United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
ORDER
WILLIAM H. STEELE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
These
matters come before the Court on defendant Aaron Steven
Wright's “Motion for Specific Performance of
Judgment and Commitment” (doc. 31 in 15-0125, doc. 40
in 16-0066). Wright, a federal inmate housed at FCI
Greenville in Greenville, Illinois, was sentenced by this
Court on June 28, 2018 to a term of imprisonment of 24 months
on revocation of supervised release term in these two
matters. The Judgment in a Criminal Case entered by the
undersigned on July 6, 2018, provided in part as follows:
“The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of
the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a
total term of 24 MONTHS in case 15-00125-WS and 16-00066-WS;
said terms to run concurrently; defendant is to get credit
for time served.” (Doc. 27 in 15-0125, at 2; doc. 36 in
16-0066, at 2.)
In his
current Motion, Wright challenges the Bureau of Prisons'
computation of sentence credits relating to that Judgment.
Specifically, the BOP denied his request for prior custody
credit for time spent in state custody, which the BOP
construed as a request for nunc pro tunc or
retroactive designation. In a letter to Wright dated May 31,
2019, the BOP explained its position that Wright is
“not eligible for a retroactive designation”
because the state sentences were imposed prior to the federal
sentence, and “[his] federal Judgment in a Criminal
Case does not state whether [his] federal sentence is to be
served concurrently with or consecutively to [his]
undischarged state sentences imposed on June 14, 2018,
” such that 18 U.S.C. § 3584 requires the federal
sentence to be served consecutively. Wright now petitions
this Court for relief from the BOP's determination, and
seeks an order compelling the BOP to grant him nunc pro
tunc designation for the time he previously spent in
state custody.
Wright's
Motion is procedurally defective in two critical respects.
Here's why: It is well settled that, as a general
proposition, “[t]he Attorney General through the BOP,
and not the district courts, is authorized, under 18 U.S.C.
3585(b), to compute sentence credit awards after
sentencing.” Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884, 889
(11th Cir. 1995). The Eleventh Circuit has
summarized applicable law and procedure for defendants in
Wright's position in the following terms:
“In construing 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), the Supreme
Court has held that the Attorney General through the Bureau
of Prisons, as opposed to the district courts, is authorized
to compute sentence credit awards after sentencing. …
As a result, a federal prisoner dissatisfied with computation
of his sentence must pursue the administrative remedy
available through the federal prison system before seeking
judicial review of his sentence. … A claim for credit
for time served is brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after
the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”
United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 987, 990
(11th Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).[1] Moreover, it is black-letter law that
ordinarily § 2241 proceedings must be pursued in the
district where the petitioner is being confined, not the
district where sentencing occurred. See, e.g., Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 159
L.Ed.2d 513 (2004) (“The plain language of the habeas
statute thus confirms the general rule that for core habeas
petitions challenging present physical confinement,
jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of
confinement.”); Diaz v. United States, 580
Fed.Appx. 716, 717 (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2014)
(“A § 2241 petition by a federal prisoner must be
brought in the district where the inmate is
incarcerated.”); Garcia v. Warden, 470
Fed.Appx. 735, 736 (11th Cir. Mar. 27, 2012) (as a
general proposition, “jurisdiction for § 2241
petitions lies only in the district of confinement”).
What
does all of this mean for Wright? The BOP letter dated May
31, 2019 and attached to his Motion confirms that Wright has
not exhausted his administrative remedies with the BOP to
date; indeed, that letter expressly notified him, “If
you are not satisfied with this response, you may utilize the
administrative remedy process.” There is no indication
that Wright has done so; however, he cannot skip that step
and proceed directly to § 2241 review in federal court
under the circumstances presented here. Moreover, because he
is confined in federal prison in Bond County, Illinois, any
§ 2241 petition that Wright submits after exhausting his
administrative remedies with the BOP would properly be
directed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Illinois (his district of incarceration), rather than this
District Court.
For all
of the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion for Specific
Performance of Judgment and Commitment is
denied, without prejudice to Wright's
ability to renew such a motion in an appropriate court at an
appropriate time.
DONE
and ORDERED.
---------
Notes:
[1] Subsequent decisions have made clear
that the exhaustion prerequisite for § 2241 motions is
not jurisdictional. See, e.g., Santiago-Lugo v.
Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 475 n.5 (11thCir. 2015)
(“To the extent that other published decisions of this
Circuit have held or stated that exhaustion is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to § 2241 ...