United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
WILLIAM E. CASSADY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Darrell Parker (“Petitioner” or
“Parker”), who proceeds pro se, has
filed a petition that seeks habeas corpus relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (“2254 Petition”). Doc. 1. The
2254 Petition, which has been fully briefed and is ripe for
adjudication (Docs. 1 & 14), was referred to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge for issuance of a report and
recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Rule 72,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter,
“FRCP” followed by the Rule number); and S.D.
Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(R). Based upon a thorough review of the
2254 Petition (Doc. 1) and the briefs and supporting
materials, (Docs. 1, 14, & 23), the undersigned finds an
evidentiary hearing is not warranted and the 2254 Petition is due
to be denied as moot. Accordingly, it is recommended
Parker's 2254 Petition be denied as moot and judgment be
entered in favor of Respondent and against Petitioner, and if
Parker seeks the issuance of a certificate of appealability,
his request be denied along with any request to appeal in
29, 1999, Parker was convicted of two (2) charges of unlawful
distribution of a controlled substance and was sentenced to
two (2) twenty-year (20) sentences by the Baldwin County
Circuit Court. Doc. 14-10. Parker was paroled on March 17,
2015. Id. On August 17, 2015, Parker's parole
officer prepared a Report of Parole Violation, in which he
brought two (2) charges against Parker for (1) violation of
Life Tech Rule 18 - positive drug and alcohol tests and (2)
violation of Life Tech Rule 32 - resident's conduct or
behavior results in a safety, security, or health hazard.
Id. at 2-3. Parker was arrested on August 15, 2015
(id. at 3), and was given notice on August 19, 2015,
of his parole court hearing, which was scheduled for August
24, 2015 (Doc. 14-11). Three witnesses were called at the
hearing, including Parker. Doc. 14-12, at 2. The Parole Board
found there was insufficient evidence to support Parker's
first charge based on the testimony that a drug test was not
administered, but found him guilty of his second charge based
on the testimony that he was not acting as himself and was
aggressive. Id. at 2-5. Based on the Parole
Board's findings, Parker's parole was revoked on
September 30, 2015. Doc. 14-13.
October 21, 2015, Parker filed his Writ of Certiorari in the
Circuit Court of Montgomery County, in which he challenged
the revocation of his parole by the Alabama Board of Pardons
and Paroles (the “Parole Board”). Doc. 14-1, at
5-9. The Parole Board filed its Motion for Summary Judgment
on April 17, 2016. Id. at 36-41. The Parole Board
summarized Parker's Writ of Certiorari to state a due
process violation claim based on his assertion that the
Parole Board's decision to revoke his probation was based
on insufficient evidence. Id. at 37. The Parole
Board argued Parker was afforded due process because he was
given notice of the hearing, and the charges against him, and
he was found guilty of one of his noticed charges based on
the testimony of an eyewitness, which was sufficient evidence
for the Parole Board's decision. Id. at 38-39.
The Circuit Court granted the Parole Board's Motion for
Summary Judgment and dismissed Parker's petition on April
20, 2016. Doc. 14-2, at 12. Parker filed his Notice of Appeal
on May 10, 2016. Id. at 40.
filed his appellate brief with the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals on July 28, 2016. Doc. 14-3. In his appellate brief,
Parker again argued his petition for a writ of certiorari was
improperly revoked because there was insufficient evidence.
See id. The Parole Board filed its response brief on
August 29, 2016 (Doc. 14-4), and the Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment (Doc.
14-5). Parker's Application for Rehearing was overruled
by the Court of Criminal Appeals on November 18, 2016 (Doc.
14-6), and a Certificate of Judgment was issued on December
7, 2016 (Doc. 14-7).
filed his instant 2254 Petition on June 6, 2017, in which he
alleges violations of his due process rights, Sixth and
Eighth Amendment rights, and discrimination, which are all
based on his claim that his parole was improperly revoked.
Doc. 1. Although Parker named many individuals as respondents
to his 2254 Petition (see Doc. 1), the Court
corrected his petition to reflect Warden Guy Noe
(“Respondent” or “Noe”) is the
properly named respondent (see Doc. 3, at 1 n.1).
Respondent filed his Answer and Special Report on November
16, 2017 (Doc. 14), after the Court granted his motions for
extension of time (see Docs. 8, 9, 12, & 13).
February 20, 2018, Parker filed a notice with the Court that
his address had changed and he was released on parole. Doc.
16. On September 13, 2018, the Court issued an order, based
on Parker's notice, for him to inform the Court whether
he wanted to pursue this action and, if he did, why this
action is not moot since he was released on parole. Doc. 21.
Parker responded to the Court's order he wanted to
continue this action because he was wronged by witnesses at
his parole revocation hearing. Doc. 23.
III of the Constitution, known as the case and controversies
limitation, prevents federal courts from deciding moot
questions because the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Coral
Springs St. Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d
1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2004). Mootness can occur due to a
change in circumstances or a change in law. Id. at
1328. A case is also moot when the issue presented is no
longer live, the parties lack a legally cognizable interest
in its outcome, or a decision could no longer provide
meaningful relief to a party. Troiano v. Supervisor of
Elections in Palm Beach Cty., Fla., 382 F.3d 1276, 1282
(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273
F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 2001)). “‘Th[e]
case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages
of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate . . . .
The parties must continue to have a “personal stake in
the outcome” of the lawsuit.'” Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 983, 140 L.Ed.2d 43
(1998) (quoting Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494
U.S. 472, 477-78, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 1254, 108 L.Ed.2d 400
(1990)). Dismissal is not discretionary but “‘is
required because mootness is jurisdictional.'”
Troiano, 382 F.3d at 1282 (quoting Al
Najjar, 273 F.3d at 1336) . “Any decision
on the merits of a moot case or issue would be an
impermissible advisory opinion.” Id.
a habeas petition presents a case or controversy hinges on
whether the petitioner suffers “collateral
consequences” as a result of the conviction he
challenges. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7, 118 S.Ct. at
An incarcerated convict's (or a parolee's) challenge
to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the
case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration
(or the restriction imposed by the terms of the parole)
constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and
redressable by invalidation of the conviction. Once the
convict's sentence has expired, however, some concrete
and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration
or parole-some “collateral consequence” of the
conviction-must exist if the suit is to be maintained.
See, e.g., Carafas [v. LaVallee,
391 U.S. 234');">391 U.S. 234, ] 237-38, 88 S.Ct. [1556, ] 1559-60[, 20
L.Ed.2d 554 (1968)].
Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7, 118 S.Ct. at 983. There is
no presumption of collateral consequences that result from a
parole revocation; it is for the petitioner to demonstrate