United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Karen Denise Coleman brought this action under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of
a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social
Security (“the Commissioner”) denying her
application for supplemental security income
(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. Upon
consideration of the parties' briefs (Docs. 14, 17) and
those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 12)
(hereinafter cited as “(R. [page number(s) in
lower-right corner of transcript])”) relevant to the
issues raised, and with the benefit of oral argument held
November 27, 2018, the Court finds that the
Commissioner's final decision is due to be
AFFIRMED under § 1383(c)(3) and
sentence four of § 405(g).
March 20, 2015, Coleman filed a Title XVI application for
supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning
November 27, 2013. After her application was initially denied
on August 11, 2015, Coleman requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) with the
SSA's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. A
hearing was held with an ALJ on February 13, 2017. On May 1,
2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Coleman's
applications, finding her not disabled under the Social
Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See
Commissioner's decision on Coleman's application
became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of
Disability Adjudication and Review denied her request for
review of the ALJ's decision on March 5, 2018. Coleman
subsequently filed this action under § 405(g) and §
1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the Commissioner's
final decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3)
(“The final determination of the Commissioner of Social
Security after a hearing [for SSI benefits] shall be subject
to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this
title to the same extent as the Commissioner's final
determinations under section 405 of this title.”); 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a
hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount
in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a
civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to
him of notice of such decision or within such further time as
the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.”);
Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d
1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The settled law of this
Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of
section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals
Standards of Review
Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether
the Commissioner's decision is ‘ “supported
by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”' ”
Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176,
1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))).
However, the Court “ ‘may not decide the facts
anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for
that of the [Commissioner].' ” Id.
(quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240
n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th
Cir. 1983))). “‘Even if the evidence
preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual
findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is
supported by substantial evidence.' ”
Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin
v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act
as automatons. [The Court] must scrutinize the record as a
whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence[.]”
Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and
quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748
F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“We are
neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp
the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our
function is to ensure that the decision was based on a
reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was
carefully considered in light of all the relevant
facts.”). “In determining whether substantial
evidence exists, [a court] must…tak[e] into account
evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the
[Commissioner's] decision.” Chester v.
Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).
the “substantial evidence” “standard of
review applies only to findings of fact. No. similar
presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]'s
conclusions of law, including determination of the proper
standards to be applied in reviewing claims.”
MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir.
1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins
v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982)
(“Our standard of review for appeals from the
administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates
that ‘(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact,
if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive
....' 42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) … As is plain from the
statutory language, this deferential standard of review is
applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary,
and it is well established that no similar presumption of
validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law,
including determination of the proper standards to be applied
in reviewing claims.” (some quotation marks omitted)).
This Court “conduct[s] ‘an exacting
examination' of these factors.” Miles v.
Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520,
1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). “‘The
[Commissioner]'s failure to apply the correct law or to
provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for
determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted
mandates reversal.'” Ingram, 496 F.3d at
1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143,
1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir.
courts “review the Commissioner's factual findings
with deference and the Commissioner's legal conclusions
with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245
F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de
novo the legal principles upon which the
Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v.
Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we
review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir.
Eligibility for DIB and SSI requires that the claimant be
disabled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E),
1382(a)(1)-(2). A claimant is disabled if she is unable
“to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A).
Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597
Fed.Appx. 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step,
sequential evaluation process used to determine whether a
claimant is disabled: (1) whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the
claimant has a severe impairment or combination of
impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the
severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of
Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) assessment, whether the claimant can
perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the
impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of
jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform
given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v);
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).
regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to
demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to
perform past relevant work.” Moore, 405 F.3d
at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090,
1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). “In determining whether the
claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must
consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or
clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians;
(3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant's age,
education, and work history.” Jones v. Bowen,
810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing
Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir.
1983) (per curiam)). “These factors must be considered
both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a
single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.”
Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).
Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a
claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability
and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes
the Commissioner's burden, at Step Five, to prove that
the claimant is capable-given his or her age, education, and
work history-of engaging in another kind of substantial
gainful employment that exists in the national economy.
Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir.
1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th
Cir. 1985). Finally, although the “claimant bears the
burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or]
her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security
has an obligation to develop a full and fair record.”
Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987).
See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276
(11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“It is well-established
that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair
record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of
proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is
responsible for producing evidence in support of his
claim.” (citations omitted)). “This is an onerous
task, as the ALJ ...