Ball says that he refused the uniform because Officer Singleton did not also give him shoes, and because it was inappropriate for him to have a regular uniform, as opposed to a gown, inside the suicide observation unit. (Doc. # 191 at 8).

         Mr. Ball testified that Officer Singleton then “came with profanity and things that was improper [sic].” (Doc. # 183-1 at 22(85)). In his declaration, Mr. Ball clarifies that Officer Singleton entered his cell and attempted to force him, physically, to put on the uniform. (Doc. # 191 at 9). Officer Singleton pushed Mr. Ball against the cell wall and then placed his large steel cell key against Mr. Ball's throat and choked Mr. Ball. (Doc. # 191 at 8, 9). Mr. Ball also asserts that Officer Singleton punched him in the head twice. (Doc. # 191 at 9). Mr. Ball then “backed [Officer Singleton] out of [the] cell and held [Officer Singleton] until supervision arrived.” (Doc. # 191 at 9). Mr. Ball suffered “excruciating pain and abrasions” from this incident, and went to the UAB emergency room for treatment. (Doc. # 191 at 9).^[26]

         A December 10, 2014, entry in Mr. Ball's Jail medical record reflects that on that date Mr. Ball had an “altercation with [an] officer, ” and noted that Mr. Ball had a “red area on the [right] side of [his] chest.” (Doc. # 191 at 28). Mr. Ball also complained of chest pain. (Doc. # 191 at 28). The note reflects that Mr. Ball was “sent to [the] hospital for evaluation, ” and later “[returned] from the hospital [with a diagnosis] of superficial abrasion” and a normal EKG. (Doc. # 191 at 28). Officer Singleton did not initiate any disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Ball as a result of Mr. Ball refusing to comply with his orders (Doc. # 163-1 at 4), and there are no records of any other disciplinary proceedings which arose out of this incident.

         Mr. Ball contends that there is an “administrative policy, regulation, or [standard operating procedure (SOP)”] for cell extraction which Singleton did not follow, and that Officer Moten failed to train Officer Singleton to follow. (Doc. # 191 at 9).^[27] The record contains no evidence of this policy and/or procedure, and Officer Singleton is “not familiar with” such a policy. (Doc. # 163-1 at3, 4). Mr. Ball explained: “I feel that any contact whatsoever from any correctional officer was improper because I was under psychiatric, you know, treatment.” (Doc. # 183-1 at 22(85)). He continued:

[W]hat I'm saying is Singleton -- it had to be for no reason -- I mean, no proper reason due to the fact that I was under psychiatric care. Then correctional officers shouldn't have had any interaction with me in any shape, form or fashion.

So [I'm] saying that any force that was used was excessive because he should not have even been in my cell at all. . . . Unless the doctor told him to come in there.

(Doc. # 183-1 at 22(87)). Mr. Ball believes that because he was under psychiatric care, Officer Singleton did not have any authority or right to come into his cell, and that Officer Singleton should have gotten the permission of the medical staff before doing so. (Doc. # 183-1 at 23(89, 90)). According to Mr. Ball, such a policy applied to all correction officers in the Jail. (Doc. # 183-1 at 23(89-90)). Mr. Ball propounded the following interrogatory to Officer Davis: “During Nov. 2014 thru Jan. 6, 2015, did you require subordinates to follow the cell extraction Policy Regulation or S.O.P. at said Jail?” (Doc. # 159 at 5; Doc. # 163-1 at 23). Officer Davis answered: “Regardless of the date, personnel are required at hire to follow policy.” (Doc. # 163-1 at 23).

         F. Involuntary Commitment

         Dr. Norman Huggins, a physician and psychiatrist, treated Mr. Ball at the Jail. On December 11, 2014, Dr. Huggins noted that Mr. Ball “poses an imminent danger to [him]self and others due to impaired judgment and delusional beliefs.” (Doc. # 191 at 29). Dr. Huggins also noted that he “will file petition for involuntary commitment due to depression, paranoia, delusional beliefs, and agitation.” (Doc. # 191 at 30). Defendant Deirdre Daniels was a social worker at the Jail during Mr. Ball's incarceration. (Doc. # 183-8 at 12; Doc. # 163-1 at 10).^[28] Her responsibilities included “prepar[ing] petitions upon recommendation from the [d]octor for all prisoners at the Birmingham City Jail.” (Doc. # 183-8 at 12; see also, Doc. # 163-1 at 11). On December 16, 2014, Dr. Huggins wrote the following in Mr. Ball's medical record: “social worker please notify detainee of status of petition.” (Doc. # 191 at 31). That same date, Ms. Daniels filed the petition. (Doc. # 191 at 36; see also, Doc. # 163-1 at 10; Doc. # 141-1 at 6).^[29] On January 7, 2015, the probate judge issued a notice to Mr. Ball stating that Ms. Daniels had filed the involuntary commitment proceedings, and informing Mr. Ball of the January 16, 2015, hearing date. (Doc. # 191 at 36). On January 5, 2015, two days before the probate judge issued the notice to Mr. Ball, Trinity Hospital admitted Mr. Ball “under a probate court petition for assessment of symptoms of psychosis and agitation.” (Doc. # 183-1 at 12(46, 47); Doc. # 191 at 34).^[30] In her affidavit, Daniels states:

Upon receipt of documentation and the [d]octor[']s orders dated December 11, 2014, I filed a Petition for Involuntary Commitments [sic] in Jefferson County Probate Court in a timely manner. Once notified by Jefferson County Probate Court that the Judge approved the Petition and a bed was available, Mr. Ball was transported to the hospital.

(Doc. # 183-8 at 13).^[31] Because Mr. Ball stayed at Trinity Hospital for seven or eight days (Doc. # 183-1 at 12(49)), he was released from Trinity prior to his hearing date. No. order committing Mr. Ball appears in the record, and it is unclear whether there was a hearing and/or what became of this petition.

         G. Mr. Ball's Prescribed Dietary Needs

         While at the Jail, Mr. Ball could not take his medications without food because they upset his stomach. (Doc. # 191 at 15). On November 24, 2014, Dr. Huggins ordered staff to give Mr. Ball snacks with his medication. (Doc. # 191 at 25). Dr. Huggins followed up with Mr. Ball on December 1, 2014, and noted that Mr. Ball had lost 8 pounds over the previous three weeks, and that Mr. Ball “feels like he's being starved.” (Doc. # 191 at 26). It is undisputed that Dr. Huggins ordered the Jail staff to give Mr. Ball “double portions with meals.” (Doc. # 191 at 26; see also, Doc. # 183-1 at 17(66)). Dr. Huggins also noted that the Jail staff were not giving Mr. Ball snacks with his medications as ordered, and that Mr. Ball could not take his medications without a snack because they upset his stomach. (Doc. # 191 at 26). Dr. Huggins explained that “the intent of granting snacks with meds is to have food on his stomach prior to taking meds.” (Doc. # 191 at 26-27). On December 16, 2014, Dr. Huggins saw Mr. Ball again and noted: “Nurse reports [Mr. Ball] refuses to take 4:00 a.m. med[ications] without snack. Snacks are not given in a.m.” (Doc. # 191 at 31).^[32]

         Defendant Emantic Bradford was the Chief Steward or Cook while Mr. Ball was at the Jail. (Doc. # 141-1 at 2; 163-1 at 15; Doc. # 183-8 at 17; Doc. # 191 at 39). It was Mr. Bradford's responsibility to determine whether Mr. Ball had special dietary needs while Mr. Ball was there. (Doc. # 141-1 at 3; Doc. # 163-1 at 15-16; Doc. # 191 at 40).

         Officer Davis agrees that “[s]tewards are required to follow doctor's orders.” (Doc. # 163-1 at 23). Mr. Ball says he spoke to Officer Davis “on numerous occasions” while he was incarcerated. (Doc. # 183-1 at 16(64), ...