United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division
DAVID PROCTOR, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
case is before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment
filed by the following Defendants: the City of Birmingham,
Verlyne Moten, Freida Taylor, Lawerence Singleton,
Deidre Daniels, Emantic Bradford, Timothy Brown, Coyrrie
Campbell, and Kathie Davis (collectively, “the
Movants”). (Doc. # 182). Consistent with the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in McBride v. Sharpe, 981
F.2d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 1993), the court gave the pro se
Plaintiff, Jim Henry Ball, Jr., “express, ten-day
notice of the summary judgment rules, of his right to file
affidavits or other materials in opposition to the motion,
and of the consequences of default.” (Doc. #
184). The parties have fully briefed the motion.
(Docs. # 183, 190, 191). For the reasons explained below, the
Movants' Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted
in part and denied in part.
The Second Amended Complaint Is the Operative
Ball filed this civil action in the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County, Alabama on May 20, 2016. (Doc. # 1-1 at
1). On July 7, 2017, Dr. Paul O'Leary, who is no longer a
party, removed the case to the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama.
(Id.).On August 29, 2016, the Middle District of
Alabama transferred the case to this district. (Doc. # 1 at
10; Doc. # 13). Mr. Ball filed an Amended Complaint on
January 9, 2017. (Doc. # 43).
3, 2017, this court appointed attorney David Gespass
“for the limited purpose of drafting a second amended
complaint which raises cognizable claims and complies with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Doc. # 73 at
1). On June 19, 2017, Mr. Gespass filed a Second Amended
Complaint on Mr. Ball's behalf. (Doc. # 74). The claims
in the Second Amended Complaint relate to (1) Mr. Ball's
confinement in the Birmingham City Jail (the
“Jail”), and (2) Mr. Ball's treatment while
at Grandview Medical Center in January 2015. (Doc. # 74). The
Second Amended Complaint named the following parties as
• the City of Birmingham (Doc. # 74 at 3, ¶ 9);
• “[Kathie Davis, ] [who] was, at all relevant times,
the chief correctional officer at the jail” (Doc. # 74
at 3, ¶ 10);
• “[Lawerence Singleton], [Freida
Taylor], [Coyrrie Campbell], Nunn,
Sheffield, Debra[, ] and Rogers[, ] [who] were, at all
relevant times, correctional officers at the jail (Doc. # 74
at 4, ¶ 11);
• “[Timothy Brown], [Verlyne Moten,
] and Drake[, ] [who] were[, ] at all
relevant times, employed as sergeants at the jail”
(Doc. # 74 at 4, ¶ 12);
• “[Emantic Bradford, ] [who] was, at all
relevant times, the chief steward at the Jail” (Doc. #
74 at 4, ¶ 13);
• “[Deidre Daniels] [who] was, at all relevant
times, a social worker in the jail” (Doc. # 74 at 4,
¶ 14); and
• “Karen E. Callahan[, ] [who] was, at all
relevant times, a doctor employed at Grandview Medical Center
(formerly Trinity Medical Center) who treated [the]
[P]laintiff while he was there” (Doc. # 74 at 4, ¶
22, 2017, the court dismissed the Defendants (including the
Defendant identified only as “W. Fowler”) who Mr.
Ball named in the Complaint and/or First Amended Complaint,
but did not name in the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. #
76). In its Order, the court specifically noted that
“[t]his action will proceed against Defendants City of
Birmingham, Davis, Singleton, Taylor, Campbell, Nunn,
Sheffield, Debra, Rogers, T. Brown, Moten, Drake, Bradford,
Daniels, and Callahan.” (Doc. # 76, at 1, n. 1). The
parties and the court have come to refer to the individually
named Defendants as the “City Defendants.”
August 1, 2017, the court gave Mr. Ball leave to amend his
complaint and provided the following instructions:
His amendment should detail the specific facts alleged
regarding Defendant Fowler, as well as the legal claims
Plaintiff intends to pursue against Defendant Fowler.
Plaintiff SHALL include any other changes he
desires to make to his complaint in this amendment.
(Doc. # 88 at 1). On August 11, 2017, Mr. Ball filed a Third
Amended Complaint which added claims only against Defendant
Fowler. (Doc. # 97). On October 17, 2017, the court severed
Mr. Ball's claims against Defendant Callahan into a
separate case, dismissed Mr. Ball's federal claims
against Defendant Callahan, and remanded Mr. Ball's case
against Defendant Callahan to the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County, Alabama. (Doc. # 118).
November 1, 2017, Defendant Fowler filed a Motion for More
Definite Statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. # 123). On November 6, 2017,
the court granted that motion and ordered Mr. Ball to
re-plead his claims against Defendant Fowler. (Doc. # 124).
On November 13, 2017, Mr. Ball filed a Fourth Amended
Complaint asserting claims only against Defendant Fowler.
(Doc. # 127). To be clear, the Third and Fourth Amended
Complaints were actually only “amendments to” the
Second Amended Complaint, as each merely added Fowler as a
party and asserted claims against Fowler alone. The court
dismissed Defendant Fowler on January 22, 2018, and the
Second Amended Complaint once again became the
“operative complaint in this case.” (Doc. # 145
Mr. Ball Has Not Perfected Service on Several of the City
record reflects that Mr. Ball executed service on several of
the City Defendants on March 21, 2017. (Doc. # 65). On April
4, 2017, those Defendants contested service arguing that
service “was improperly accomplished, by attempting to
serve the City of Birmingham's Legal Department and/or
Birmingham City Clerk's office, by hand delivery on or
about March 15, 2017.” (Doc. # 66 at 5; see
also Doc. # 67). On June 22, 2017, after the filing of
the Second Amended Complaint, the court noted:
Before Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint, certain
Defendants maintained that they were improperly served. The
court will conduct a telephone conference on July 5, 2017 at
11:00 a.m. to discuss this issue with Plaintiff and the
(Doc. # 76 at 2). The court held the telephone conference as
scheduled, but Mr. Ball did not attend. (Minute Entry July 5,
2017). Following that conference, the court entered the
Defendants Nunn, Sheffield, Debra, T. Brown, and Drake have
not been served for purposes of this action. Plaintiff is
DIRECTED to request service and provide
sufficient identifying information for these Defendants on or
before July 21, 2017. Failure to do so may result in
dismissal of this action against those Defendants.
(Doc. # 79 at 1).
court held a hearing in this matter on August 11, 2017, after
which, at the direction of the court, Mr. Ball met with
counsel for the Defendants upon whom he had perfected service
at that time. (Doc. # 88 at 1). Thereafter, the City provided
the Clerk of Court the name and address of “Timothy
Brown” for “T. Brown, ” and “George
Drake” for “Drake.” (Doc. # 89 at 1). The
City represented that it “does not have the personal
addresses or knowledge of the location of ‘Nunn',
‘Sheffield' and ‘Debra' as they are not
employed by the City and have never been employed with the
City.” (Doc. # 89 at 2).
service was executed upon Timothy Brown, but was returned
unexecuted as to George Drake. (Docs. # 94, 133). On December
4, 2017, after Mr. Ball referred to George Drake as
“non-existing, ” and “not [a] Defendant
to this instant [case], ” the court dismissed George
Drake and ordered Mr. Ball to provide the court with the full
name [and address] of Drake.” (Doc. # 137 at 1) (citing
Doc. # 131 at 2). The court's December 4, 2017, Order
“terminated” Drake in the court's CM/ECF
system (Doc. # 137), and Drake remains
despite the fact that the court did not name Rogers as an
unserved Defendant, Mr. Ball served discovery requests upon
the Defendants seeking the full name and last known address
of Rogers, as well as Drake, Nunn, Debra, and Sheffield.
(See Doc. # 168). The City eventually identified a
person known as “Judy Drake” who might be the
“Drake” Mr. Ball wished to sue. On September 4,
2017, the court Ordered the City of Birmingham to provide the
full name and last known address, if they had it, of Judy
Drake. (Doc. # 171 at 2). The court did not issue a similar
order regarding Nunn, Debra, Rogers, and Sheffield, because
the City of Birmingham “[had] previously advised the
court and Plaintiff that it does not have the personal
addresses or knowledge of the location of [these individuals]
because they are not, and never have been, employed by the
City.” (Doc. # 171 at 2) (citing Doc. # 89 at 2)). On
September 6, 2018, the City of Birmingham confirmed that they
did not have the address of Judy Drake. (Doc. # 173).
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides that “[i]f a
defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is
filed, the court--on motion or on its own after notice to the
plaintiff--must dismiss the action without prejudice against
that defendant or order that service be made within a
specified time.” More than 90 days has passed since the
operative complaint naming Defendants Nunn, Sheffield, Debra,
and Rogers was filed. (Doc. # 74 at 4, ¶ 11) (filed June
19, 2017). As noted above, the court gave Mr. Ball notice on
July 5, 2017 that failure to serve these defendants could
result in dismissal of this action against the unserved
defendants. (Doc. # 79). Mr. Ball has neither requested
service for, nor perfected service upon, Defendants Nunn,
Sheffield, Debra and Rogers since this court's Order of
July 5, 2017. Accordingly, all claims in this action against
unserved Defendants Nunn, Sheffield, Debra, and Rogers are
due to be dismissed without prejudice under Rule 4(m). Thus,
there are nine Defendants who remain in this case: the City
of Birmingham, Verlyne Moten, Freida Taylor, Lawrence
Singleton, Deidre Daniels, Emantic Bradford, Timothy Brown,
Coyrrie Campbell, and Kathie Davis. As noted above, each of
these Defendants has moved for summary judgment.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is
proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for
summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party has
met its burden, Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to go
beyond the pleadings and -- by pointing to affidavits, or
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on
file --designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
substantive law will identify which facts are material and
which are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable
doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are
resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of
Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir.
2007); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112,
1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is
not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.
See Id. at 249.
faced with a “properly supported motion for summary
judgment, [the nonmoving party] must come forward with
specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere
allegations.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc.,
131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson teaches,
under Rule 56(c) a plaintiff may not simply rest on her
allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party
bearing the burden of proof at trial, she must come forward
with at least some evidence to support each element essential
to her case at trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
“[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.' ” Id. at 248 (citations
judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “Summary judgment may be
granted if the non-moving party's evidence is merely
colorable or is not significantly probative.”
Sawyer v. Sw. Airlines Co., 243 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1262
(D. Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at
the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not
himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
“Essentially, the inquiry is ‘whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.'”
Sawyer, 243 F.Supp.2d at 1262 (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52); see also, LaRoche
v. Denny's, Inc., 62 F.Supp.2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (“The law is clear . . . that suspicion,
perception, opinion, and belief cannot be used to defeat a
motion for summary judgment.”).
court has gleaned the facts set out in this opinion from the
parties' submissions and the court's own examination
of the evidentiary record. All reasonable doubts about the
facts have been resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.
See Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of
Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002). These are
the “facts” for summary judgment purposes only.
They may not be the actual facts that could be established
through live testimony at trial. See Cox v. Adm'r
U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, 17 F.3d 1386,
1400 (11th Cir. 1994).
Mr. Ball's Affidavit
delving into the Rule 56 record, the court addresses the
“Affidavit” Mr. Ball submitted in opposition to
the Movants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. # 191 at
5, 7-23). While they do not move to strike that document, the
Movants argue that “[Mr.] Ball's
‘affidavit' is not signed, witnessed and notarized
under oath before a certified notary public. Rather, Ball
executes his own ‘affidavit'. Thus, it is not a
true affidavit required under FRCP Rule 56(c)(4).”
(Doc. # 190 at 2).
affidavit is a sworn statement in writing made under oath or
on affirmation before a notary public or other authorized
officer.” Holder v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 2008 WL 3887632, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2008).
Since it is not sworn, Mr. Ball's submission is not an
affidavit. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1746 provides, in
Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any
rule, regulation, order, or requirement made pursuant to law,
any matter is required or permitted to be supported,
evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn declaration,
verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in
writing of the person making the same . . ., such matter may,
with like force and effect, be supported, evidenced,
established, or proved by the unsworn declaration,
certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such
person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of
perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form:
(2) If executed within the United States, its territories,
possessions, or commonwealths: “I declare (or certify,
verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing
is true and correct. Executed on (date).
28 U.S.C. § 1746. Furthermore, this court previously
advised Mr. Ball that “[a]ffidavits must either be
notarized or be subscribed as true under penalty of
perjury. (Doc. # 184 at 3) (emphasis added). Mr.
Ball's submission is dated and signed “under . . .
penalty of perjury.” (Doc. # 191 at 23). Mr. Ball's
submission substantially follows the form required by 28
U.S.C. § 1746 and complies with this court's Order.
The court concludes that Mr. Ball's submission is
therefore a declaration submitted in opposition to the
the court may consider Mr. Ball's submission is another
matter. “An affidavit or declaration used to support or
oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out
facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the
affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). In their reply brief,
the Movants do not address the substance of Mr. Ball's
submission (Doc. # 191), calling it “mere incoherent
and editorial rambling which the Defendants, at times, cannot
defend or understand.” (Doc. # 190 at 2). The Movants
also contend that Mr. Ball's submission “presents
nothing substantive, ” that Mr. Ball's
“‘facts' and ‘arguments' are based
on his own opinions, ideas, and conspiracy[-]fueled theories,
” and that Mr. Ball “at times, merely repeats the
allegations in the [Second] Amended Complaint.” (Doc. #
190 at 2). The Movants cite no examples to support these
claims. The court will consider Mr. Ball's submission,
but it will also assess whether the Movants are correct as to
some portions of Mr. Ball's submission and determine the
extent to which the submission complies with Rule 56(c)(4) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Traffic Accident and Mr. Ball's Arrest
3, 2014, Mr. Ball was involved in a car accident in
Birmingham, Alabama. (Doc. # 183-1 at 9(35-36); Doc. # 183-5
at 2). When the Birmingham Police arrived on
the scene, they discovered that Mr. Ball had an outstanding
arrest warrant and arrested him. (Doc. # 183-1 at 10(37-38);
Doc. # 183-5 at 2). The arresting officers transported Mr.
Ball to the University of Alabama at Birmingham Medical
Center (UAB) for psychiatric evaluation and treatment. (Doc.
# 183-1 at 10(39-40), 12(46); Doc. # 183-5 at
2). Mr. Ball stayed at UAB for a few hours.
(Doc. # 183-1 at 10(40), 12(46); Doc. # 183-5 at 2).
Thereafter, Birmingham police officers transported Mr. Ball
to the Birmingham City Jail. (Doc. # 183-1 at 11(41); Doc. #
183-5 at 2). Mr. Ball was held at the Jail from May 3, 2014,
until March 17, 2015. (Doc. # 183-1 at 12(45)).
Davis was the City Jail Chief or Chief Correctional Officer
at the Jail at the time Mr. Ball was there. (Doc. # 163-1 at
20; Doc. # 183-8 at 1). Her responsibilities in that role
were to “manage, coordinate and supervise all the
employees at the Birmingham City Jail, ” and to
“observe the conduct and behavior of inmates to prevent
disturbances and escapes.” (Doc. # 183-8 at 1). Officer
Davis admits that while Mr. Ball was at the Jail, it was her
responsibility to train and supervise her subordinates to
prevent constitutional violations. (Doc. # 163-1 at 31).
However, in her affidavit she denies any familiarity with Mr.
Ball. (Doc. # 183-8 at 3).
The Conditions of Mr. Ball's Confinement
Ball testified to being in a cell “without any
exercise, without any showers[, ] and without the proper
recommended diet.” (Doc. #183-1 at 14(56)). In his
declaration, Mr. Ball states:
On December 9, 2014 . . . the Plaintiff sat in his stripped,
cold, suicidal observation cell hemorrhaging from the inside
of his body[.] [S]aid cell only had a sink and commode[.]
[T]he sink did not work properly; it only trickle[d] hot
water [and] not enough to drink[.] I had to request water
from a cooler in the cell block day area.
I wasn't issued soap, toilet paper, [a] tooth brush, [or]
tooth paste[.] Also, [my] cell windows were broken out and
[there was] inadequate heat in the cell[.] [The] cell lights
were broken, I wasn't allowed to shower, [and] the day
room showers did not work either[.] I was denied any
opportunity to exercise[.] I smelled horrible and felt worse.
. . .
I wasn't allowed eating utensils to eat with[.]
(Doc. # 191 at 16). Mr. Ball also states that he was
“in complete isolation from others, ” with no
contact with others except “food [and medications]
being passed through a tray slot in the cell door.”
(Doc. # 191 at 17). Mr. Ball states that Jail personnel fixed
his cell lights on or about January 3, 2015. (Doc. # 191 at
Jail Personnel Leave Mr. Ball Naked in His Cell
personnel placed Mr. Ball on suicide watch, isolated in
segregation, where he stayed from December 19, 2014, to
January 5, 2015. (Doc. # 183-1 at 12(45), 14(55-56); see
also Doc. # 183-8 at 15). Mr. Ball testified that
Defendants Brown and Moten left him naked in his cell without
a reason. (Doc. # 183-1 at 19(73)). Defendant Timothy Brown
was a corrections officer (“C.O.”) at the Jail
while Mr. Ball was there. (Doc. # 183-8 at 9). His
responsibilities were “to maintain security and enforce
order and discipline among inmates to ensure a safe jail
environment.” (Doc. # 183-8 at 9). Officer Brown is
familiar with Mr. Ball. (Doc. # 183-8 at 9).
Ball states that Jail personnel gave him a gown typically
given to people on suicide watch, but that on December 9,
2014, Officer Brown took it from Mr. Ball and gave it to
someone else, leaving Mr. Ball naked. (Doc. # 183-1 at
14(56)-15(57), 19(75-76); Doc. # 191 at 17). In his answers
to Mr. Ball's First Interrogatories, Officer Brown states
that he does not recall whether he confiscated Mr. Ball's
gown on December 9, 2014. (Doc. # 141-1 at 10).Officer Davis
agrees that while Mr. Ball was on suicide watch, Jail
personnel should have given Mr. Ball a gown to wear. (Doc. #
163-1 at 24).
Verlyne Moten was a sergeant at the Jail while Mr. Ball was
there. (Doc. # 183-8 at 6). Her responsibilities included
supervising and coordinating the correctional officers and
prisoners at the Jail. (Doc. # 183-8 at 6). Officer Moten
also maintained security and enforced order and discipline to
ensure a safe jail environment. (Doc. # 183-8 at 6). Officer
Davis was Officer Moten's supervisor. (Doc. # 183-8 at
6). Officer Moten says she is not familiar with Mr. Ball.
(Doc. # 183-8 at 7). In her answers to Mr. Ball's First
Interrogatories, Officer Moten states that she “had no
contact with Mr. Ball.” (Doc. # 141-1 at 15).
Mr. Ball testified in his deposition that he had direct
conversations with Officers Moten and Brown, the nature and
substance of those conversations is not in the Rule 56
record. (Doc. # 183-1 at 19(74)).
The Altercation with Defendant Singleton
Lawrence Singleton was a C.O. at the Jail while Mr. Ball was
there. (Doc. # 163-1 at 2; Doc. # 183-8 at 21). Officer Moten
was Officer Singleton's supervisor. (Doc. # 163 at 3). As
a C.O., Officer Singleton is responsible for maintaining
security and enforcing order and discipline among inmates to
ensure a safe jail environment. (Doc. # 183-8 at 21). Mr.
Ball testified that on December 10, 2014, Officer Singleton
entered Mr. Ball's cell and “assaulted [him] and
used force that wasn't warranted.” (Doc. # 183-1 at
Ball admitted in his deposition that he did not know why
Officer Singleton came to the cell on that date. (Doc. #
183-1 at 21(84) (“I don't know why he was
there.”), 22(85) (“I don't know what his
purpose for entering my cell [was].”)). Officer
Singleton explains that he came to get Mr. Ball because
either Mr. Ball asked to see the nurse, or the nurse asked to
see Mr. Ball- Officer Singleton could not remember which.
(Doc. # 163-1 at 3). Officer Singleton states in his
Mr. Ball needed to see the nurse but was naked. He had been
given a suicide gown which is made o[f] paper or some other
easily torn material but he had taken or torn [it off] and
was completely naked. I opened the cell to give him a regular
In order to see the nurse, Mr. Ball needed to get dressed as
he was naked at the time. I gave Mr. Ball a regular uniform.
(Doc. # 183-8 at 21-22; see also, Doc. # 163-1 at
Ball refused to dress himself in the uniform Officer
Singleton gave him. (Doc. # 163-1 at 4; Doc. # 183-8 at 22;
Doc. # 191 at 8). Mr. Ball says that he refused the uniform
because Officer Singleton did not also give him shoes, and
because it was inappropriate for him to have a regular
uniform, as opposed to a gown, inside the suicide observation
unit. (Doc. # 191 at 8).
Ball testified that Officer Singleton then “came with
profanity and things that was improper [sic].” (Doc. #
183-1 at 22(85)). In his declaration, Mr. Ball clarifies that
Officer Singleton entered his cell and attempted to force
him, physically, to put on the uniform. (Doc. # 191 at 9).
Officer Singleton pushed Mr. Ball against the cell wall and
then placed his large steel cell key against Mr. Ball's
throat and choked Mr. Ball. (Doc. # 191 at 8, 9). Mr. Ball
also asserts that Officer Singleton punched him in the head
twice. (Doc. # 191 at 9). Mr. Ball then “backed
[Officer Singleton] out of [the] cell and held [Officer
Singleton] until supervision arrived.” (Doc. # 191 at
9). Mr. Ball suffered “excruciating pain and
abrasions” from this incident, and went to the UAB
emergency room for treatment. (Doc. # 191 at
December 10, 2014, entry in Mr. Ball's Jail medical
record reflects that on that date Mr. Ball had an
“altercation with [an] officer, ” and noted that
Mr. Ball had a “red area on the [right] side of [his]
chest.” (Doc. # 191 at 28). Mr. Ball also complained of
chest pain. (Doc. # 191 at 28). The note reflects that Mr.
Ball was “sent to [the] hospital for evaluation,
” and later “[returned] from the hospital [with a
diagnosis] of superficial abrasion” and a normal EKG.
(Doc. # 191 at 28). Officer Singleton did not initiate any
disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Ball as a result of Mr.
Ball refusing to comply with his orders (Doc. # 163-1 at 4),
and there are no records of any other disciplinary
proceedings which arose out of this incident.
Ball contends that there is an “administrative policy,
regulation, or [standard operating procedure (SOP)”]
for cell extraction which Singleton did not follow, and that
Officer Moten failed to train Officer Singleton to follow.
(Doc. # 191 at 9). The record contains no evidence of this
policy and/or procedure, and Officer Singleton is “not
familiar with” such a policy. (Doc. # 163-1 at3, 4).
Mr. Ball explained: “I feel that any contact whatsoever
from any correctional officer was improper because I was
under psychiatric, you know, treatment.” (Doc. # 183-1
at 22(85)). He continued:
[W]hat I'm saying is Singleton -- it had to be for no
reason -- I mean, no proper reason due to the fact that I was
under psychiatric care. Then correctional officers
shouldn't have had any interaction with me in any shape,
form or fashion.
So [I'm] saying that any force that was used was
excessive because he should not have even been in my cell at
all. . . . Unless the doctor told him to come in there.
(Doc. # 183-1 at 22(87)). Mr. Ball believes that because he
was under psychiatric care, Officer Singleton did not have
any authority or right to come into his cell, and that
Officer Singleton should have gotten the permission of the
medical staff before doing so. (Doc. # 183-1 at 23(89, 90)).
According to Mr. Ball, such a policy applied to all
correction officers in the Jail. (Doc. # 183-1 at 23(89-90)).
Mr. Ball propounded the following interrogatory to Officer
Davis: “During Nov. 2014 thru Jan. 6, 2015, did you
require subordinates to follow the cell extraction Policy
Regulation or S.O.P. at said Jail?” (Doc. # 159 at 5;
Doc. # 163-1 at 23). Officer Davis answered:
“Regardless of the date, personnel are required at hire
to follow policy.” (Doc. # 163-1 at 23).
Norman Huggins, a physician and psychiatrist, treated Mr.
Ball at the Jail. On December 11, 2014, Dr. Huggins noted
that Mr. Ball “poses an imminent danger to [him]self
and others due to impaired judgment and delusional
beliefs.” (Doc. # 191 at 29). Dr. Huggins also noted
that he “will file petition for involuntary commitment
due to depression, paranoia, delusional beliefs, and
agitation.” (Doc. # 191 at 30). Defendant Deirdre
Daniels was a social worker at the Jail during Mr. Ball's
incarceration. (Doc. # 183-8 at 12; Doc. # 163-1 at
10). Her responsibilities included
“prepar[ing] petitions upon recommendation from the
[d]octor for all prisoners at the Birmingham City
Jail.” (Doc. # 183-8 at 12; see also, Doc. #
163-1 at 11). On December 16, 2014, Dr. Huggins wrote the
following in Mr. Ball's medical record: “social
worker please notify detainee of status of petition.”
(Doc. # 191 at 31). That same date, Ms. Daniels filed the
petition. (Doc. # 191 at 36; see also, Doc. # 163-1
at 10; Doc. # 141-1 at 6). On January 7, 2015, the
probate judge issued a notice to Mr. Ball stating that Ms.
Daniels had filed the involuntary commitment proceedings, and
informing Mr. Ball of the January 16, 2015, hearing date.
(Doc. # 191 at 36). On January 5, 2015, two days before the
probate judge issued the notice to Mr. Ball, Trinity Hospital
admitted Mr. Ball “under a probate court petition for
assessment of symptoms of psychosis and agitation.”
(Doc. # 183-1 at 12(46, 47); Doc. # 191 at 34). In her
affidavit, Daniels states:
Upon receipt of documentation and the [d]octor[']s orders
dated December 11, 2014, I filed a Petition for Involuntary
Commitments [sic] in Jefferson County Probate Court in a
timely manner. Once notified by Jefferson County Probate
Court that the Judge approved the Petition and a bed was
available, Mr. Ball was transported to the hospital.
(Doc. # 183-8 at 13). Because Mr. Ball stayed at Trinity
Hospital for seven or eight days (Doc. # 183-1 at 12(49)), he
was released from Trinity prior to his hearing date. No.
order committing Mr. Ball appears in the record, and it is
unclear whether there was a hearing and/or what became of
Mr. Ball's Prescribed Dietary Needs
at the Jail, Mr. Ball could not take his medications without
food because they upset his stomach. (Doc. # 191 at 15). On
November 24, 2014, Dr. Huggins ordered staff to give Mr. Ball
snacks with his medication. (Doc. # 191 at 25). Dr. Huggins
followed up with Mr. Ball on December 1, 2014, and noted that
Mr. Ball had lost 8 pounds over the previous three weeks, and
that Mr. Ball “feels like he's being
starved.” (Doc. # 191 at 26). It is undisputed that Dr.
Huggins ordered the Jail staff to give Mr. Ball “double
portions with meals.” (Doc. # 191 at 26; see
also, Doc. # 183-1 at 17(66)). Dr. Huggins also noted
that the Jail staff were not giving Mr. Ball snacks with his
medications as ordered, and that Mr. Ball could not take his
medications without a snack because they upset his stomach.
(Doc. # 191 at 26). Dr. Huggins explained that “the
intent of granting snacks with meds is to have food on his
stomach prior to taking meds.” (Doc. # 191 at 26-27).
On December 16, 2014, Dr. Huggins saw Mr. Ball again and
noted: “Nurse reports [Mr. Ball] refuses to take 4:00
a.m. med[ications] without snack. Snacks are not given in
a.m.” (Doc. # 191 at 31).
Emantic Bradford was the Chief Steward or Cook while Mr. Ball
was at the Jail. (Doc. # 141-1 at 2; 163-1 at 15; Doc. #
183-8 at 17; Doc. # 191 at 39). It was Mr. Bradford's
responsibility to determine whether Mr. Ball had special
dietary needs while Mr. Ball was there. (Doc. # 141-1 at 3;
Doc. # 163-1 at 15-16; Doc. # 191 at 40).
Davis agrees that “[s]tewards are required to follow
doctor's orders.” (Doc. # 163-1 at 23). Mr. Ball
says he spoke to Officer Davis “on numerous
occasions” while he was incarcerated. (Doc. # 183-1 at